

233

The Modern Schoolman

A Quarterly Journal of Philosophy

VOLUME XXVIII

November 1950 to May 1951

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY

THE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE AND THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

SAINT LOUIS

**ANDOVER-HARVARD
THEOLOGICAL LIBRARY
CAMBRIDGE, MASS.**

H79, 2'78
~~Nov. 9, 1951~~

Editor: George P. Klubertanz, S.J.

Managing Editor: Charles W. Mulligan, S.J.

Associate Editors

James A. McWilliams, S.J.
Vernon J. Bourke
James Collins

William L. Wade, S.J.
Thomas E. Davitt, S.J.
Robert J. Henle, S.J.

Corresponding Editors

Belgium and France: Joseph de Finance, S.J., Vals, Le Puy en Velay,
Haute-Loire

Latin America: Dr. Oswaldo Robles, Mexico City

The British Isles: The Reverend D. J. B. Hawkins, Esher, Surrey,
England

Period.

1197.5
VI 28

Business Manager: John W. Padberg, S.J.

Modern

Permission is required to reprint an article or part of an article.

THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN is published on the first of November, January, March, and May. The subscription price is \$3.00 a year. Single copies are \$1.00 each. The price for foreign subscriptions is \$3.20 a year.

Address all communications to:

The Editor or the Business Manager

THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

St. Louis University, St. Louis 3, Missouri

GILES OF ROME, AUDITOR AND CRITIC OF ST. THOMAS

Peter E. Nash, S.J.

In the fifteenth century Denis the Carthusian was shocked by the apparent delight with which Giles of Rome in his *Commentary on the First Book of the Sentences*, written only three years after St. Thomas Aquinas's death, criticized his old master.¹ In recent years Giles's criticisms have received careful attention. In 1930 Father Edgar Hocdez, S.J., commented on a manuscript of the Vatican Library whose unknown author takes up the cudgels on behalf of St. Thomas, refuting fifty-two attacks by Giles.² Gerardo Bruni later edited this

¹Dionysius Cartusianus, *In I Sent.*, 32, a. 1; Vol. XX of *Opera Omnia* (Tournai), p. 342: "In his quoque contradicit magistro suo Thomae . . ." Giles of Rome, Aegidius Romanus, sometimes mistakenly called a Colonna, was born about 1243. He joined the Hermits of St. Augustine when fourteen. In 1260 he went to the new Augustinian house of studies in Paris, receiving his bachelor of arts in 1263 and his master of arts in 1266. While preparing for the licentiate in theology he was a pupil of St. Thomas Aquinas, probably from 1269 to 1272. About 1275 he became a *Baccalaureus Sententiarius*; and he wrote his *Commentary on the First Book of Sentences* about 1277. He refused to retract certain Aristotelian propositions, identical with, or similar to, those condemned by Bishop Tempier in 1277, and left Paris for six years, returning only after the intervention of Pope Honorius IV. In the seven years after his return he became one of the best-known teachers in Paris, "qui modo melior de tota villa in omnibus reputatur" (Heinrich Denifle and Emile Chatelain, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, II, 510, n. 539). In 1287 he was proclaimed official master of the Order. The decree almost credited him with infallibility, since it committed the Order to teach not only what he had taught, but all he might teach (*ibid.*, p. 12, n. 542). He became general in 1292, archbishop of Bourges in 1295, and died in 1316. For further details of his life see Pierre Mandonnet, O.P., "La Carrière Scolaire de Gilles de Rome," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, IV (1910), 480-99; Gerardo Bruni, "Quadro Cronologico della Opera di Egidio Romano: Saggio," *Una Inedita 'Quaestio de Natura Universalis' di Egidio Romano* (Naples, 1935) (the table is valuable though the "Quaestio" is spurious); Etienne Gilson, *La Philosophie au moyen âge* (2d ed.; Paris, 1947), pp. 546-48; Aubrey Gwynn, S.J., *The English Austin Friars in the Time of Wyclif* (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1940), pp. 35 ff.

²Edgar Hocdez, S.J., "Gilles de Rome et Saint Thomas," *Mélanges Mandonnet*, I (1930) 385-409. An appendix gives the contents of the manuscript. It is pointed out that Denis the Carthusian noted all but five of these attacks.

manuscript under the title *Incerti Auctoris Impugnationes Contra Aegidium Romanum Contradicentem Thomae super Primum Sententiarum*.³ Another list of seventy-three criticisms, mostly on trinitarian speculation, contained in a manuscript of Magdalen College, Oxford, has been noted by Bruni.⁴ It coincides with the former list in twenty-five points. Neither list is exhaustive.

Father Hocedez made a valuable contribution in showing that Giles's attitude continued in his later works, for instance, in the *Commentary on the Liber de Causis*, written in 1290.⁵ Calling attention to these numerous and sustained criticisms has helped break down an old legend, which, from the sixteenth century to as late as 1925, portrayed Giles as an authentic and loyal disciple of St. Thomas.⁶

Giles's polemic repays close study. It sheds light on St. Thomas as a teacher: the Angelic Doctor was not one to browbeat his pupils into submission. But, more importantly, it confirms the presence of an intense intellectual ferment in the thirteenth century, for Giles's critique is governed by his own discovery of Proclus as the key to the assimilation (and baptism) of the new Aristotelianism; he was not attempting a restatement of St. Thomas's solution. This does not mean that Giles was not influenced by St. Thomas or that many of his leading ideas are not Thomist, at least in formulation—for example, the "real distinction" between *esse* and *quod est*, unicity of form, God's knowledge of individuals, and identity of the divine ideas with God. In fact, Father Hocedez is willing to class Giles as a Thomist because of the master theses adopted, while granting him an indepen-

³Vatican, 1942 [*Bibliotheca Augustiniana Medii Aevi, Series I, Textus Theologici et Philosophici, I*].

⁴Codex Oxfordiensis Magdalen College 217 (saec. xiv), fol. 367-84v; cf. Bruni, "Egidio Romano e la sua polemica antitomista," *Rivista di Filosofia neoscolastica*, XXVI (1934), 239-51. Bruni has also shown that Giles attacked St. Thomas as early as 1273-75 in the *De Plurificatione Intellectus*, ("Egidio Romano Antiberroista," *Sophia*, I [1933] 208-19. Josef Koch (in *Giles of Rome, Erroris Philosophorum*, trans. John C. Ried [Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1944], p. lvi) says that the position that Giles's polemical discussions are largely against St. Thomas "can without effort be demonstrated for the commentaries on Aristotelian treatises. From his very first commentary, which was on the *De generatione et corruptione* [c. 1273-74], Giles opposes many interpretations which Thomas had previously given."

⁵Hocedez, *op. cit.*, pp. 389-93.

⁶Coriolano's mistaken attribution (1481) to Giles of the authorship of the *Correctorium Corruptorii 'Quare'* (ed. P. Glorieux, Vol. IX of *Bibliothèque Thomiste*, ed. P. Mandonnet [26 vols.; Kain: *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, 1927]) seems to have been largely responsible for the growth of the legend. Cf. Koch, *loc. cit.*

dence of aim and spirit.⁷ He admits Proclus's influence, but evaluates it mainly as bolstering an imaginative interpretation by Giles of St. Thomas's doctrine of the "real distinction,"⁸ so that any Neoplatonism in Giles would have to be considered as an interpolation into a fundamentally Thomist position.

But the very criticisms themselves point to a more radical divergence between master and pupil. It is the purpose of this paper to show that Giles must have heard and read St. Thomas in the light of a different synthesis. Giles was an auditor, but no disciple. His leading ideas may sound Thomist, but their meaning is not. I shall consider three criticisms which bring us to the heart of Giles's metaphysics, which is his doctrine of *esse* in the constitution of the individual.

I. ESSENCE AND ESSE IN GOD: THE DE POTENTIA

The first criticism to be considered is in an article dealing with the problem of composition in God.⁹ It is valuable for showing that Giles sometimes completely misunderstood the argument he criticizes; here, at least, it seems that Giles missed the point precisely because of his own different *point de départ*. There is no better instance of what Professor Gilson has said of Giles: "... il fut un de ces disciples qui pensent que le maître avait raison, mais qu'ils sont les premiers à savoir pourquoi."¹⁰

Without telling us that St. Thomas is the author of the opinion which he summarizes, Giles gives us a résumé of what is unmistak-

⁷Hocedez, *op. cit.*, p. 402: "Nous conclurons donc que le Père Mandonnet avait vu juste lorsqu'il écrivait: 'on doit, sans forcer la note, le ranger parmi les Thomistes, non pas dans ce sens qu'il faille passer par lui pour aller au fond de la pensée de Thomas d'Aquin, mais en ce sens [nous ajouteron] volontiers pour préciser seulement' qu'il a adopté les grandes thèses du docteur dominicain". Pour nous qui classons les philosophes d'après les grandes idées directrices, nous pouvons le nommer thomiste: mais d'intention Gilles fut un indépendant; et il appurut comme tel à ses contemporains."

⁸So as to conceive this distinction as being *inter rem et rem*; see Giles of Rome, *Theorematum de esse et essentia*, ed. Edgar Hocedez, S.J., (Louvain: Museum Lessianum [Section Philosophique, No. 12], 1930), Introd., sec. VII, "Gilles de Rome et Saint Thomas," p. (64): "Malgré les atténuations et les correctifs qu'il apporte, il n'a pu s'empêcher de l'*imaginer*, comme deux 'choses', qui s'ajoutent ou se séparent, et ainsi il a préparé la conception suarézienne de la distinction réelle."

⁹Giles, *In I Sent.*, 8, pars 2, prin. 1, q. 2, "Utrum in deo sit compositio esse et essentiae" (*Primus Egidii . . . primus sententiarum correctus reverendo magistro Augustino Montifalciano . . . Venetiis [1521]*, fol. 52 v). Harvard Library has a copy of this edition.

¹⁰E. Gilson, *La Philosophie au moyen âge*, p. 548.

ably St. Thomas's argument in the *Quaestio Disputata de Potentia*, 7. 2 for the absence in God of any composition of essence and *esse*.¹¹ Despite omissions and changes and inversions the identification of

¹¹This criticism is noted by Denis the Carthusian (*In I Sent.*, 8, q. 5, [*Opera*, XIX, 389-90]) but by neither of the manuscript lists. Denis was of the opinion that the position is "de mente Thomae in prima parte Summae" and is accurately stated: "...conveniens est et vera, et bene concludit propositum." Hocedez shows that Giles is really attacking the *De Potentia*; see *Theoremata*, Introd., sec. VIII, "Influences Néoplatoniciennes," p. (68). St. Thomas's argument runs as follows: "Respondeo dicendum, quod in Deo non est aliud esse et sua substantia. Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est, quod cum aliquae causae effectus diversos producentes communicant in uno effectu, praeter diversos effectus oportet quod illud commune producant ex virtute alicujus superioris causae cuius illud est proprius effectus. Et hoc ideo, quia cum proprius effectus producatur ab aliqua causa secundum suam propriam naturam vel formam, diversae causae habentes diversas naturas et formas oportet quod habeant proprios effectus diversos. Unde si in aliquo uno effectu convenient, ille non est proprius alicujus earum, sed alicujus superioris, in cuius virtute agunt; sicut patet quod diversa complexionata convenient in calefaciendo, ut piper et zinziber, et similia, quamvis unumquodque eorum habeat suum proprium effectum diversum ab effectu alterius. Unde effectum communem oportet reducere in propriam causam cuius sit proprius, scilicet in ignem . . . Omnes autem causae creatae communicant in uno effectu qui est esse, licet singulae proprios effectus habeant, in quibus distinguuntur. Calor enim facit calidum esse, et aedificator facit domum esse. Convenient ergo in hoc quod causant esse, sed differunt in hoc quod ignis causat ignem, et aedificator causat domum. Oportet ergo esse aliquam causam superiorem omnibus cuius virtute omnia causant esse, et ejus esse sit proprius effectus. Et haec causa est Deus. Proprius autem effectus cuiuslibet causae procedit ab ipsa secundum similitudinem suae naturae. Oportet ergo quod hoc quod est esse, sit substantia vel natura Dei. Et propter hoc dicitur in lib. de Causis (prop. IX [melius prop. 4, ed. Bardenhower, p. 166, line 19]), quod intelligentia non dat esse nisi in quantum est divina, et quod primus effectus est esse, et non est ante ipsum creatum aliquid" (*De Pot.*, 7, 2 [ed. Marietti, I (1942) 223-24]). Giles summarizes thus: "Quidam sic probant esse dei non facere compositionem in deo, quia quando aliquis effectus convenit pluribus causis, oportet illum appropriari uni causae, sicut nos videmus quod piper et cinciber convenient in hoc effectu, quia utrumque calefacit. Necesse est ipsum calefacere reduci in causam unam ut in ignem ita quod proprium erit igni calefacere. Cum igitur videamus omnes causas communicare in dare esse, diversificari autem secundum diversa esse, quia quidam dant suis causatis esse hominem, quidam esse leonem, et sic de aliis. Igitur oportet aliquam causam esse cuius sit proprium causare esse, et ista causa est causa prima, quia oportet primum causatum esse a causa prima, et e contra. Huic sententiae videtur concordare Auctor de causis, qui in quarta propositione illius libri ait quod prima rerum creatarum est esse et non est ante ipsum creatum aliquid. Quia igitur esse est primum causatum, dei est dare esse tamquam primae causae, et quia proprium est deo dare esse, erit ipsum esse" (*In I Sent.*, 8, pars 2, prin. 1, q. 2, fol. 52 v.).

the passage is clear because of the identity of the main principle involved, the odd examples, and the reference to the *Liber de Causis*.

The main principle involved, as Giles understands it, is that an effect which belongs to several causes must be appropriated to one cause only. The example of pepper and ginger is adduced: both cause heat, so their action of heating must be attributable to one cause—namely, fire—since heating is proper to fire. St. Thomas uses the same principle, though he speaks rather of a *superior* cause and not of one cause, and has exactly the same example of pepper and ginger. Giles's summary then goes on to make the same application of the principle to the more general case of the giving of *esse* by all causes. He concludes, with St. Thomas, that *esse* must be the proper effect of some one cause.

And this is all that Giles sees in St. Thomas's argument, as though St. Thomas had held it as evident that God must be *ipsum esse* (and hence with no essence differing from his *esse*) just because it is proper to God to give *esse*. But Giles has completely omitted what is in reality the very heart of St. Thomas's reasoning. He has chosen to ignore the principle, clearly stated in the article in question, that a proper effect proceeds from its cause according to a likeness of the nature of the cause. This explains why diverse causes, having diverse natures and forms, have diverse proper effects. It also shows why the nature or substance of God is *esse*.

St. Thomas concluded his proof by affirming that this is really the reason why the author of the *Liber de Causis* said that an intelligence gave *esse* only in so far as it is divine, and that the first created effect is *esse*. Giles refers to this concordance.

Giles then calmly proceeds to criticize the above argument, as he has given it, on the grounds that the conclusion is unwarranted by the premises and that St. Thomas rests his case on the Platonic *Liber de Causis*.¹² The conclusion does not follow, because the reduction

¹²Ibid: "Sed iste modus dupliciter videre deficere. Primo in modo investigationis. Secundo in propositione supra quam se appodiat. Primum sic patet. Nam si effectus conveniens pluribus causis reducitur in causam unam quasi propriam, bene arguitur quod illud competit illi causae primo et per se, sed quod non faciat compositionem cum ea non habetur ex forma arguendi, nisi forte gratia materiae. Nam, si effectus caliditatis reducitur in ignem tamquam in causam propriam, bene habetur quod ignis fit calidus in fine caliditatis, ut scribitur II *Metaph.*, [Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, a, II, 993b25] ita quod calor per se et primo competit igni, sed quod non faciat compositionem in igne non est verum, cum non sit ipse calor. Ita est in proposito. Si esse reducitur in deum tamquam in causam propriam bene arguitur quod esse per se et primo competit deo, sed quod non faciat compositionem in eo per se loquendo et ex modo arguendi non habetur."

of a common effect to one cause does not necessarily entail absence of composition of that effect with the cause. Giles comes back to the example of heat. Its proper cause is fire. Heat belongs to fire *primo et per se*; but, as fire is not heat itself, it does not follow that there is no composition in fire. Hence, from the formal reasoning, it cannot be concluded that there is no composition of essence and *esse* in God. Of course the conclusion is unwarranted, if Giles chooses to ignore St. Thomas's key principle that a proper effect proceeds from its cause "according to the likeness of the cause's nature or form."

The question is, Why did Giles misunderstand St. Thomas here? Before attempting an answer, let us first consider Giles's criticism of St. Thomas for resting his case on the *Liber de Causis*.¹³ He admits that St. Thomas is correct in holding that the proposition "*prima rerum creatarum est esse*" may be interpreted in his favor; but he adds that had St. Thomas been aware of the original Platonic intent of the proposition he would have seen that it really contradicts his position. "For the *Liber de Causis*, which contains the proposition, originates from a book of Proclus, who was a disciple of Plato," as though St. Thomas had not been the first to point out the correct origin and character of the book.¹⁴ It is true that St. Thomas wrote the *De Potentia* before the appearance of William of Moerbeke's translation of Proclus's *Elementatio Theologica* in 1268 and so might be excused for not having realized its Platonic character.¹⁵ But Giles had no right to elevate the citation into a principle of interpretation instead of leaving it, as St. Thomas did, as matter for interpretation. And it was

¹³Ibid: "Rursum illa propositio super quam se appodian sic dicentes, licet posset trahi ad dictum intellectum, considerando tamen illius propositionis principium originale, non est pro eis quod dicitur, sed contra eos. Nam liber de Causis, ubi illa propositio scribitur, extractus fuit ex libro Procli, qui fuit discipulus Platonis. Plato autem posuit ordinem deorum secundum ordinem abstractorum, ita quod omnes dii dependebant a primo deo tamquam participantes ipso. Ordo autem abstractorum hic erat. Nam ens non dicebatur de omnibus, quia materia prima, et ea quae sunt penitus in potentia, non sunt entia. Sed unum et bonum dicebantur de omnibus, ita quod essentia unitatis et bonitatis erat deus primus, et quia post bonum et unum non est aliquid a deo commune sicut ens, ipsum esse erat primum non simpliciter, sed in genere creatorum. Et ideo cum dixisset prima res creatarum est esse, subdit et non est ante ipsum creatum aliud, ideo in commento dicitur quod post causam primam non est latius neque prius creatum ipso. Istam viam sectando deus non est esse, nec proprium ei esse, sed est super esse. Sed quia intentio nostra est loqui de esse, quod est in deo, et est ipse deus, auctoritas non est ad propositum."

¹⁴Cf. St. Thomas, *In Lib. de Causis*, lect. 1 (ed. Parma, XXI [1866], 718a).

¹⁵It is generally agreed that the *De Potentia* was written prior to 1268.

at least ungentlemanly of him not to note St. Thomas's commentary on the *Liber de Causis*, a commentary which he himself later criticized.¹⁶ It is possible, of course, that Giles, writing three years after St. Thomas's death, was not yet aware of St. Thomas's commentary written some seven years earlier. Giles proceeds to instruct St. Thomas in the literal meaning of the "prima rerum" principle. It means that God is not *esse* and that *esse* is not proper to him and that God is above *esse*. Unctuously Giles concludes that the "authority" is beside the point "because it is our intention to talk of the *esse* which is in God."

These observations are followed by an explanation of the thesis already used against St. Thomas that heat belongs to fire *primo et per se* without being identical with it. Fire acts only in virtue of the "supercelestial" body; hence it is not its own virtue or power of operation. But were fire the very first agent and were heat the principle of the participation in fire of all that was caused by fire, fire would be its own heat. This is true only in the case of the first cause through whose *esse* all things have *esse*.¹⁷

This explains why Giles considers that St. Thomas's argument is no stronger than the principle of the appropriation of common effects to one cause. What is lacking is a clear-cut participation theory. Only that which is absolutely the first cause, in which all things participate, can be *per se* and so be *ipsum esse*.

Father Hocedez cites this critique without pointing out the tendentiousness of the summary.¹⁸ His purpose is to show that Giles was well aware of Proclus. He cites a number of other passages which amply prove Proclus's influence, particularly on participation of *esse*, which led Giles to conceive it somewhat differently from St. Thomas.¹⁹ Giles conceived or imagined *esse* "somewhat in a Platonic fashion, as a sort of physical perfection which is multiplied (*hoc totum est*

¹⁶Giles wrote his *In Lib. de Causis* in 1290. He borrows many examples, divisions, and so on from St. Thomas's commentary.

¹⁷*In I Sent.*, 8, pars 2, prin. 1, q. 2, fol. 52v P: "Ideo notandum quod ut habitum est ea quae agunt in virtute alterius non sunt sua virtus. Unde ignis non est suus calor, quia agit in virtute supercaelestis corporis. Sed si ignis esset primum agens et calor esset illud cuius virtute omnia causata ab igne participarent igne ignis esset suus calor. Cum igitur omnia habeant esse per esse primi, iuxta illud Commentatoris in II *Metaph.* [cap.1., com.4, (Venice, apud Iuntas, 1574) fol.30r C] unum est igitur *per se* *ens* et *per se* *verum*, et omnia alia sunt entia et vera per *esse* et veritatem eius. Deus igitur erit ipsum *esse*, cum sit primum agens, et per eius *esse* omnia habeant esse."

¹⁸Hocedez, *Theoremata*, Introd., sec. VIII, "Influences Néoplatoniciennes," p. (68).

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. (73).

divisibile) and diversified by its reception in essence."²⁰ This betrays "at least a philosophical imagination, haunted by the separate Platonic forms."²¹ Hocedez's conclusion to his remarks on Neoplatonic influence is:

Our philosopher does not succeed, despite his sincere efforts and decided intention to fight Plato, in not imagining *esse* after the fashion of a separated form. By wanting to explain participation in Neoplatonic language, while denying the existence of separated forms, he has produced a system open to criticism. And we must conclude once more that his distinction *inter rem et rem* is suspect and deviates from the Thomist line.²²

What Hocedez says is true as far as it goes; but one would gather that Giles did not differ radically from St. Thomas in the meaning he gives to *esse*, except for the imagined reification. Yet there is a strong hint in the present critique of the *De Potentia* that Giles does not see eye to eye with St. Thomas on this fundamental point, a divergence which we shall see confirmed by a criticism of St. Thomas's explanation of God's knowledge of singulars (noted by Hocedez) and by a direct contradiction of St. Thomas's principle that recession from simplicity does not necessarily entail composition (noted neither by Hocedez nor by Bruni).

In the *De Potentia* article St. Thomas had said that created causes agree in making their effects exist. Heat makes a hot thing exist (*facit calidum esse*); a builder makes a house to be (*facit domum esse*). Yet it cannot be the proper effect of any created cause to give *esse*, to make anything *to be*, because the causes, having different natures or forms, must have different proper effects.²³

Giles understands this argument to mean that it is proper to any cause, differing by nature from another cause, to give a different *esse*. Created causes give formally diverse kinds of *esse*. Thus some causes (and here he twists St. Thomas's formula and changes his examples from the concrete to the specific) give human *esse*, others leonine *esse*: *quidam dant suis causatis esse hominem, quidam esse leonem.* St. Thomas is then made to say that there must be one cause, namely, God, to whom it is proper to give *esse*—not *esse hominem* or *esse leonem*, but simply *esse*.²⁴

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. (70).

²¹*Ibid.*, p. (71).

²²*Ibid.*, p. (74).

²³See n. 11.

²⁴See n. 11.

Here Giles has certainly widened the meaning of *esse*. It covers now not only the *esse* of the individual existent, but also the state of specific diversity. It is precisely the *esse* of the individual as such which God, as first cause, gives; it is adequately distinct from the specific *esse* given by any other cause and, being proper to God alone, adequately distinguishes him as a distinct cause.

One gets the impression that Giles understands St. Thomas solely from the standpoint of diversity. It looks as though the *esse*, given by God, marks off the individual as an individual from the specific nature. This would fit the participation theory, mentioned by Hocedez, according to which God creates by giving an *esse*, which is limited by its reception in diverse recipients, a theory in which diversity comes not from God but from the recipients.²⁵

However, the exact role of *esse* is not clear from the present criticism. It is necessary to examine a criticism of St. Thomas on the constitution of the individual existent. Such a criticism is to be found in the discussion of God's knowledge of singulars. All that can be said from the present passage is that Giles misconstrues St. Thomas and, in doing so, betrays a definitely non-Thomist approach to *esse*.

II. THE DETERMINANT OF PARTICULARITY

In the thirty-sixth distinction of his *Commentary on the First Sentences* Giles disagrees with St. Thomas, not on the fact of God's knowledge of singular material beings, but on the explanation of that knowledge.²⁶ He sides with St. Thomas against the denial of that knowledge by the "philosophers" (Averroes, Avicenna, Algazel, Moses Maimonides), whose opinions he refutes in St. Thomas's order. He then gives an accurate précis of St. Thomas's justification of his

²⁵ Compare Giles, *In Lib. de Causis*, prop. 24 (Venice, 1551), fol. 81v with St. Thomas, *In Lib. de Causis*, prop. 24 (Parma, 753a). Giles differs from St. Thomas on the creation of diversity. For a discussion of these passages cf. Hocedez, *Theoremata*, Introd., sec. VIII, "Influences Néoplatoniciennes," pp. (72)-(73).

²⁶ In *I Sent.*, 36, prin.1. q. 1, fol. 185v M: "Quarto defecerunt aliqui in assignando rationem et declarando modum quomodo deus particularia secundum quod huiusmodi cognoscit. Dicunt enim quod deus non solum producit formam sed etiam materiam. Alia autem agentia producunt res inducendo formam, non creando essentiam materiae. Et quia a forma sumitur rei universalitas, a materia particularitas, eo quod materia sit individuationis principium, deus res non solum universaliter, sed etiam particulariter cognoscit. Nam si artifex archam producendam non cognoscit particulariter, priusquam eius cognitionem a sensu accipiat, hoc est quia solum formam inducit in materia. Quod si tamen ipsam materiam produceret, cognitionem archae particulariter haberet."

position—namely, that, since God produces both form and matter, which latter is the principle of individuation, God must know particulars.²⁷

Though Giles graciously admits that St. Thomas's solution is nearer the truth than any other, he thinks it fails to give the essential reason. "For particulars are not known as particulars (*particulariter*) except insofar as they are determined by actual *esse*." If that is so, then St. Thomas has a God who either does not know things as particulars or has to submit to an increase of his knowledge every time things progress in *esse*.²⁸

Giles is serious about the need of determination by actual *esse* for particularity. His own solution in the latter part of the article demands it. Without it there is no problem to solve. Given that knowing the particular as such is knowing it according to its *esse actuale* and that knowing it universally is knowing it only according to the *esse* it possesses in its causes, or according to its quiddity, how can God know particulars as such without an increase of knowledge?

Giles's solution is based on the principle that one's understanding parallels one's nature. Human nature, or any created nature, is such that it has to be determined by actual *esse*. Hence the human intellect in its operation must, naturally speaking, be first determined by actual *esse* if it is to know anything in its actual *esse*, that is, as particular. The "real distinction" of nature and *esse* entails a like distinction in the operation of a created intellect. Hence human understanding, like human nature, is not a pure act, but an act compounded with potency, an act within which is a potentiality that needs determination, an act which of itself is not entirely determined. Hence also human understanding is not identical with *ipsum esse*, since the "real distinction" between human nature and its *esse* means that no action is so essential to it that its *agere* would be its *esse*. Therefore such an understanding cannot contain within it every *ratio essendi* and will need a further determination to know things according to their *esse*. The composition of the human supposit (essence and *esse*) is

²⁷Cf. St. Thomas, *In I Sent.*, 36. 1. 1 (ed. Pierre Mandonnet, O.P., and M. F. Moos, O.P. [Paris: Lethielleux, 1929-33], I, 832).

²⁸Giles, *In I Sent.*, 36, prin. 1, q.1, fol. 185v MN: "Sic dicentes autem licet inter ceteros magis ad veritatem appropinquent, non tamen in assignando causam dicti rationem per se assignant. Nam, ut habitum est, particularia non cognoscuntur particulariter, nisi ut determinantur per actuale esse. Quantumcumque igitur deus producat materiam et formam, vel deus non cognosceret res particulariter, vel oportet eas determinari per actuale esse, ut particulariter cognoscantur. Et ita ex progressu rerum in esse aliquid accrescit divinae scientiae."

thus perfectly paralleled in the composition of human understanding (intellect and *esse*).²⁹

God escapes this need of determination by *esse* for the simple reason that he is *ipsum esse* and his *intelligere*. He is therefore pure act with no potentiality which would need determining. He also contains every *ratio essendi*. Any determination by a new *esse* on the part of creatures would add nothing. So God's knowledge does not increase with the appearance of new particular beings.³⁰

29*Ibid.*, fol. 185v O-Q: "Est ergo alia via incedendi. Notandum igitur quod modus actionis rei sequitur modum naturae. Et ideo diversitas actionum arguit diversitatem naturae, ut potest haberi a Damasceno lib. III, cap. 15 [*Expositio Accurata Fidei Orthodoxae*, II, 15 (PG, XCIV, 1048)]. Nam cum agere praesupponat *esse*, et *esse* naturam, modus agendi rei ex *esse* eius et natura ipsius declarari habet... Omnis ergo intellectus cuius natura determinatur per actuale *esse*, res in suo actuali *esse* naturaliter cognoscere non poterit, antequam per tale *esse* determinetur. Ideo omne sic intelligens vel non cognoscit particularia particulariter, vel ex progressu rerum in *esse* aliquid scientiae eius accresci. Ideo, dato per impossibile quod aliquod agens agat non ex suppositione materiae, ita quod non solum formam induceret, sed etiam essentiam materiae crearet, si haberet naturam distans ab *esse*, quia modus intelligendi sequeretur modum naturae eius, ut cognosceret res secundum actuale *esse*, oporteret eas determinari per tale *esse*, sicut et natura eius per actuale *esse* determinatur. Nam intelligere quod competit rei cuius *esse* est distans a natura, de necessitate quantum ad praesens duo habet, ex eo quod est in tali natura sive supposito talem naturam habente. Primo, quia non est actus purus sed ammissus potentiae, cum sit in re in cuius natura potentialitas habet *esse*. Secundo, non est ipsum *esse*, nam nulli rei est actio essentialis, ita quod suum agere sit suum *esse*, si habeat *esse* distans a natura. Ex eo autem quod tale intelligere ammissam potentialitatem habet non est de se omnino determinatum. Et ideo oportet res per tale intelligere intellectas secundum suum *esse* determinari ut in suo *esse* determinate cognoscantur. Rursum quia non est ipsum *esse* non reservatur in eo omnis ratio *essendi*. Propter quod non poterit in seipso absque alia determinatione res secundum suum *esse* cognoscere. Et ideo nisi per esse res determinentur, sic intelligens eas, in suo *esse* cognoscere non poterit. Et quia cognoscere particulare ut particulare est ipsum cognoscere secundum suum actuale *esse*, cognoscere autem ipsum universaliter est ipsum scire solum secundum *esse* quod habet in suis causis vel secundum suam rationem quidditatis. Omne igitur habens naturam distans ab *esse* vel non cognoscit particulare particulariter vel, si cognoscit ipsum, aliquid accrescit scientiae suae ex eo quod res progrederuntur in *esse*."

30*Ibid.*, fol. 186r A: "Deus igitur cum sit ipsum *esse* et suum intelligere et non habeat potentialitatem ammissam, sed in eo reservetur omnis ratio *essendi*, poterit res cognoscere etiam particulariter. Et ex eo quod res progredientur in *esse* nihil accresceret scientiae suae. Quod et hoc concordat cum via Dionysii VII *De Div. Nom.* [cap. VII, no. 2 (PG, III, 869)], qui dicit deum omnia existentia ab ipso cognoscere in quantum omnibus est causa es-

Giles thinks that his solution agrees with that suggested by Denis the Areopagite, who says that God knows all things which exist in dependence on him insofar as he is the cause of being for all. This is in direct opposition to St. Thomas, who started his solution thus:

Wherefore we must proceed according to the way taught by Denis. For he says that, since God knows things through his essence which is the cause of things, he knows things in the way he gives them esse.³¹

For St. Thomas the way in which God gives material beings esse is his production of both matter and form. To produce is precisely to make the composite to be. For St. Thomas, esse is the act of the composite in the order of existence; it is not the ultimate determinant of particularity.

We can conclude from the present criticism that here at least Giles gives a very different meaning to esse from that given by St. Thomas. Esse as actual is the ultimate determinant of particularity. This agrees with the implications of the criticism of the *De Potentia* article. There things with different natures were considered to be diverse by a specific esse. What more natural than the next step of positing a particular esse as the principle of diversification within a nature? Since such an esse would be ultimate determinant or act of individuals which alone exist, it would naturally be called esse *actuale*.

These reflections, occasioned by two of the criticisms noted by Hochedez and Bruni, clearly call for further investigation. How is esse as act related to nature as potency? What is the unity of the individual in this case? What, finally, does it mean for an individual to exist? Whatever be the answers to these questions, it is certain from what we have seen so far of Giles's conscious opposition to St. Thomas that, when Giles speaks of a "real distinction" between essence and esse, it must not be taken for granted that he gives the same value to the terms of the distinction. These criticisms should warn against any facile equation. The signs point to a radical divergence on a most fundamental metaphysical position.

sendi. Nam ex hoc omnibus est causa essendi, quia est ipsum esse, et habet naturam indistinctam ab esse, propter quod in eo omnis essendi ratio reservatur, quod diligenter considerandum est, quia ex hoc, ut patebit, quaestiones quamplurime dissolventur."

³¹St. Thomas, *In I Sent.*, 36. 1. 1 (ed. Mandonnet, I, 831): "Unde procedendum est per viam quam docet Dionysius, VII cap. *De div. nomin.*, n.2, col. 867, t. I. Dicit enim, quod cum Deus cognoscit res per essentiam suam quae est causa rerum, eodem modo cognoscit res quo modo esse rebus trahidit . . ."

I remarked that Giles's summary of St. Thomas's explanation of the divine knowledge of particulars was accurate enough. Giles, however, made one substitution of a word which is significant in the light of his own solution. Throughout he avoids the term *singulare*, giving instead *particulars*. St. Thomas in his discussion of the problem uses both terms, but prefers *singulare*. Giles's exclusiveness on this point confirms the suspicion that his main problem in the constitution of existent beings is the Platonic one *de eodem et diverso*.

We shall now consider Giles's flat contradiction of St. Thomas on the nature of simplicity, a contradiction which is the key to Giles's ultimate views on the individual.

III. THE ONE AND THE SIMPLE

Giles's *Commentary on the First Sentences* contains a contradiction of St. Thomas which is fundamental in its implications, especially as it occurs in the framework of two articles dealing with the constitution of creatures. St. Thomas remarked in the eighth distinction of his commentary that no creature has a simplicity comparable with that of God.³² This does not necessarily mean that every creature is composite. Creatures are of two kinds—those that exist as complete beings and those that exist as component principles of something else, for example, prime matter in a material being. The former are characterized by the composition of at least nature and *esse*, since in God alone *esse* is his quiddity. The latter, though not as simple as God, are not thereby composite. The opposite opinion would mean an infinity of principles—a relation to relate a relation, and so on ad infinitum. The lower grade of simplicity in these principles is due either to their potential divisibility or to their being able to enter into composition with other principles, to neither of which possibilities is God subject.

Governing St. Thomas's solution is this principle:

From this, that something recedes from simplicity, it is not necessary that it falls into composition, just as from this that something recedes from the supreme goodness, it is not necessary that some evil appears in it.³³

³²St. Thomas, *In I Sent.*, 8. 5. 1 (ed. Mandonnet, I, 226): "Respondeo dicendum, quod omne quod procedit a Deo in diversitate essentiae, deficit a simplicitate eius."

³³"Ex hoc autem quod deficit a simplicitate, non oportet quod incidat in compositionem; sicut ex hoc quod deficit a summa bonitate, non oportet quod incidat in ipsum aliqua malitia" (*ibid.*). Giles denies it.

Giles denies it:

And from this it is clear that to recede from the divine simplicity and its actuality, is to approach to composition, although some say the opposite. And to recede from the divine goodness is to approach to some evil.³⁴

It is enough for the present article to consider the immediate context of the denial, for this will sufficiently throw into sharp relief Giles's views on existence and the unity of being in the individual.

The premise to Giles's contradiction is his definition of simplicity: "For to the notion of simplicity there belong indivisibility and immutability or actuality, because mutability follows potentiality." It follows that "the more divided and less in act anything is, the more composite it is."³⁵

In the previous question Giles had laid it down that "unity, simplicity, and immutability are correlative. For, from the fact that a thing is more simple, it is more one, because more indivisible and less in need [of completion]."³⁶ This principle is essential to the proof of the thesis Giles is upholding at this point, namely, the composition of the human soul.³⁷

Giles has to take this stand on the human soul because in the previous question he has proved to his satisfaction that every creature is composite, including every created component part of creatures. He also considers it more in keeping with St. Augustine's view that the soul, though simple in comparison with the body, is multiple in comparison with God.³⁸ It is the absolutely unique simplicity of God which Giles must save at all costs and which he considered he had felicitously saved in the previous question by a doctrine of totalities taken directly from Proclus. This same doctrine is reaffirmed as giving the final solution on the problem of the compositeness of the soul.

³⁴"Ex quo appetet quod recedere a divina simplicitate et eius actualitate est accedere ad compositionem, quamvis conversum quidam dicunt. Et recedere a bonitate divina est accedere ad aliquam malitiam" (Giles, *In I Sent.*, 8, pars 2, prin. 2, q. 2, fol. 54r H).

³⁵*Ibid.*

³⁶*Ibid.*, q. 1, fol. 54r C: "Ista tria unitas, simplicitas et immutabilitas sequuntur. Nam ex eo aliquid est magis simplex et magis unum, quia magis indivisibile est minus indigens."

³⁷Giles expressly sets aside the problem of spiritual matter: "Respondeo dicendum, quod non est nostra intentio inquirere utrum anima sit composita ex materia et forma, quia hoc quaeremus in 2a, sed aliis modis compositionis animae intendimus dubitare." *Ibid.*, q. 2, fol. 54r G.

³⁸*Ibid.* "In Contrarium est Augustinus Vo De Trin. cap. 7 quia dicit quod anima, licet sit simplex respectu corporis, est tamen multiplex respectu dei."

So Proclus becomes a reason for contradicting St. Thomas, and not merely an occasion for exaggerating St. Thomas.

Let us examine these two questions in order. We start then with the more fundamental question of the compositeness of creatures in general. Now Giles admits, with St. Thomas, that there are two kinds of creatures, namely, complete beings, which he describes as having *per se esse*, and component creatures, which he says exist in that which is, or in that which participates *esse*. To prove the compositeness of the first is not to prove that of the latter. Yet the compositeness of component parts must be proved if the simplicity, immutability, actuality, and unity of God are to be safeguarded.³⁹

The proof of the compositeness of creatures of the first type is interesting in that it contains a clear formulation of a "real distinction" in Boethian terms: "I answer: we must say that in every creature which has *per se esse* we must grant that there is a composition of *quod est* and *esse*." This composition follows from creation, that is, from receiving *esse* from another. To receive *esse* is to be in potency to *esse*; otherwise it would be a pure act without any potentiality and hence not a creature, which as a creature requires something "essentially different from it to bring it into being."⁴⁰

But it is the proof for the composition of even component parts which is of special interest. It is governed by the principle of the convertibility of unity, simplicity, and immutability. This is said to agree with Proclus's doctrine that what is "unitary . . . is not dependent on its own elements."⁴¹ It also agrees with St. Augustine's view that simplicity goes hand in hand with immutability.⁴² With this

³⁹*Ibid.*, q. 1, 54r A: "Respondeo dicendum, quod in omni creato quod habet per se esse oportet nos concedere esse compositionem ex quod est et esse . . . (54 B) Sed propter hoc non habemus omnem creaturam esse compositum: quia etiam ipsum esse quod existit in eo quod est vel in participante esse, creatura est nec tamen est compositum ex quod est et esse . . . (54 E) Omnis ergo creatura composita."

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 54 A: "Respondeo dicendum quod in omni creato quod habet per se esse oportet nos concedere esse compositionem ex quod est et esse. Et est ratio, quia si creatum est, ab alio habet esse. Omne, quod ab alio habet esse, est in potentia ad esse et non est ipsum esse; quia, si ipsum esse esset, tunc esset actus purus sine aliqua potentialitate. Non igitur indigeret aliqua essentialiter differente ab eo ipsum ad esse produceret. Ponere igitur creatum sic esse est ponere creatum non esse creatum."

⁴¹Cf. Proclus, *The Elements of Theology*, Prop. 127, ed. E. R. Dodds (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), p. 112: "οὔτε ἐξ ὄντων ὑφέστηκεν . . ." The 1551 edition of Giles's *In I Sent.* refers incorrectly to Prop. 26.

⁴²The words of St. Augustine (*De Trinitate*, VI, 6 [*PL*, XLII, 929]) are: "Nihil enim simplex mutabile est; omnis autem creatura mutabilis."

equation of unity, simplicity, immutability, actuality, the proof proceeds logically. It is the very essence of a part to be in potency to the whole. Such potency implies mutability. Mutability implies lack of simplicity. Hence any part, anything that enters into composition with another, cannot be simple, cannot be free from all composition.⁴³

Giles feels that this proof of universal compositeness of creatures needs further justification. This he finds (and it is his great discovery) in Proclus's doctrine of totalities.

Proclus posits three totalities in the universe: *totum ante partes*, *totum ex partibus*, *totum in parte*. The first is God as *esse imparcibile*. The second is any creature which exists *per se*, which participates in *esse*, whose parts, consequently, are *quod est* and *esse*. The created *esse*, the *esse participatum*, in which totalities of the second class participate is an example of a *totum in parte*; it is never received according to its totality or maximum and is therefore found always only according to a part, *in parte*.⁴⁴

Giles forestalls the objection that created *esse* as actually found in the composite could be simple, even though it is only a part of the *esse* which might have been received had the receiver been more receptive. He asserts that a *totum in parte* does not escape composition. *Esse*, as a divisible whole, with one part received here and another

⁴³In *I Sent.*, 8, pars 2, prin. 2, q. 1, fol. 54 BC: "Sed propter hoc non habemus omnem creaturam esse compositam: quia etiam ipsum esse quod existit in eo quod est vel in participante esse creatura est nec tamen est compositum ex quod est et esse. Et ideo notandum est quod ista tria unitas, simplicitas et immutabilitas se consequuntur. Nam ex eo quod aliquid est magis simplex est magis unum; quia magis indivisible et minus indigens, quia compositum indiget componentibus, et numerus unius unum autem et simplex non indigent aliis, ut tradit Proclus, 26a propositione [melius 127a]. Item quanto aliquid est magis immutabile tanto magis simplex. Unde Augustinus, VI *De Trin.*, cap. 7: nihil enim simplex mutabile est. Quia igitur ad rationem simplicis requiritur immutabilitas et unitas, cum omnis pars importet aliquam potentialitatem et per consequens mutabilitatem, quia nihil immistum potest esse omnino immutabile, nulla pars erit abstracta ab omni modo compositionis."

⁴⁴Ibid., fol. 54 CD: "Ut ergo possimus scire quae sunt composita et quae non, sciendum est quod est triplex totalitas, ut narrat Proclus, 66a propositione [Dodds, *op. cit.*, Prop. 67], scilicet ex partibus, in parte et ante partes. Haec autem sic distinguuntur, nam quaedam res participant esse, quaedam est ipsum esse participatum, quaedam est esse imparcibile. Res quae participat esse est totum ex partibus, quia constat ex quod est et esse. Esse participatum est totum in parte, quia omne quod recipitur in aliquo recipitur secundum modum rei recipientis. Cum igitur tale esse sit receptum in alio, non recipietur secundum sui totalitatem, nec secundum totum suum esse, sed recipietur secundum partem. Unde si totum dicetur non erit totum ut totum, sed totum ut pars. Totum ante partes est esse divinum"

there, falls short of unity, *ac per hoc ab unitate declinat*. Also, since it depends on the supposit in which it is present, it contains a potentiality within it and so is in some degree subject to change, mutable, not simple.⁴⁵

The problem of the compositeness of creatures has been reduced to that of the one and the many. God alone is one; hence everything else must be many.⁴⁶ Simple and composite, immutable and mutable, pure act and act-with-potency are expressions of the same opposition.

A question immediately arises. Does Giles deny any unity to the existent individual creature? He does not express himself clearly on the point here, though he does elsewhere; for example, in the fourth distinction the individual is said to be an *unum aggregatum*.⁴⁷ From the present context we can see why he allows the individual no more than an aggregate unity: diversity of the creature from the Creator must exclude any simple unity in the creature.

Giles describes the existent creature, which alone is *per se*, as a totality made up of its parts, *totalitas ex partibus*.⁴⁸ In Question I of the distinction it is described simply as being constituted of *quod est* and *esse*; such a totality is not simple because it has parts.⁴⁹ In Question II Giles discusses other general aspects of Proclus's totalities before applying them to the soul. In a sense, he says, a *totalitas in parte* is more divided and less in act than a *totalitas ex partibus*, which somehow has its parts joined together and united as a whole.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, fol. 54 DE: "Totum autem in parte non effugit esse compositum. Nam hoc totum divisibile est, ex eo quod secundum unum modum sive secundum aliquam partem recipitur in uno alio modo et secundum aliam partem in alio, ac per hoc ab unitate declinat. Rursum, quia tale totum dependent ab eo in quo est, aliqua potentialitas in ipso existit. Unde aliquo modo mutationi subicitur. Non igitur debet dici simplex cum in eo non sit omnimodo unitas et immutabilitas, quae rationem simplicitatis perficiunt. Tertium vero totum, ut totum ex partibus, simplex dici non debet ratione partium ex quibus constat."

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, fol. 54 E: "Et, quia omnis creatura vel est ex aliquibus vel dependet ab eo quod est ab aliquibus, et ei inest, vel est totum ex partibus vel in parte, et nulla est totum ante partes. Omnis ergo creatura composita. Solus deus est simplex, quia est ante partes totum."

⁴⁷Cf. *In I Sent.*, 4, prin. 2, q. unica, fol. 32v L: "Substantia prima est aggregatum vel individuum in genere substantiae . . ." In d. 2, prin. 2, q. 1, fol. 19r C, Giles speaks of the created supposit as being one with the unity of a sum, *unum unitate addita*. Though in the *Theorematum* Giles considers that the theory of act and potency makes it senseless to ask about unity (*Theor.*, 8, p. 41), he will not admit that a supposit is an *unum per se* (*Theor.*, 13, p. 83: "ens per se dicit unum per se et non includit esse . . .").

⁴⁸See n. 39.

⁴⁹See n. 46.

Thus, what consists of matter and form has form united to matter; what consists (*constat ex*) of quiddity and *esse* has *esse* joined to quiddity. A *totalitas in parte* is not as well off, is further removed from unity because its parts are disparate; it is parceled out in diverse existents. The existent is a *totum ex partibus* whose parts are quiddity and *esse*; the supposit alone exists *per se*. *Esse*, though it is actuality, cannot be said to be, but is rather that through which the supposit is said to be.⁵⁰

This last statement may sound like St. Thomas, but the meaning is different. Existence here means no more than having the parts necessary to be an individual: the act of existence or the actuality which is *esse* so actuates essence as to give a totality whose very multiplicity of component parts must make the existent less than unity.⁵¹

⁵⁰In *I Sent.*, 8, pars 2, prin. 2, q. 2, fol. 54r HI: "Et quia totalitas in parte est magis quid divisum et minus ens actu quam ex partibus, ideo talis totalitas potest aliquo modo concedi magis composita. Quod sic est videre, quia totum ex partibus habet aliquo modo suas partes coniunctas et unitas sicut totum. Quod constat ex materia et forma habet formam unitam materiae. Et quod constat ex quidditate et esse habet esse quidditati coniunctum. Sed totalitas in parte non sic. Nam ex hoc esse participatum dicitur totalitas in parte, quia secundum omnem modum non recipitur in participante, sed secundum unam partem est in isto existente et secundum aliam in alio. Quae partes propter diversitatem existentium non habent unionem ad se invicem, vel non tantam sicut partes totius ex partibus. Rursum, licet totum in parte posset dici ipsum esse vel ipsa actualitas, tamen tale totum non adeo est sicut aliud quid totum ex partibus sive ipsum suppositum est illud cui per se competit esse: ipsum tamen esse participatum non est, sed suppositum per ipsum est. Unde Boethius in *lib. de Hebdromadibus* [Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint, bonae sint, cum non sint substantialia bona, (PL, LXIV, 1311)]: diversum est esse et id quod est.... Hoc viso, notandum quo anima est pluribus modis composita quam ceterae formae, simpliciter tamen est compositior forma quae non est unita materiae et simplicior aliis formis, quod sic patet. Quia duae totalitates prohabita, quae compositionem important, habent modum oppositum. Nam ex hoc aliiquid est totum quia per se habet esse. Et hoc est totum in parte quia est pars eius quod per se habet esse. Unde 63a Propositione [Dodds, op. cit., Prop. 68] Procli dicitur: omne quod in parte totum pars est eius quod est ex partibus totius. Et 68a [Dodds, op. cit., Prop. 69] scribitur: omne, quod ex partibus totum, participat ea quae in parte totalitate. Et, quia quanto aliiquid est magis pars tanto minus ei competit per se existere, quanto aliiquid est magis totum in parte tanto est minus totum ex partibus et e converso. Et, quia, ut habitum est, magis attenditur compositio quodammodo ex totalitate in parte quam ex partibus. Quod si simpliciter non est vera, loquendo tamen de compositione formarum absolute verum est, quia quanto forma est magis immersa materiae tanto magis composita, et minus competit ei per se esse, propter quod magis est totum in parte et minus est totum ex partibus."

⁵¹It is as though *existere* derived from *constare ex*. Giles will say in the *In lib. de Causis*, Prop. 22, fol. 74r H: "Existit enim et constat ex multis

CONCLUSION

If this is the correct interpretation of Giles's doctrine on *esse*, existence, and the unity of the individual, we are driven to ask how Giles works out this primacy of the One. Can he do it consistently? In doing so, does he arrive at a new synthesis? In particular, one must ask, Does Giles consider *esse actuale* as a form? Is essence an act in the same order as *esse*? Is the actuation of *esse* accidental? To answer these questions a closer study would have to be made of the wider context of the entire *Commentary of the First Sentences*.⁵² It is not my purpose to make that study here. Such investigation does show, however, that Giles's master idea is the primacy of unity, simplicity, and immutability and that in perfect consistency with this master idea Giles makes *esse actuale* the determinant of individuality as an accidental act. Quite logically he allows only an aggregate unity to the created existent, for whom existence is the possession by a nature of what it needs to be an individual.

The point of this article is that it is not enough to list Giles's criticisms of St. Thomas. They must be studied in close comparison with St. Thomas's text. Such study at least suggests that one should not take for granted that even a pupil of St. Thomas understood then current formulae as St. Thomas did. In the three criticisms touched on we have seen (a) that Giles misinterprets St. Thomas on creation by interpreting an argument on the divine causality of *esse* in the light of diversity; (b) that Giles differs from St. Thomas on the meaning of *esse* by making *esse actuale* an ultimate determinant of the species in the line of particularity; and (c) that Giles, to safeguard the unity of God, feels he has adequately distinguished existent individuals from God, and to that extent explained their constitution, by making them wholes, none of which is an *unum simpliciter*, because each is an aggregate of essence and *esse actuale*. The point is not whether Giles

partibus." And in his *In II Sent.*, 17, q. 1, a. 3, dub. 4 (Venice, 1581, Vol. 2, p. 43, 1a), written perhaps as late as 1309, he says: "Sed quaeres: utrum hoc possit adaptari ad divinam essentiam ut dicatur constituta in esse. Ad quod dici potest quod constare est idem quod cum alio stare. Nam semper ad constare concurrent duo, quia non stat cum alio, ubi non sunt duo. Personae ergo possunt dici constare, vel constitui in esse, quia in eis essentia stat cum alio, i.e. cum relatione, ex quibus duobus tamquam per res duorum praedicamentorum constituitur persona in esse. Sed divina essentia non constituitur in esse, sed est ipsum esse, nec realiter refertur ad aliquid, ut ex hac relatione eam constituant in esse."

52The *Theoremata* also give valuable data on the manner in which *esse* actuates the essence. See *Theor.*, 3, p. 14, 11. 19-24; 5, p. 20, 11. 11-15; 5, p. 21, 11. 15-18; 6, p. 29, 11. 6-8; etc.

upheld the "real distinction," but what he meant by the terms of the distinction and what unity he allowed them. I contend that the criticisms here examined point to a radically divergent philosophical outlook on Giles's part. When his "real distinction" is evaluated from the viewpoint of the primacy of unity, it is seen to be so real that it allows in the created supposit no unity other than that of a sum.

This is no aberration on the part of Giles's imagination, but the thoroughgoing application of a metaphysical principle. It is to Giles's credit that he made the application. He is a worthy representative of the intellectual ferment of the thirteenth century. He attempted his own reconciliation which would proceed on very different lines from those of his quondam master, St. Thomas. He is further witness to the judgment that the main currents of the thirteenth century were Platonic in inspiration and that St. Thomas was neither widely accepted nor understood.

THE MEANING OF SOME QUOTATIONS FROM ST. AUGUSTINE IN THE *SUMMA THEOLOGICA* OF ST. THOMAS—Continued

ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST

The examples we have cited make it quite clear that the transition from mere ornamental or conventional quotations to a method of readjusting or assimilating these quotations to the Thomistic thesis is only a gradual change which often escapes notice. In other places, however, St. Thomas actually corrects rather thoroughly certain Augustinian statements by reinterpreting their original significance. In *Summa Theologica* I. 17. 2, for instance, the question is asked whether there is falsity in the senses. In the first objection St. Augustine is quoted as saying that "*If all the bodily senses report as they are affected, I do not know what more we can require from them.*"⁸¹ "*Thus it seems,*" St. Thomas continues, "*that we are not deceived by the senses. Therefore falsity is not in them.*" Significantly enough, St. Thomas starts his main argument with another quotation from St. Augustine to the effect that "*It appears that the senses entrap us in error by their deceptive similitudes.*"⁸² Then he proceeds to expound the three possible ways by which, according to Aristotle,⁸³ a thing might become the object of our senses, and also the three ways by which the senses might deceive us. In his reply to the first objection he points out that

The affection of sense is its sensation itself. Hence, from the fact that sense reports as it is affected, it follows that we are not deceived in the judgment by

⁸¹Pegis, I, 182. "Sed ne ipsi quidem oculi fallunt; non enim renuntiare possunt animo nisi affectionem suam. Quod si non solum ipsi, sed etiam omnes corporis sensus ita renuntiant ut afficiuntur; quid ab eis amplius exigere debeamus ignoro" (*De Vera Religione*, 33 [*PL*, XXXIV, 149]).

⁸²Pegis, I, 182. ". . . sensus renuntient in veri similitudinem habitare falsitatem; . . . nonne similitudine imaginum . . . decipimur? . . . Ergo apparet nos in omnibus sensibus sive aequalibus, sive in deterioribus rebus, aut similitudine lenocinante falli; aut etiamsi non fallimur suspentes consensionem, seu differentiam dgnoscentes, tamen eas res falsas nominare quas verisimiles deprehendimus" (*Soliloquia*, II, 6 [*PL*, XXII, 890]). Obviously, the original Augustinian text is devoid of the absolute meaning given to it by St. Thomas. Cf. ". . . apparet nos in omnibus sensibus sive in deterioribus rebus aut similitudine lenocinante falli . . ." (*ibid.*).

⁸³*Metaphysics*, E, 4, 1027b25.

which we judge that we are sensing something. Since, however, sense is sometimes affected otherwise than is the thing, it follows that it sometimes reports that thing otherwise than as it is; and thus we are deceived by sense about the thing, not about the fact of sensation.⁸⁴

In other words, St. Thomas corrects the Augustinian statement by interpreting it to mean that we are never deceived about the fact of sensation—in short, that we are justified in saying that we sense sensation. Needless to say, this Thomistic interpretation expands the original meaning of the Augustinian passage, inasmuch as this passage reads "as they are affected," and not, as St. Thomas seems to suggest, "that they are affected."

In *Summa Theologica* I. 5. 4, objection 3, St. Augustine is quoted as saying that "*we exist, because God is good.* . . . Therefore, goodness implies the aspect of an efficient cause."⁸⁵ In this connection it would be well to remember that St. Augustine's Platonism is to a great extent derived from Plotinus and the Neoplatonists. Thus the Augustinian statement "*quia bonus est [sc., Deus], sumus*" probably reminded St. Thomas of Plotinus's doctrine, also used by Avicenna, that the Ineffable One is also the *summum bonum*, and that all existence is derived from the boundless goodness of this Ineffable One in a causal-emanative rather than conscious-teleological or creationist manner. St. Augustine actually rejects the views of Plotinus by emphasizing the creationist and conscious efficacy of the divine will. He tries here merely to point out that inasmuch as we are, we are good, "and inasmuch as we are bad, we are less" (*minus sumus*).⁸⁶ Thus he only implies that God's being constitutes the absolute good, while our created being is merely imparted being and hence a partial good. For we have being only by virtue of our participation in the divine being. And insofar as we have being—that is to say, partake of the divine being—we also participate in the divine goodness which is the divine being. Torn from its original context, however, the statement "*We exist because God is good*" might denote an emanative or even pantheistic standpoint. Hence St. Thomas is most anxious to correct this isolated Augustinian statement. He stresses the fact that the concept of the good is related to that of the will.

⁸⁴Pegis, I, 183.

⁸⁵Pegis, I, 46. "*Quia enim bonus est [sc., Deus], sumus; et in quantum sumus, boni sumus*" (*De Doctrina Christiana*, I, 32 [*PL*, XXXIV, 32]).

⁸⁶"*Porro autem quia etiam iustus est [sc., Deus], non impune sumus mali; et in quantum mali sumus, in tantum etiam minus sumus*" (*De Doctrina Christiana*, I, 32 [*PL*, XXXIV, 32]).

He who has a will is said to be good, so far as he has a good will; because it is by our will that we employ whatever powers we may have. Hence a man is said to be good . . . because he has a good will. Now the will relates to the end as to its proper object. Thus the saying that *we exist because God is good* has reference to the final cause.⁸⁷

The same problem reappears in *Summa Theologica* I. 19. 4, where the question is discussed whether the will of God is the cause of things. Here, too, the third objection is based on the Augustinian statement that because God is good we exist.⁸⁸ St. Thomas reaches the conclusion that St. Augustine actually intended to say here that God is the cause of things by his nature, and not by his will. In order to counteract any possible Neoplatonic notion concerning the origin of created being which might be read into this Augustinian passage, St. Thomas, in his reply to the third objection, once more points out that "Good is the object of the will. The words, therefore, *Because God is good, we exist*, are true inasmuch as his Goodness is the reason of his willing all other things . . ."⁸⁹ The same Augustinian quotation—namely, "because God is good, we exist" appears for a third time in *Summa Theologica* I. 104. 3, objection 2.⁹⁰ Here St. Thomas asks whether God can annihilate anything. St. Thomas rejects this Augustinian statement because it might convey the idea that "God, in giving being to creatures, acted from natural necessity . . . But . . . such an opinion is entirely false," for "God created things freely." God is not the cause of the being of things from natural necessity, but gives being to a creature according to his will. Hence, St. Thomas continues in his reply to the second objection, "God's goodness is the cause of things, not as though by natural necessity, because the divine goodness does not depend on creatures; but by a free will."

From his interpretation of this Augustinian *quia bonus est sumus* we may gather that St. Thomas wishes above all to dispel any misunderstanding of the true relationship which exists between creator and creation. For the Augustinian passage as it is quoted by St. Thomas permits of a Neoplatonist assumption of a determinist-causal

⁸⁷Pegis, I, 47. In his main argument St. Thomas points out that "goodness is that which all things desire, and since this has the aspect of an end, it is clear that goodness implies the aspect of an end" (*ibid.*, 46-47). Cf. *ST*, I, 5. 1.

⁸⁸*De Doctrina Christiana*, I, 32 (*PL*, XXXIV, 32), quoted in n. 85 *supra*.

⁸⁹Pegis, I, 201.

⁹⁰Pegis, I, 967.

relationship between God's nature and the created universe. The identical problem once more seems to preoccupy St. Thomas when he deals with the question whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things.⁹¹ In order to prove his argument that the knowledge of God is the cause of things, St. Thomas quotes St. Augustine as saying that not because they are, does God know all creatures both spiritual and temporal, but they are because he knows them.⁹² But to avoid the impression that the knowledge of God is the sole efficient cause of all created existence, St. Thomas subsequently adds: ". . . God causes things by his intellect, since his being is his act of understanding; and hence his knowledge must be the cause of things, in so far as his will is joined to it."⁹³ Now the idea that God's knowledge of things is the cause of things—namely, "in so far as his will is joined to it"—constitutes a definitely novel interpretation of the original Augustinian statement which in this connection does not refer to God's will as the necessary cause of existence. Here again St. Thomas's effort to avoid a possible emanative interpretation of the relationship of God's knowledge to creation is the motive which prompted this interpretative correction of the original Augustinian text.

These examples should demonstrate that in many instances St. Thomas corrects certain statements taken from St. Augustine's works by essentially reinterpreting their original meaning. Admittedly, in many instances such corrections are necessary and proper in order to bring out more clearly the fundamental agreement that actually exists between St. Augustine and St. Thomas on many points. It must be conceded, furthermore, that on the whole these corrections do not really alter or distort to any essential degree, the meaning of the

91*ST*, I. 14. 8.

92 "Ac per hoc novit omnia [sc., Filius] quae novit Pater; sed ei nosse de Patre est, sicut esse . . . quod autem in ea [sc., veritate] non est, nec in ipso [sc., Deo] est" (*De Trinitate*, XV, 3 [*PL*, XLII, 1076]). Cf. "Ibi novit omnia Deus quae fecit per ipsam, et ideo cum decadant et succedant tempora, non decedit aliiquid vel succedit scientiae Dei. Non enim haec quae creata sunt, ideo sciuntur a Deo, quia facta sunt . . ." (*De Trinitate*, VI, 10 [*PL*, XLII, 931]).

93 Pegis, I, 147. Prior to this statement St. Thomas points out that "the knowledge of the artificer is the cause of the things made by his art from the fact that the artificer works through his intellect. Hence the form in the intellect must be the principle of action. . . . a natural form, being a form that remains in that to which it gives being, denotes a principle of action according only as it has an inclination to an effect. . ." (*ST*, I. 14. 8; Pegis, I, 147).

Augustinian text cited. For in essence they merely endow it with some additional meaning which, although it is not exactly to be found in the phrasing of St. Augustine himself, is nevertheless implied by him and can, therefore, be brought out by proper exegesis.

So far we have dealt with some instances in which St. Thomas attempts to show the essential concordance which exists between his own views and those of St. Augustine. It now remains for us to discuss those instances in which St. Thomas resorts to outright corrective alterations of the original Augustinian text. In their essence these particular instances characterize the conflict between Thomism and Augustinianism, between Aristotelianism and Platonism. They deal primarily with the conflicting doctrines of St. Thomas and St. Augustine about the nature and function of intellectual knowledge and truth. In such matters which touch upon the very roots of the Thomistic-Aristotelian system it is no longer possible for St. Thomas merely to readjust the original Augustinian text by way of reinterpretation. For such basic conflicts between two viewpoints cannot be reconciled simply by the expedient of reinterpretation and readjustment.

In *Summa Theologica* I. 16. 7, for instance, St. Thomas raises the issue whether created truth is eternal. (In 10. 3, he had already pointed out that God alone is eternal.) Now

The truth of enunciations is nothing other than the truth of the intellect. For an enunciation . . . has truth . . . according as it signifies some truth of the intellect, and not because of any truth residing in the enunciation. . . . Things are called true from the truth of the intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be eternal.⁹⁴

In the first objection to his main thesis, namely, that created truth is not eternal, St. Thomas quoted St. Augustine as saying that "Nothing is more eternal than the nature of a circle, and that two added to three make five. But the truth of these is a created truth."⁹⁵ Thus it appears that St. Augustine insists on the eternity of certain created truths. St. Thomas corrects, and thus fundamentally changes, the original meaning of the Augustinian passage when he says in his reply to the first objection that "The nature of a circle and the fact that

⁹⁴ *ST*, I. 16. 7; *Pegis*, I, 176.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.* Cf. ". . . septem autem et tria decem sunt; et non solum nunc, sed etiam semper; . . ." (*De Libero Arbitrio*, II, 8 [PL, XXXII, 1252]); (*De Libero Arbitrio*, II, 12 [PL, XXXII, 1259]); ". . . istas quae in geometrica docentur, habitare in ipsa veritate. . ." (*Soliloquia*, II, 18 [PL, XXXII, 901]).

two and three make five, have eternity in the mind of God.”⁹⁶ But this is not what St. Augustine originally had in mind when he speaks of the eternity of the nature of a circle. For in the context in which he makes this statement, he merely intends to show that since God is the truth, truth must be eternal. St. Thomas, on the other hand, insists that since God is eternal, all truths in the divine intellect are likewise eternal. Hence a rather thorough alteration of the original meaning of the Augustinian text is necessary to bring it into harmony with the Thomistic thesis that the eternity of truth is dependent on whether or not it is contained in the divine intellect.

In the following article, where the question is raised whether truth is immutable, St. Thomas insists that truth consists in the conformity of the intellect to the things understood. Now

in one way, truth varies on the part of the intellect, from the fact that a change of opinion occurs about a thing which in itself has not changed, and, in another way, when the thing is changed, but not the opinion. . . . If, then, there is an intellect wherein there can be no alteration of opinions, and the knowledge of which nothing can escape, in this is immutable truth. Now such is the divine intellect. . . . Hence the truth of the divine intellect is immutable. But the truth of our intellect is mutable.⁹⁷

In the first objection St. Augustine is quoted as saying that “*Truth and mind do not rank as equals, otherwise truth would be mutable, as the mind is.*”⁹⁸ Answering St. Augustine, St. Thomas, in his reply to the first objection, merely remarks that Augustine is speaking

96*ST*, I. 16. 7 ad 1; *Pegis*, I, 177.

97*ST*, I. 16. 8; *Pegis*, I, 178.

98*Pegis*, I, 177. “*Si autem esset aequalis mentibus nostris haec veritas, mutabilis etiam ipsa esset*” (*De Libero Arbitrio*, II, 12 [*PL*, XXXII, 1259]). Compare “*Ut enim nos et omnes animae rationales secundum veritatem de inferioribus recte iudicamus; sic de nobis, quando eidem cohaeremus, sola ipsa Veritas iudicat. . . . Omnia ergo iudicat [sc., Veritas], quia super omnia est. . . si vir bonus est et sapiens, illam ipsam consulerit aeternam [sc., legem], de qua nulli animae iudicare datum est; et secundum eius incommutabiles regulas, quid sit pro tempore iubendum vetandumque discernat*” (*De Vera Religione*, 31 [*PL*, XXXIV, 147]). “*Unde etiam phantasias rerum corporalium per corporis sensum haustas, et quodam modo infusas memoriae, ex quibus etiam ea quae non visa sunt, ficto phantasmate cogitantur; sive aliter quam sunt, sive fortuiter sicuti sunt, aliis omnino regulis supra mentem nostram incommutabiliter manentibus, vel approbare apud nos metipos, vel improbare convincimur, cum recte aliquid approbamus, aut improbamus. Nam et cum recolo Carthaginis moenia quae vidi, et cum fingo Alexandriae quae non vidi, easdemque imaginarias formas quasdam quibusdam*

here of the divine truth. But obviously, this is not what St. Augustine intended to say in the *De Libero Arbitrio* II. 12, the *De Vera Religione* 31, and the *De Trinitate* IX. 6, where he actually discussed the superiority of objective truth over the mind, without, however, referring to the divine truth. Hence the assertion that St. Augustine is speaking here merely of the divine truth is tantamount to a corrective restatement of the original Augustinian text.

The *Summa Theologica* I. 84. 5 raises the issue whether the intellectual soul knows material things in the eternal exemplars. In the *Quaestiones Disputatae de Spiritualibus Creaturis* 10, this question had been answered in the negative. In the *Summa Theologica*, St. Thomas prefaces his main argument with the following statement taken from St. Augustine:

*If we both see that what you say is true, and if we both see that what I say is true, where do we see this, I pray? Neither do I see it in you, nor do you see it in me; but we both see it in the unchangeable truth which is above our minds.*⁹⁹

Then he adds: "Now the unchangeable truth is contained in the eternal exemplars. Therefore the intellectual soul knows all the truths in the external exemplars." We may ask here, does this statement of St. Thomas mean that he accepts part of the Platonism of St. Augustine? Definitely not, for St. Thomas goes on to quote St. Augustine once more.

If those who are called philosophers said by chance anything that was true and consistent with our faith we must claim it from them as from unjust possessors. For some of the doctrines of the pagans are spurious imitations or superstitious inventions,

praeferens, rationabiliter praefero; viget et claret desuper iudicium veritatis, ac sui iuris incorruptissimis regulis firmum est: et si corporalium imaginum quasi quodam nubilo subtextitur, non tamen involvitur atque confunditur" (*De Trinitate*, IX, 6 [PL, XLII, 966]). "Possunt . . . et pecora et sentire per corporis sensus extrinsecus corporalia. . . haec atque huiusmodi quamvis in sensibus, atque in eis quae inde animus per sensum corporis traxit agantur atque versentur, non sunt tamen rationis expertia. . . Sed sublimioris rationis est iudicare de istis corporalibus secundum rationes incorporales et semipternas: quae nisi super mentem humanam essent, incommutabiles profecto non essent; atque his nisi subiungeretur aliquid nostrum, non secundum eas possemus iudicare de corporalibus. Iudicamus autem de corporalibus ex ratione dimensionum atque figurarum, quam incommutabiliter manere mens novit" (*De Trinitate*, XII, 2 [PL, XLII, 999]).

99 Pegis, I, 804. "Si ambo videmus verum esse quod dicas, et ambo videmus verum esse quod dico; ubi, quaeso, id videmus? Nec ego utique in te, nec tu in me; sed ambo in ipsa, quae supra mentes nostras est, incommutabili Veritate" (*Confessiones*, XXII, 25 [PL, XXXII, 840]).

*which we must be careful to avoid when we renounce the society of the pagans.*¹⁰⁰ Consequently whenever Augustine, who was imbued with the doctrines of the Platonists, found in their teaching anything consistent with faith, he adopted it. . . Now Plato held . . . that the forms of things subsist of themselves apart from matter. These he called Ideas, and he said that our intellect knows all things by participation in them. . . But it seems contrary to faith that the forms of things should subsist of themselves without matter outside the things themselves, as the Platonists held. . . Therefore, in the place of the Ideas defended by Plato, Augustine said that the exemplars of all creatures existed in the divine mind. It is according to these that all things are formed, as well as that the human soul knows all things.¹⁰¹

When, therefore, the question is asked: Does the human soul know all things in the eternal exemplars? we must reply that one thing is said to be known in another in two ways. First, as in an object itself known; as one may see in a mirror the images of the things reflected therein. In this way the soul, in the present state of life, cannot see all things in the eternal exemplars; but thus the blessed, who see God and all things in Him, know all things in the eternal exemplars. Secondly, one thing is said to be known in another as in a principle of knowledge; and thus we might say that we see in the sun what

100["]Philosophi autem qui vocantur, siqua forte vera et fidei nostrae accomodata dixerunt, maxime Platonici, non solum formidanda non sunt, sed ab eis etiam tamquam iniustis possessoribus in usum nostrum vindicanda. . . Sic doctrinae omnium Gentilium non solum simulata et superstitiosa figmenta gravesque sarcinas supervacanei laboris habent, quae unusquisque nostrum duce Christo de societate Gentilium exiens, debet abominare atque devitare; . . ." (*De Doctrina Christiana*, II, 40 [*PL*, XXXIV, 63]).

101["]Ideas Plato primus appellare perhibitur . . . Sunt . . . ideae principales formae quaedam, vel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quae ipsae formatae non sunt, ac per hoc aeternae ac semper eodem modo sese habentes, quae indivisa intelligentia contineantur. Et cum ipsae neque orientur, neque intereant; secundum eas tamen formari dicitur omne quod oriri et interire potest, et omne quod oritur et interit. Anima vero negatur eas intuiri posse, nisi rationalis . . . Et ea quidem ipsa rationalis anima non omnis et quaelibet, sed quae sancta et pura fuerit, haec asseritur illi visioni esse idonea: . . ." (*De Diversis Quaestionibus*, q. 46 [*PL*, XL, 29-30]). "Quod si hae rerum omnium creandarum creatarumve rationes in divina mente continentur, neque in divina mente quidquam nisi aeternum atque incommutabile potest esse; atque has rerum rationes principales appellat ideas Plato: non solum sunt ideae, sed ipsae verae sunt, quia aeternae sunt, et eiusmodi atque incommutabiles manent; . . ." (*ibid.*)

we see by the sun. And thus we must needs say that the human soul knows all things in the eternal exemplars, since by participation in these exemplars we know all things. For the intellectual light itself, which is in us, is nothing else than a participated likeness of the uncreated light, in which are contained the eternal exemplars. . . . By the seal of the divine light in us all things are made known to us.¹⁰²

What St. Thomas really is trying to demonstrate here is only the doctrine that we know what we know, and that we are capable of knowing what we know, because our intellect has been created in the likeness of the divine intellect in which all the eternal exemplars are contained. In this fashion St. Thomas alters and corrects the meaning which, according to St. Augustine, the ideas have for our understanding of things. For the meaning of these ideas is now reduced to the part which they play in the likeness that exists between the divine intellect and the human intellect. He continues:

But since besides the intellectual light which is in us, intelligible species, which are derived from things, are required in order that we may have knowledge of material things, therefore this knowledge is not due merely to a participation of the eternal exemplars, as the Platonists held, maintaining that the mere participation in the ideas sufficed for knowledge.¹⁰³

For St. Thomas insists that through the medium of the *intellectus agens* we also derive our intellectual knowledge from material things (or from phantasms caused by these material things). Thus it seems that we no longer require the eternal exemplars. Hence, according to St. Thomas, these Platonic ideas are actually eliminated as far as their epistemological significance is concerned. Nevertheless, he refuses to admit that there exists a serious conflict between his own views concerning the nature and function of the ideas and those proposed by St. Augustine. On the contrary, St. Thomas appeals to the authority of St. Augustine in order to prove that the eternal exemplars are actually derived from experience.

¹⁰²Pegis, I, 804-5. The eternal ideas are nothing else than a principle of knowledge, while the *lumen intellectuale* in us--in other words, our intellect--is nothing other than a copy of the divine intellect in which the eternal ideas or immutable exemplars are contained.

¹⁰³Pegis, I, 805.

Therefore Augustine says: *Although the philosophers prove by convincing arguments that all things occur in time according to the eternal exemplars, were they able to see in the eternal exemplars, or to find out from them, how many kinds of animals there are and the origin of each? Did they not seek for this information from the story of times and places?*¹⁰⁴

Now in the original passage¹⁰⁵ St. Augustine's main concern is to point out the limitations of all intellectual knowledge. St. Thomas, on the other hand, reads into this Augustinian passage the Aristotelian doctrine that through the medium of the *intellectus agens* we gain from experience the genera or eternal exemplars of the things. Nevertheless, after having made this corrective analysis, St. Thomas insists that his views on the matter are in complete conformity with those of St. Augustine. Hence he continues:

Now that Augustine did not understand all things to be known in their *eternal exemplars* or in the *unchangeable truth*, as though the eternal exemplars themselves were seen, is clear from what he says, viz., that *not each and every rational soul can be said to be worthy of that vision*, namely, of the eternal exemplars, *but only those that are holy and pure*, such as the souls of the blessed.¹⁰⁶

104*Ibid.* "Numquid enim quia verissime disputant, et documentis certissimis persuadent, aeternis rationibus omnia temporalia fieri, propterea potuerunt in ipsis rationibus perspicere, vel ex ipsis colligere, quot sint animalium genera, quae semina singulorum in exordiis, qui modus in incrementis. . . qui motus in appetendis quae secundum naturam sunt, fugiendisque contrariis? Nonne ista omnia, non per illam incommutabilem sapientiam, sed per locorum ac temporum historiam quaesierunt . . . ?" (*De Trinitate*, IV, 16 [*PL*, XLII, 902]). Cf. ". . . tamen propinquior nobis est qui fecit, quam multa quae facta sunt. In illo enim vivimus, et movemur, et sumus . . . istorum autem pleraque remota sunt a mente nostra propter dissimilitudinem sui generis, quoniam corporalia sunt; nec idonea est ipsa mens nostra, in ipsis rationibus quibus facta sunt, ea videre apud Deum, ut per hoc sciamus quot et quanta qualiaque sint, etiamsi non ea videamus per corporis sensus" (*De Genesi ad Litteram*, V, 16 [*PL*, XXXIV, 333]).

105Quoted in n. 101 *supra*.

106Pegis, I, 805. "Anima vero negatur eas intueri posse nisi rationalis, ea sui parte qua excellit, ut est ipsa mente atque ratione, quasi quadam facie vel oculo suo interiore atque intellegibili. Et ea quidem ipsa rationalis anima non omnis et quaelibet, sed quae sancta et pura fuerit, haec asseritur illi visioni esse idonea; id est, quae illum ipsum oculum quo videntur ista, sanum, et sincerum, et serenum, et similem his rebus quas videri intendit, habuerit. Qui autem religiosus et vera religione imbutus, quamvis nodum possit haec intueri, negare tamen audeat. . . omnia quae sunt. . . Deo auctore esse procreata. . . ? Quo constituto atque concesso, quis audeat dicere

The intended meaning of this Augustinian passage, however, is to be found only in the whole context from which it has been taken. Undoubtedly, St. Augustine expounds here a Platonic viewpoint.¹⁰⁷ He is concerned particularly with the problem of the sense in which the Platonic theory of ideas can and must be accepted. He refers only in a very general way to the human soul, which, since it is the most exalted among all created things, stands closest to God in the hierarchy of creation. And the more the soul is permeated by the light of the divine intellect, the purer and holier it becomes. But there is no express mention in St. Augustine that only the blessed in heaven could possess the vision of the eternal exemplars or the unchangeable truth. As a matter of fact, in the *Retractationes*¹⁰⁸ St. Augustine expressly recants a former statement of his, found in the *Soliloquia*,¹⁰⁹ to the effect that God considers only those who are pure of heart worthy of the vision of truth. This retraction, which does not distinguish between beatific vision and secular knowledge, clearly insists that even those who are not of a pure heart can have intellectual knowledge, that is, knowledge of the eternal exemplars. Obviously, this retraction was prompted by St. Augustine's desire to avoid the extreme consequences of those Neoplatonic teachings which denied any form of intellectual knowledge to those who are not in a state of purity. Nevertheless, he never completely denies the relationship which exists even in this life between purity of heart and intellectual knowledge. This is clearly brought out when he corrects a highly significant statement he had made in his *De Moribus Ecclesiae*

Deum irrationabiliter omnia condidisse? . . . Has autem rationes ubi arbitrandum est esse, nisi in ipsa mente Creatoris? . . . Quod si hae rerum omnium creandarum creatarumve rationes in divina mente continentur, neque in divina mente quidquam nisi aeternum atque incommutabile potest esse. . . non solum sunt idea, sed ipsae verae sunt, quia aeternae sunt. . . ; quarum participatione fit ut sit quidquid est, quoquomodo est. Sed anima rationalis inter eas res quae sunt a Deo conditae, omnia superat; et Deo proxima est quando pura est, eique in quantum charitate cohaeserit, in tantum ab eo lumine illo intelligibili perfusa quadam modo et illustrata cernit, non per corporeos oculos, sed per ipsius sui principale, quo excellit, id est per intelligentiam suam, istas rationes, quarum visione fit beatissima" (*De Diversis Quaestionibus*, q. 46 [PL, XL, 30-31]).

¹⁰⁷See n. 106 *supra*.

¹⁰⁸"Responderi enim potest, multos etiam non mundos multa scire vera: neque enim definitum est hic quid sit verum, quod nisi mundi scire non possint, et quid sit scire. Et illud quod ibi positum est, 'Deus cuius regnum est totus mundus, quem sensus ignorat' [*Soliloquium*, I, 3]; si Deus intelligendus est, addenda fuerant verba, ut diceretur, quem mortalis corporis sensus ignorat" (*Retractationes*, I, 4 [PL, XXXII, 589]).

¹⁰⁹*Soliloquia* I, 6 (PL, XXXII, 875), quoted in n. 111 *infra*.

Catholicae,¹¹⁰ that before we shall know God we must love Him *plena caritate* even in this world. In the *Retractationes*,¹¹¹ written about twenty years later, he substitutes for the term *plena caritate* the term *sincera caritate* in order to show that the *plena caritas* can be attained only in heaven where the beatific vision is realized. Hence there must be room for an ever more intensive love of God in heaven, where alone the earthly *sincera caritas* can become a *plena caritas*. In any event, all these statements should make it quite clear that St. Augustine does not limit the faculty of knowing the eternal exemplars exclusively to the souls of the blessed in heaven, as St. Thomas tries to suggest. For St. Augustine definitely asserts that intellectual knowledge can be attained by all pure and holy souls in this world and that some of this knowledge can even be gained by sinners. Thus the effort of St. Thomas to reconcile the views of St. Augustine about the nature and function of the ideas or eternal exemplars with his own notions

110 "Diligamus igitur Deum ex toto corde, ex tota anima, ex tota mente, quicumque ad vitam aeternam pervenire proposuimus. Vita enim aeterna est totum praemium, cuius promissione gaudemus: nec praemium potest precedere merita, priusque homini dari quam dignus est . . . Aeterna igitur vita est ipsa cognitio veritatis. Quamobrem videte quam sint perversi atque praeposteri, qui sese arbitrantur Dei cognitionem tradere, ut perfecti simus, cum perfectorum ipsa sit praemium. Quid ergo agendum est, quid quaeso, nisi ut eum ipsum quem cognoscere volumus, prius plena caritate diligamus?" (*De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae*, I, 25 [PL, XXXII, 1331]).

111 "Quod autem dixi: 'Eum ipsum quem cognoscere volumus, hoc est Deum, prius plena caritate diligamus. . .': melius diceretur, Sincera, quam plena; ne forte putaretur caritatem Dei non futuram esse maiorem, quando videbimus facie ad faciem. Sic ita hoc accipiatur, tanquam plena dicta sit, qua maior esse non possit, quamdiu ambulamus per fidem: erit enim plenior, imo plenissima, sed per speciem" (*Retractationes*, I, 7 [PL, XXXII, 593]).

As to the content of this whole paragraph, cf. "Non enim hoc est habere oculos quod aspicere; aut idem hoc est aspicere, quod videre. Ergo animae tribus quibusdam rebus opus est ut oculos habeat, quibus iam bene uti possit, ut aspiciat, ut videat. Oculi sani mens est ab omni labe corporis pura, id est, a cupiditatibus rerum mortalium iam remota atque purgata: . . ." (*Soliloquia*, I, 6 [PL, XXXII, 875]); "Nam et terra visibilis, et lux; sed terra, nisi luce illustrata, videri non potest. Ergo ea quae in disciplinis traduntur . . . non posse intellegi, nisi ab alio quasi suo sole illustrentur. Ergo quomodo in hoc sole tria quaedam licet animadvertere; quod est, quod fulget, quod illuminat: ita in illo secretissimo Deo quem vis intellegere, tria quaedam sunt; quod est, quod intellegitur, et quod caetera fecit intellegi. Haec duo, id est, te ipsum et Deum, ut intelligas, docere te audeo. Sed responde quomodo haec acceperis; ut probabilia, an ut vera? A. Plane ut probabilia; et in spem, quod fatendum est, maiorem surrexi . . ." (*Soliloquia*, I, 8 [PL, XXXII, 877]). "Unum certe quaerimus, quo simplicius nihil est. Ergo in simplicitate cordis quaerimus illum [sc., Deum]" (*De Vera Religione*, 35 [PL, XXXIV, 151]).

amounts to a rather definite alteration and correction of the original Augustinian text.

Again, in *Summa Theologica* I. 12. 11, the question is asked whether anyone in this life can see the essence of God. St. Thomas holds the view that God cannot be seen in his essence by one who is merely man. Now the third objection states:

Further, that wherein we know all other things, and whereby we judge of other things, is in itself known to us. . . . for Augustine says: *If we both see that what you say is true, and we both see that what I say is true, where, I ask, do we see this? neither I in thee, nor thou in me, but both of us in that incommutable truth itself above our minds.*¹¹² He also says, *We judge of all things according to divine truth,*¹¹³ and that, *it is the business of reason to judge of these corporeal things according to the incorporeal and eternal ideas; which unless they were above the mind, could not be incommutable.* Therefore, even in this life we see God Himself.¹¹⁴

¹¹² *Confessiones*, XII, 25 (*PL*, XXXII, 840), quoted in n. 99 *supra*. Cf. ". . . nullo modo negaveris esse incommutabilem veritatem . . . quam non possis dicere tuam vel meam, vel cuiusquam hominis, sed omnibus incommutabilia vera cernentibus, tanquam miris modis secretum et publicum lumen, praesto esse ac se praebere communiter: . . . Duorum enim oculi quod simul vident, nec huius nec illius oculos esse poteris dicere, sed aliquid tertium in quod utriusque conferatur aspectus. . . ." (*De Libero Arbitrio*, II, 12 [*PL*, XXXII, 1259]).

¹¹³ "Haec autem lex omnium artium cum sit omnino incommutabilis, mens vero humana cui talem legem videre concessum est, mutabilitatem pati possit erroris, satis apparet supra mentem nostram esse legem, quae veritas dicitur" (*De Vera Religione*, 30 [*PL*, XXXIV, 147]); "Nec iam illud ambigendum est, incommutabilem naturam quae supra rationalem animam sit, Deum esse. . . Nam haec est illa incommutabilis veritas, quae lex omnium artium recte dicitur . . . Itaque cum se anima sentiat nec corporum speciem motumque iudicare secundum seipsam, simul oportet agnoscat praestare suam naturam ei naturae de qua iudicat; praestare autem sibi eam naturam, secundum quam iudicat, et de qua iudicare nullo modo potest . . . Ut enim nos et omnes animae rationales, secundum veritatem de inferioribus recte iudicamus; sic de nobis, quando eidem cohaeremus, sola ipsa Veritas iudicat". (*De Vera Religione*, 31 [*PL*, XXXIV, 147]).

¹¹⁴ *Pegis*, I, 107. *De Trinitate*, XII, 2 (*PL*, XLII, 999); *De Libero Arbitrio*, II, 12 (*PL*, XXXII, 1259); *De Trinitate*, IX, 6 (*PL*, XLII, 966), all quoted in n. 98 *supra*. Cf. "Ubi eas [sc., regulas] vident? Neque enim in sua natura, cum procul dubio mente ista videantur, eorumque mentes constet esse mutabiles, has vero regulas immutabiles videat, quisquis in eis et hoc videre potuerit; nec in habitu suae mentis, cum illae regulae sunt iustitiae, mentes vero eorum constet esse iniustas. Ubinam sunt istae regulae scriptae . . .

In his reply to the third objection St. Thomas points out that

All things are said to be seen in God, and all things are judged in Him, because of the participation of His light we know and judge all things; for the very light of natural reason is a participation of the divine light; as likewise we are said to see and judge of sensible things in the sun, that is, by the sun's light. Hence Augustine says, *The lessons of instruction can be seen only if they be illumined by their own sun,*¹¹⁵ namely, God. Just as therefore, in order to see a sensible thing it is not necessary to see the substance of the sun, so in like manner to see something intelligible, it is not necessary to see the essence of God.¹¹⁶

On one point both St. Augustine and St. Thomas agree, that it is impossible to have an immediate and perfect knowledge of God.¹¹⁷ Nevertheless, the meaning which St. Thomas attributes to these Augustinian passages is definitely of a corrective nature. Even when employing the Platonic-Augustinian term *participatio*, St. Thomas does not actually adopt its traditional significance. For participation means to St. Thomas something quite different from what it means to Plato and St. Augustine. It signifies to St. Thomas that God endows his creatures to some degree, according to their created natures, with something which he himself possesses in absolute perfection. In other words, the human intellect, for instance, which is actually a divine gift, constitutes merely an infinitely inferior "copy" or image of the divine intellect. God, therefore is the *causa exemplaris* of the human intellect as well as the *causa exemplaris* of the truth to which the human intellect may attain. If, therefore, the term *participatio* means to St. Thomas the relation of a creationist *causa exemplaris* to its *effectus*, then there can no longer be applied the typical Augustinian comparison of the relation of God to the human intellect to the relation of the light to seeing things. According to St. Thomas, participation means here the seeing of things in the light of God, and

nisi in libro lucis illius quae veritas dicitur? unde omnis lex iusta describitur, et in cor hominis. . . imprimendo transfertur. . ." (*De Trinitate*, XIV, 15 [PL, XLII, 1052]).

¹¹⁵ *Soliloquia*, I, 8 (PL, XXXII, 877), quoted in n. 111 *supra*. Cf. "... disciplinarum autem quaeque certissima talia sunt, qualia illa quae sole illustrantur, ut videri possint, veluti terra est atque terrena omnia: Deus autem est ipse qui illustrat" (*Soliloquia*, I, 6 [PL, XXXII, 875]).

¹¹⁶ *Pegis*, I, 108.

¹¹⁷ In the *Soliloquia*, I, 8 (PL, XXXII, 877), St. Augustine speaks of the "secretissimus Deus." See n. 111 *supra*.

not, as in St. Augustine, the being illuminated by his light. For participation in the light of the sun signifies, according to St. Augustine, being illuminated by the light of the sun, and not, as St. Thomas infers, seeing things in the light of the sun.¹¹⁸

In *Summa Theologica* I. 88. 3, St. Thomas considers whether God is the first object known to the human mind; and it is his conclusion that God is not the first object of our knowledge. Now, in the first objection, St. Augustine is quoted as saying that "we know all things in the light of the first truth, and thereby judge of all things. . . Therefore God is the first object known to us."¹¹⁹ The rejection of this Augustinian statement in the reply to the first objection contains a drastic correction and reinterpretation of the original Augustinian text:

We see and judge of all things in the light of the first truth, insofar as the light itself of our intellect, whether natural or gratuitous is nothing else than an impression of the first truth upon it. . . Hence, since the light itself of our intellect is not that which the intellect understands, but the medium whereby it understands, much less can it be said that God is the first thing known by our intellect.¹²⁰

In this reply to St. Augustine, St. Thomas obviously is relying on two Aristotelian principles: first, that all our knowledge is derived from the senses--but God is furthest away from our senses; and second, that whatever is posterior in nature, is anterior to reason, a fact which makes whatever is less knowable according to nature more knowable according to reason. And since created things in their being are posterior to God according to nature and thus less knowable than God, God himself is posterior to created things according to reason and therefore more knowable than the created things according to reason. From these two notions St. Thomas infers that St. Augustine could not really have intended to say that the eternal or first truth, namely God, constitutes the most immediate and first principle, in the light of which we see and judge of all things. What St. Augustine actually intended to say, according to St. Thomas, is that we see and judge by the *impression* of the first truth or light upon our intellect, and not by the first truth or light itself. It is the gratuitous impression

¹¹⁸Cf. the whole tenor of *Soliloquia*, I, 6 (*PL*, XXXII, 875), partly quoted in n. ¹¹⁵*supra*.

¹¹⁹Pegis, I, 849. *De Vera Religione*, 31 (*PL*, XXXIV, 147), quoted in n. ¹¹³*supra*; *De Trinitate*, XII, 2 (*PL*, XLII, 999), quoted in n. ⁹⁸*supra*; *Confessiones*, XII, 25 (*PL*, XXXII, 840), quoted in n. ⁹⁹*supra*.

¹²⁰Pegis, I, 849. Cf. *ST*, I. 12. 11 ad 3; *ibid.*, 84. 5.

of the first truth or light which constitutes our intellect; and the efficacy of our intellect depends upon the first and uncreated light. Hence it is not necessary for us to know first the impression of the first truth. For we merely know of things through the medium of the impression of the first light, that is to say, through the medium of the derived light in that it makes these things knowable. Consequently our understanding of things does not consist in the anterior knowledge of this derived light which then would communicate to us the knowledge of other things.¹²¹ Only through the medium of knowable things—in other words, through our knowledge of things—may we know of the derived light of our intellect and, hence, of the eternal light or the first truth. St. Thomas's main argument is that God cannot be the first object known to us, because we know God only by knowing God's creation first. Hence our knowledge of God proper is derived from the fact that his creation rationally and logically presupposes a divine creator. In this manner the statement of St. Augustine, that we know all things in the light of the first truth, is readjusted and corrected. The novel significance which St. Thomas attributes to this Augustinian statement is that we know of things because our intellect makes them knowable. But our intellect is a gratuitous gift, an impression of the divine intellect, from which our intellect derives all its powers. In this sense, and only in this, according to St. Thomas, may we accept the Augustinian assertion that we know all things in the light of the first truth.

These examples show to what extent St. Thomas in his *Summa Theologica* alters or reinterprets by way of radical correction certain passages which he has quoted from the works of St. Augustine. Here St. Thomas no longer attempts merely to improve upon these Augustinian statements in order to align them (and incorporate them into) his own views; he basically changes their original significance by attributing an entirely novel meaning to them.

On the whole, the policy of St. Thomas is the following: while he discards or disregards no important element of the Augustinian tradition itself completely, he nevertheless revalues, corrects, and improves rather thoroughly many of the original ideas of St. Augustine.¹²² There are two important reasons which should fully explain

¹²¹This idea has found its classical formulation in St. Thomas's *Commentarium in Boethii de Trinitate*, I, 3: "Non enim eo alia cognoscimus, sicut cognoscibili quod sit medium cognitionis, sed sicut eo, quod facit alia cognoscibilia."

¹²²The disagreement between certain views held by St. Thomas and those expressed by St. Augustine and the so-called Augustinians has been established by J. Hessen (*Augustinische und thomistische Erkenntnislehre* [Pader-

and justify this policy of St. Thomas. In the first place, we must realize that St. Thomas was well aware that Platonic thought and method had a considerable influence on St. Augustine.¹²³ Now most, if not all, of his information concerning Platonic philosophy came to St. Thomas through the medium of Aristotle,¹²⁴ who is not always a sympathetic or even accurate historian, particularly in matters pertaining to Plato's philosophy. The many and often fundamental innovations of Platonic thought which Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism in particular had introduced, do not really concern St. Thomas. Since the supposed Platonism of St. Augustine is, however, actually more Neoplatonic than Platonic, his indifference towards the Neoplatonic problem in St. Augustine is unfortunate, at least from a historical point of view. It also must be remembered that whenever St. Thomas discusses that influence of Platonic philosophy on St. Augustine, he nearly always has in mind the Platonic theory of ideas and no other aspect of Plato's philosophy. According to St. Thomas, St. Augustine translates these ideas into thoughts existing in the Divine Mind¹²⁵—a Neoplatonic rather than a Platonic notion.

born, 1921]), p. 28: "Any attempt by St. Thomas and the later Thomists to close the gap which in the domain of epistemology exists between St. Augustine and the Mediaeval Aristotelians must be considered as having ended in failure. . ." Cf. É. Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 55 ff. M. Grabmann, in his *Der göttliche Grund menschlicher Wahrheitserkenntnis nach Augustinus und Thomas von Aquin* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1924), pp. 70-71, claims that St. Thomas is fully conscious of this disagreement.

123 "Augustine, however, followed Plato as far as the Catholic faith would permit it . . ." (*Quaestio Disputata de Spiritualibus Creaturis*, III, 10 ad 8). This passage makes it quite clear that St. Thomas is fully conscious of the fact that he is expounding a theory based on philosophical principles which are quite different from those on which the teachings of St. Augustine are based. Cf. É. Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 119, together with note 1.

124 Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, A, 5, 987a32 ff.

125 Cf. ". . . Augustine said that the exemplars of all creatures existed in the divine mind" (*ST*, I, 84. 5; Pegis, I, 804). It should be remembered, however, that already certain members of the so-called Middle Platonism had clearly stated that the Platonic ideas are actually "eternal thoughts in the mind of God." See, for instance, Albinus, *Didascalus*, p. 163 (ed. Hermann in Vol. VI of his edition of Plato's works, Leipzig, 1851-53) and Atticus in Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica*, XV, 13 ff. (*PG*, 1337-42). This important and far-reaching reinterpretation of the nature of Plato's ideas was taken up not only by the Neo-Pythagoreans (see, for instance, Nicomachus of Gerasa in his Αριθμητικὴ Εἰσαγωγὴ, ed. R. Hoche [Leipzig: Teubner, 1866]), as well as Philo of Alexandria in *De Cherubim* XXXV, 125 ff. (ed. Cohn-Wendland [Berlin: Reimer, 1896], I, 199), and the Neo-Platonists, but also by many fathers of the church. Thus, as H. Diels has pointed out in his *Doxographi Graeci* (Berlin and Leipzig: W. de Gruyter), p. 567, the *Philosophumena* of

In this connection there are to be found in St. Thomas frequent references to certain common Neoplatonic terms such as "light" and "illumination" and the relation between the two. These terms also are often used by St. Augustine to describe the relationship of the Ineffable One to the individual created things. But whenever St. Thomas encounters these terms he seems always to have in mind a well-known passage from Aristotle's *De Anima* which reads as follows:

Since in every class of things . . . we find two factors, (1) a matter which is potentially all the particulars included in the class, (2) a cause which is productive in the sense that it makes them all . . . [and] these distinct elements must likewise be found within the soul. And in fact mind . . . is what it is by virtue of becoming all things, while there is another which is what it is, by virtue of making all things: this is a sort of positive state like light. For in a sense light makes potential colors into actual colors.¹²⁶

It is only natural that St. Thomas would translate the Neoplatonic-Augustinian terms of light and illumination into typical Aristotelian nomenclature, forgetting that in St. Augustine these two terms have a particular meaning which Aristotle's statement completely lacks. Nor does St. Thomas always realize that when St. Augustine attempts to express the close interrelation between God and every form of intellectual knowledge by using the Neoplatonic imagery of light and illumination, he is only offering a sort of paraphrase of the nature of a relation, the true essence of which, according to St. Augustine, can by no means be completely explained in a paraphrase. St. Thomas also fails to do full justice to the Augustinian assumption that all our intellectual knowledge is dependent upon divine co-operation. For our intellectual or cognitive powers, like all our acts, are nothing other than divinely imparted powers. Although the manner in which St. Thomas at times reshapes and reinterprets certain Augustinian notions might strike us as being artificial and even arbitrary, it should always be remembered that St. Thomas himself merely Hippolytus in their report on the teachings of Plato definitely go back to a source which belongs to Middle Platonism. As a matter of fact, it is fairly safe to assume that the majority of the church fathers derived their knowledge of Platonic philosophy not so much from the study of Plato's authentic works, but rather from that type of Platonic tradition which developed during the second century A.D. in the so-called Middle Platonism.

¹²⁶*De Anima*, Γ, 5, 430a10-17; Richard McKeon, *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York: Random House, 1941), pp. 591-92. Permission to quote from this work has kindly been granted by the publisher.

wants to align these notions with his own views through the medium of gentle adjustment, rather than make any radical alteration of their original meaning. And since most of the Augustinian passages quoted had been torn from their larger context, this meaning might often only vaguely be known to St. Thomas.

The other reason why St. Thomas, rather than disregard the Augustinian tradition, subjects it to certain important changes, is to be found in the accidents of history. Both the writings of Aristotle and the works of the Arabic philosophers in their Latin translations became known to the medieval world approximately at the same time. In particular the teachings of Avicenna and Averroes, which are a rather fantastic mixture of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic elements, made a profound impression upon a number of influential medieval thinkers.¹²⁷ Hence, St. Thomas, among others, felt himself compelled to combat these teachings both in his great systematic works and also in a special treatise.¹²⁸ It is this opposition to the followers of Avicenna and Averroes in particular which profoundly influenced St. Thomas's interpretation and alteration of certain Augustinian passages. For above all he intended to prevent any possible exploitation of St. Augustine in support of Avicennan and Averroist notions.¹²⁹ While it is

127 Cf. "The influence of Averroes on the Latin thought of the Middle Ages, as a matter of fact, becomes immediately manifest. The influence of Avicenna, although much less manifest and certainly more complex than that of Averroes, was nevertheless equally persistent. As a matter of fact, it might be said that the latter excelled the former by the depth to which it penetrated Mediaeval Thought" (É. Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 7). The position in which the Augustinian philosopher found himself as regards the influence of Averroes and Avicenna is made clear by É. Gilson: ". . . the greater part rejected him [Averroes], although some accepted him. . . Avicenna was by no means more acceptable . . . But the Christians, whose thought, through the intermediary of St. Augustine, had already been conditioned by Proclus and Plotinus, could find in him [Avicenna] the same Platonism which had been influenced by the Syrian Christians" (*ibid.*).

128 St. Thomas, *De Unitate Intellectus Contra Averroistas*. As to the relationship of St. Thomas to the teachings of Averroes and Avicenna see, among others: E. Rénan, *Averroës et l'Averroïsme* (2d ed.; Paris: Michel Levy, 1861), pp. 236-46; P. Mandonnet, "Polémique averroïste de Siger de Brabant et de S. Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue Thomiste*, III (1895), 704-18; IV (1896), 18-35, 689-710; V (1897), 95-110; P. Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant et l'Averroïsme latin du XIII^e siècle*, (2d ed.; Louvain: 1911), Vol. I; F. Picavet, "L'Averroïsme et les Averroïstes du XIII^e siècle d'après le *De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas* de S. Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, XLV (1902), 56-69; M. Chossat, "S. Thomas d'Aquin et Siger de Brabant," *Revue Philosophique*, XIV (1914) I, 553-75; II, 25-52.

129 The rather unusual fact that St. Thomas was sent to Paris in January, 1269 (i.e., in the middle of the academic year) had two special reasons.

undoubtedly true that by readjusting, reinterpreting, and reorientating certain Augustinian statements, St. Thomas tried to reconcile them with the fundamental ideas of Aristotelian-Scholastic thought, it should not be overlooked that one of the motives behind his policy was to prevent the followers of Avicenna and Averroes from claiming St. Augustine for themselves. It might also be said, on the other hand, that St. Thomas rejected in St. Augustine (or in the Augustinian tradition) the teachings of Averroes and Avicenna which make their appearance under the guise of Augustinianism.¹³⁰ In addition, St. Thomas knew that Avicenna followed Plato to a certain extent¹³¹ and that St. Augustine likewise followed Plato, "as far as his Catholic faith would permit him."¹³² Thus the issue between St. Thomas and St. Augustine can be reduced to the basic issue between Platonism and Aristotelianism.

Reduced to their bare essence, these two metaphysical systems are strictly antinomistic. One cannot side in with the one without being against those who side in with the other. And this is the reason why St. Thomas aligns himself with Aristotle against all those who align themselves with Plato.¹³³ To take the stand against the teachings of Plato in favor of the teachings of Aristotle means implicitly the reconstruction of Christian philosophy on a different basis than that offered by St. Augustine.¹³⁴

1) Gerardus Reverii had fallen sick towards the end of the year 1268, and had to be replaced by a competent teacher of theology; 2) the Averroists were rapidly gaining ground at the university. In order to check this dangerous development it became necessary to dispatch at once the most capable scholar to this all-important post in Paris. Cf. P. Mandonnet, "S. Thomas d'Aquin, Lecteur," *Xenia Thomistica*, III, 33 ff.

130Cf. É. Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

131Cf. *ST*, I, 84, 4.

132St. Thomas, *Quaestio Disputata de Spiritualibus Creaturis*, III, 10 ad 8.

133É. Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

134É. Gilson, *ibid.*

NOTES AND DISCUSSION

NOTES ON UNIVERSALS

Arthur Berndtson

The problem of the nature, function, and reality of universals has been celebrated in the history of philosophy for reasons as specialized as those of certain apologists for original sin, and as comprehensive and integral as philosophy itself. Without doubt the problem of universals lies at the center of philosophy and reaches out with devious sureness to many parts of its periphery. The problem concerns the student of language and the metaphysician; it is related to the topic of structure, which begins with logic and continues in the other parts of philosophy; it underlies the opposition of rationalism and empiricism; it helps to generalize epistemology, for the problem of the relation of the content of concepts to the processes of conceptual apprehension is of the same type as the problem of the relation of the contents of sense perception to the knower; it concerns psychology, beginning with memory, proceeding to habit, and terminating in self; it is intimately connected with theology, as shown in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity and the more general theory of the Logos; it touches upon art and beauty, in regard to intuition and the existence of standards of taste; and it has aroused absolutists in ethics from Plato to Nicolai Hartmann. For the most part these are branchings of the problem, which in essence is the problem of the conditions and extent of intelligibility in the world. And this essence is philosophy in its most general sense.

Honesty if not modesty forbids most inquirers from discoursing on all of these topics, whether simultaneously or in the course of a long life. Good strategy suggests that a frontal attack on the conditions and extent of intelligibility may not achieve very much. What this paper will attempt is an examination of two aspects of the problem: one is the phenomenology of universals, dealing with the characteristics of universals as they appear in our experience, apart from psychological questions of genesis and methodological questions of epistemic value; the other is the metaphysics of universals, concerned with the question of the type of reality to be ascribed to universals. Since even these questions are large, and much writing has been devoted to at least the second of them, the intent of this paper is mainly heuristic, to suggest problems and to clarify meanings, rather than dogmatic, to disengage a select body of true conclusions.

I

An analysis of the characteristics of universals may well begin with the distinction of form and content. Universals are differentiated primarily by their contents and are substantially alike in their form, although the degree to which a given formal property applies may vary. Universals share their contents with whatever particulars and individuals correspond to them, but in form they are sharply distinguished from particulars. In consequence, the apprehension of the content of universals stems from sensory and introspective forms of intuition, as noted by empiricists; but the form of universals is apprehended through postintuitive processes exemplified by memory, comparison, and abstraction, which the rationalist is apt to gather together under the heading of "reason."

The content of a given universal may safely, and darkly, be referred to as a "what." It should not be called an event, or occurrent, or existent, for it is not intrinsic to its "whatness" or contentuality that it occur or exist. It might be called a quality, except for the sensuous and nonrelational associations of that term: the content of a universal, apart from form, may be sensuous or nonsensuous and either simple or structured. It might be called a property, provided the question is not raised of what it is the property. Perhaps the best descriptive term is that of nature or essence, where the notion of essence is stripped of substantial and teleological affiliations.

Qualifying the content of, or essence in, a universal are a number of characteristics which constitute the universality of the universal. Of these formal properties, perhaps the most obvious is generality. The generality of a universal consists in its applicability to an indefinite number of particulars. This is an extrinsic aspect of form, since it holds only in relation to particularity; but it is independent of the existence of particulars and therefore is not contingent. The generality of universals is the basis of communication, whether from past to present in memory, or of person and person in society: this is the function of universals which is most important in human experience. Universals are not contracted to any given occasion and therefore can expand to the vicarious enjoyment, in principle, of every occasion. This gives them an extensive and perhaps diaphanous character, in opposition to the intent passion of particulars for the occasion which defines them. Thus universals exemplify the Whiteheadian dictum that the art of persistence is to be dead. This is true of universals in respect of their generality; but whether it is true of them in other ways remains to be seen. And it is not implied by these

negatives that universals have generality only by diminution of essence or content. It is true that a universal such as "figure" is relatively more general than a universal such as "triangle"; but it is not clear, from the nature either of universals or of temporal process, that a complex of essences determinate enough to exhaust an individual should therefore be debarred from generality: recurrence is not automatically novelty.

A second formal characteristic of universals is abstractness—an ambiguous term, sometimes confused with generality and much in need of clarification. In some contexts the abstract is identified with the nonsensuous; but in this sense universals are not always abstract: the essence in redness is as sensuous as the essence in any particular case of red. In other cases the abstract is taken as synonymous with the general. To do this by stipulation is not here to the point, since the concept of the general has already been appropriated. The notion of abstractness which is both useful and applicable is that of separateness or separatedness—the latter adding a verbal force to the purely adjectival character of the former. In this sense of the word universals are abstract in certain respects and problematically abstract in others. (a) Universals are separate from the locus of particulars, as indicated by their generality, discussed above, and by their potentiality, to be noted below. But the supposition that they exist or have being only as separated from or abstracted from particulars entails the empiricist's claim of the epistemic priority of knowledge of particulars and the nominalist's or conceptualist's claim of the human subjectivity of universals. Both of these positions lie beyond the province of the phenomenology of universals. As far as the present method is concerned, universals as separate might be prior in being to particulars and knowable through nondiscursive processes by a divine mind. (b) Whether universals are abstract in the sense that they are separate from each other is a debatable matter of the first importance. If universals are externally related to each other, knowledge of a given universal will yield no knowledge of any other universal. The tracing of connections between the essences or characters of our experience must then be left to our experience of particulars, which supplies no warrant for synthetic propositions of a universal kind. This problem will be taken up again, in connection with the metaphysics of universals. But all parties will agree that there are at least some cases of externality of relation among universals. Thus colority is externally related to redness, as indicated by its equal compatibility with blueness; and every color is externally related to whatever type of figure it is associated with when illus-

trated. These universals are therefore abstract in both of the basic directions: in relation to particulars, as an extrinsic aspect of their form, and in relation to universals, as an intrinsic aspect of their form.

Candidacy for a third formal characteristic of universals is supplied by the notions of indeterminacy and its reciprocal, that is, determinability. These notions emerge out of the hierarchy of genera and species, of which it can be said that genera are indeterminate and determinable in relation to their species. The concept of indeterminacy seems to involve the concept of relative degrees of saturation of essence, or "wealth of connotation." The concept of determinability seems to imply a special aptitude for one affiliation rather than another. On these points certain suggestions may be made. (a) No given universal exhausts the entire realm of essence; in this sense it is indeterminate; but it fails to exhaust all essence because of its qualitative finitude, which is a selective determination to one essence rather than another. The apparent paradox, of indeterminacy based on determination, is due to ambiguity, which can be resolved by suggesting that indeterminacy is not comparative deficiency of essence in any respect indiscriminately, but comparative deficiency in respect of a further essence for which the indeterminate essence has a peculiar aptitude. Thus the indeterminacy of a genus may be stated as involving deficiency of essence in relation to the species into which it is divisible. (b) But species can be constructed with some measure of arbitrariness, in relation to the purpose at hand; this corresponds to the notion that at least some cases of externality of relation among universals can be found; and for both reasons the notion of "peculiar aptitude" for certain further affiliation is suspect. Thus to the generic character of ink can be added a differentia of color, such as blueness, and a differentia in regard to time, such as permanence, thus giving the fairly determinate species of permanent blue inks; but these characters or essences might be combined in any order and have points of other affiliation quite independent of each other. (c) If indeterminacy is neither deficiency of essence simply, nor deficiency of essence in some respect defined by peculiar aptitude, it may still be considered as deficiency of essence in regard to illustration in particulars and individuals. Undoubtedly both factors are involved. A particular sharing the content of a certain species of blueness does not exist by itself, but in apparent affiliation with a number of other particulars sharing the content of their respective universals, such as a certain species of smoothness and another of circular figure. The minimum set of characters or essences

required for occupancy of time defines the minimum individual, which is always a complex of particulars. Universals thus are indeterminate in relation to individuals by virtue of the indeterminacy of their respective particulars to the individuals of which they are parts. To this may be added the indeterminacy of some universals in relation to particulars. Although it has been suggested that a universal may have sufficient essence to correspond exactly with a particular, as when a certain species of blueness may be defined by pointing to a certain particular case, it is more likely, for the purposes of communication, that blueness will be conceived with less content, in order to apply to more cases. The more general blueness thus conceived is indeterminate in relation to the particulars involved, but the blueness defined by pointing is not indeterminate in relation to its particular(s). The one blue is doubly indeterminate, in relation to both individuals and particulars; the other is indeterminate only in relation to individuals. And universals are logically conceivable which are not indeterminate in relation to individuals either. For if universals which are determinate in relation to the particulars in question are compounded in sufficient complexity, they will be determinate in relation to their individuals. (d) Universals may also be considered as indeterminate in relation to the processes and purposes of human apprehension. Thus the content of a typical concept of blueness is deficient in essence in comparison with the content of an image of a blue color. Since images follow sense data, which in turn give us particulars, this psychological level of indeterminacy is derivative from the level previously discussed.

In summary of these four approaches to the notion of indeterminacy it may be said that universals are indeterminate insofar as they may be deficient in essence, but they are deficient in essence not intrinsically but in relation to the nature of human apprehension on the one hand and the nature of particularization and individuation on the other. As parts they are less than wholes; but as parts or as wholes they are indefeasibly what they are and have no need to be more. If universals are thus only adventitiously indeterminate, it is still possible to recognize in them a type of determinateness which seems to be of their basic nature. This involves the Platonic concept of the One and the Pythagorean concept of the Limit. These terms can be interpreted to suggest that the scale of being involves not only the relation of universals to particulars and individuals, but also the relation of universals to a source which is neither universal nor particular. The Idea of the Good in Plato suggests such a source, which as the "author of essence" or universals is itself not essence and as the

logical antecedent of determinate multiplicity is itself neither determinate nor multiple. The concept of Limit, as involving boundary and measure, answers to the determinate status of universals in relation to their presumed source. All universals are determinate in this sense: they have what analogically may be called line, which sets being within bounds and thus gives it identity. But in conferring identity, line appears to separate essence from essence, as though to suggest that the emergence of universals from the parent Good is achieved at the cost of the synthetic unity which the Good presumably embodies.

A fourth aspect of form among universals may be called potentiality. This has appeared implicitly in the aspect of generality, which is a potentiality for indefinite illustration; but whether general or not, universals have potentiality for illustration in the locus of particulars. As relative to particularity, potentiality is an extrinsic property: it is conceivable that if there be a divine mind furnished with ideas, the ideas may be complete without reference to a world of creatures. And the potentiality for being after the mode of particulars is vicarious; for though an essence is made actual in time, it is not the essence as universal which becomes actual, but the essence as particular. Furthermore, the assertion of potentiality in the universal involves no commitment to any principle within the universal, such as power, as the ground of actualization. From the present standpoint universals may be viewed as passive essences, lucid and powerless. Their potentiality seems to involve merely their status as possibles. And this possibility is not in the first instance of a material kind; for material possibility is relative to laws induced from particulars, which are themselves relative to universals and their aspect of potentiality. The possibility in question is mere logical possibility, which lies in freedom from self-contradiction. Such freedom is a condition of the intrinsic determinateness of a universal; and the potentiality of a universal may be considered as an external consequence for particularity of the intrinsic determinateness of the universal.

Perhaps other aspects of form may be added to the list here rehearsed; but they may well be incidental to the aspects noted, even as the latter evidently overlap each other. The significance of these formal characters of universals may be summarized in the notion of intelligibility. Intelligibility is congruence with intellect: as such it embraces clarity and connexity. The clarity of universals is a function of their abstractness, which permits them to be seen for themselves, apart from the confusion and adventitious alliances of individuation. The connexity of universals lies in the first instance in their gener-

ality, which when illustrated unites many particulars and individuals by virtue of their similarity and thus permits the disjunct multiplicity of particulars to be superseded by the unity of types. Connexity is to be sought further in the relation of universals to each other, where it would yield synthetic deducibility if such relations could be found; but the considerable aspect of abstractness of universals in relation to each other suggests that this most desirable factor in intelligibility may not be supplied. Clarity and connexity among the objects of intellect answer to the reciprocal operations of intellect, analysis and synthesis, of which the first proliferates indefinitely, but the second seems to be inherently limited. Because of this limitation intellect returns to particulars to make contingent inductions of law, which it promptly seeks to arrange in a hierarchy mirroring its own demand for an intrinsic connection of universals. Thus intellect and universals are reciprocal to each other, the one as the agent of knowledge, the other as patient.

II

A definition of the nature of universals having been attempted, it is now in order to inquire into their ontological status: more hopefully, to inquire into what is meant by the various allegations of their different degrees of reality. Here ambiguity in the use of terms has been common; but overriding the artifices of terms has been a traditional division of the loci of universals into three zones: before particulars, in particulars, and after particulars. This division naturally requires further distinction, which is not to deny its usefulness. It also suggests a gradation of levels of reality, from the slightest and most relative to the sturdiest and most nearly absolute. We may arrange the possible theories in such order, beginning with the most cautious and ending with the most speculative.

a) The supposition that universals are relative to *semeiosis* may begin with the identification of universals with words or conventional signs. As sign vehicles, words have their own essences or characters, which are apart from the essences or characters which they are designed to communicate. Words are not primarily *sinsigns* (to use the Peircean dictionary), which as such have no communicative efficacy, but *legisigns*. Thus as sign vehicles, anterior to their intentionality, words are themselves universal. But this universal is in respect of the character of the sign vehicle rather than of whatever the word

intends and thus does not relate to the universality which has to be accounted for. Rather than reduce the universal in question to the relativity of signs, this situation plays into the hands of the moderate realist; for in their preintentional character words are as much objects in nature as are trees and colors.

In their intentionality words may be general, and in a sense even proper names are general. But words are general in their reference either because of an alleged universality in the "ideas" to which they may refer or through which they may detour, or because of factors of similarity in the objects in nature to which they may refer. In either case the generality of words is derivative, and attention shifts to the points of reference.

b) The "ideas" in question are concepts, which are also signs, though of a nature less conventional than words. Concepts typically involve words, a leading to images, which supply the clue to what is intended by the words, and a sense that the images are not the heart of what is meant, but merely exemplify it in their diverse and imperfect ways. The generality of the concept is to be found neither in the images, which are typically too determinate for the purpose at hand, nor in the words, for reasons given above, but in the sense of the merely exemplary character of the image clues. This sense embodies, or entails, a modified intentionality of the images in joint operation with the words. But this reference is subordinate to the essence meant, which constitutes the "logical" content of the concept. The subordination is teleological and does not imply the independence of the essence in relation to the psychological and symbolical processes involved. The issue between conceptualistic and realistic theories is in regard to the question of independence. To justify conceptualism it would be necessary to show that the essence is created by the acts of attention and intention involved in conceptual apprehension. Clearly our knowledge of essences as general, abstract, and indeterminate is based on such acts; but it is not equally clear that the ontological status of the essence has the same basis. It is not the intention of this paper to debate the epistemological question thus raised. But it does seem clear that the essence in question is not merely a factor of similarity in the images attended to and so of like subjective status with the images; rather it is in the first instance a factor of similarity in the particulars and individuals of which the images are copies. The essence thus calls our attention beyond the psychological contents of the concept to the world of objects. The examination of concepts thus leads in the same direction as that of words.

c) This world of particulars is first of all a world of sense data, and it may be doubted whether as such it constitutes a world. Sense data are essences, but hardly universals. The essence which constitutes a given sense datum is fleeting and does not recur. Whether sense data have factors of similarity cannot be known; for such knowledge entails comparison, which is the beginning of perceptual infection. Sense data are not abstract, since they are vividly identified with their time and place; but their times, or at least their places, may be multiple, and in this sense they may have a specious abstractness which involves confusion rather than clarity. Sense data are fully determinate, in the sense in which genera are indeterminate relative to their species; and being committed to time, they are not potential in the sense noted above.

d) The argument of moderate realism is directed toward the world of sense perception, which is a world of particulars but more especially of individuals. Particulars, like the red color or the surface texture of a book, may be viewed as constituted by what Santayana called association by similarity. Santayana regarded this status of particulars as evidence that they are themselves universals. It is evident that particulars abide for at least some span of time and are thus somewhat general in relation to the sense data out of which they are fused. The process of fusing is one which omits the supposed idiosyncrasies of the sense data and thus yields an essence somewhat indeterminate in relation to the sense data. But the generality and indeterminacy thus assigned are too qualified to identify a universal. The indeterminacy of universals starts where that of particulars ends and may mount indefinitely. The generality of particulars is not literal, for the particular is limited to its time and as particular is not applicable to other times. Thus the particular does not have the primary abstractness of universals in relation to temporal being. And being actual, it opposes the potentiality of universals.

For these reasons universals should not be identified with particulars, and the individuals compounded out of particulars by what Santayana called association by contiguity should not be regarded as constituted of universals. To do so is to disregard the form of universals in favor of their content. But the denial of identity does not imply a complete dissociation of universals from the world of particulars and individuals. Though not literally immanent in nature, universals are immanent in a secondary sense by virtue of the similarity or generic identity of particulars. Although two events or things may not be identical in essence on a level which, in relation to our purposes, is fully determinate, they may readily be found to be identical on levels

of lesser determinateness. The denial of literal immanence is not due to the retreat to levels of relative indeterminateness, but to the fact that the generality illustrated in the repetition transcends the instances involved in the repetition. But it may be denied, as by certain intuitionists, that universals have even a secondary immanence, on the ground that similarities are appearances and not realities, that they are concoctions of scheming mind and exist only in the perspectives of such mind. This question is again too large to be debated in this paper. But it may be suggested that utility involves some degree of relevance and that relevance hints at truth. And the levels of appearance that similarities are said to qualify may be regarded as nature itself; so that the reality of similarity may be of the same degree as the reality of the particulars and individuals among which it is claimed to exist. Nothing more is needed for the thesis of the secondary immanence of universals in particulars and individuals; and this secondary status, apart from the question of appearance, is all that moderate realism need contend for. And those who would look beyond the spatio-temporal ensemble for an absolute may contemplate a paradoxical schism regarding the absolute, as between those who find Reality in a locus more truly universal than nature and wholly timeless, and those for whom Reality is more durational than nature itself and antithetical to the universal.

e) Of these two varieties of absolutism, the second does not concern us further, but the first does, since it directs attention from the alleged loci among signs and particulars to a locus independent of these and more fundamental. Despite the historical vogue of Platonism, the concept of the primordial status of universals has been neither established nor clarified. At its minimum, this concept merely asserts that universals subsist timelessly by virtue of their "logical" essence. This "logical" essence consists in their determinate "line" and their freedom from self-contradiction, and it entails what may tautologically be called a "logical" mode of being. If it is argued that such a mode of being is merely the last and phantasmal resort of those who refuse to identify universals with the psychological acts of attention and symbolization, and who wish to provide for universals that are not illustrated in nature, it may be answered that this mode of being is also designed to provide for the feeling that prior to actuality there is possibility, which has a status anterior to actuality in general and to the specialized actualities of mental operation. The question is as to the nature of the anteriority. It is not temporal priority, which would not be to the point. If it is merely logical priority, the question is begged, by expounding "logical" being in terms

of logical priority. The priority may then be considered to be of a metaphysical order, as illustrated by the theory of the creation of time by deity and the being of universals in the divine mind. This last will be considered shortly; it goes beyond the present stage. But of the concept of subsistence it may reasonably be said that, although its possibility may match that of the essences allocated to it, the degree of reality here envisaged is rather thin in comparison with the expectations of those who would be Platonists.

f) Substance can be added to the doctrine of subsistent essences if to their status as possibilities is added a factor of necessity. This might be entertained in either a statical or a dynamical way. In the former, necessity would consist in connections between universals, involving internal relations among them and entailing the possibility of synthetic knowledge *a priori*. The scheme of categories traced in the Hegelian dialectic exemplifies, or aspires to exemplify, such necessity. The import for ontological status of this type of necessity among universals can be seen by considering that if universals are relative to human symbolism, they can have only such content as is given to them and therefore can sustain only analytic functions. If universals have status primarily among particulars, their connections extend only as far as do the connections of particulars, which yield no universal or necessary knowledge. If, then, universal and synthetic knowledge can be obtained, the implication is that universals have being beyond the province of symbolism and the realm of individual fact. Whether the antecedent holds is not the concern of this paper; it is sufficient to disengage a formula yielding some substance to the concept of the independent being of universals.

g) What might be called a dynamical factor of necessity would consist in power on the part of universals leading to their illustration and thus to the construction of nature. Whereas the statical type may be viewed analogically as involving power of universals in relation to each other, the dynamical type involves power of universals in relation to particulars. But universals do not seem to be efficient causes. Nature has a surd in space and time which eludes the efficacy of universals. If universals influence process, it is either by an appetency inherent in "matter" or by the intervention or mediation of mind. As final cause the universal may influence process; but this is only through the telic nature of a being whose defining characteristic lies in its otherness in relation to universals. "Matter" cannot be derived from universals; and this primordial status answers to the non-rational character of existence. Although this directly sets a limit on the power of universals, it indirectly flatters such power; for if uni-

versals should be final causes, nothing could so testify to their efficacy as command over the operation of an essentially alien being.

h) Although "matter" in regard to its appetency may well be called mind, the intervention or mediation of mind in relation to universals and process may more readily be thought of in connection with the human mind and especially with deity. The most ambitiously contrived lodgment for universals is in the mind of God. For some this is an argument for the existence of God, and for others it is an argument for the being of universals. By virtue of its comprehensive and integrative character, this theory comes nearest to identifying the universal with the absolute. Further one cannot hope to go. But at the same time, and paradoxically, it seems to close the circle, since it identifies the universal with concepts and amounts, in its extreme realism, to a divine conceptualism. It is distinguished from the conceptualism which hovers near the relativistic start of this examination in two respects: metaphysically, by the assertion of the independence of the universal in relation to the particular; and methodologically, as a corollary, by the assertion that the divine apprehension of concepts is not discursive but intuitive. These are important differences, but they do not obscure the similarity between the two forms of conceptualism. What is common to both is the sense that nothing is real except the agents and patients of mind. But reality has two aspects, of which one is intelligible and the other dynamical. Divine conceptualism is not content to let the intelligible hover in a disembodied shadowspace, as after the metaphors of the theory of logical and subsistential modes of being. For it, the intelligible is not secure unless it is an object of cognition. But cognition as an act signifies not only the intelligible as its object, but embodies the dynamical factor of reality in its process. Thus divine conceptualism seems to hold that the intelligible is not secure apart from the dynamical. We may reasonably ask what it is that the latter can do for the intelligible. It does not seem that the dynamical factor can make the intelligible more or less of what it inherently is. If the purest moral idealism discerns its values and makes its commitments apart from any endorsement by an extrinsic power, whether human or divine, we may look for a like independence and purity in the conduct of intellect. The lesser moralist frequently wavers in this matter, and the lesser logician may do so also. But it is probable that a further factor is involved. By relating the intelligible to divine cognition, it may indirectly be related to divine volition in general, which may be conceived to extend to other matters than merely the operation of cognition. Thus the dynamical affiliate of the intelligible may be relevant in connecting the latter with the crea-

tive fiat and thus with the ensuing world of particulars. The formula here becomes the common one of the joint participation of divine intellect and divine will in the creation of the sensible world and of finite minds. If this be the intent of divine conceptualism, the theory is not so much concerned with the reality of universals as with the nature of their rapport with particulars. But in claiming to establish such rapport, the theory implicitly harkens back to the conception noted in paragraph g above, in which the reality of universals is made to consist in their power. Granting that universals have no direct influence on process, the theory supplies indirect influence through the agency of deity.

Whether such agency exists is not a topic for this paper. But it may be asked of this theory, as of its predecessors, whether it serves any purpose commensurate in value with the cognitive risks involved in accepting it. At stake in regard to the reality of universals are a number of motives. One of these is the desire for communication, which is satisfied by the theories which relate universals to signs and to the world of particulars and individuals. Nothing more speculative than the secondary immanence of universals is required for communication. The demands for action in a spatio-temporal environment are similarly met, and certain disparagers of universals are content in this matter with less. A contingent science can be constructed within the limits of moderate realism, but the ideal of a rationally necessary science requires the statical necessity which defines one of the transcendent realisms. What is peculiar to the dynamical and theological versions of transcendent realism is their concern for the genesis of existence as such. This topic seems to be beyond the province of intelligence; and the hypotheses directed toward it, such as those of matter and a divine will, seem to have the same extra-mural position. This is not to reject these hypotheses, but to grant that in the beginning was the act and not the word.

A NOTE ON "NOTES ON UNIVERSALS"

Linus J. Thro, S.J.

Occasional words and phrases and methods of approach in this paper are reminiscent of Montague, Perry, Whitehead, Santayana, and others, who in the last half-century have striven toward, and with varying success achieved, some sort of epistemological realism. There seem to be, moreover, certain neorealistic assumptions latent in Pro-

ffessor Berndtson's handling of universals in isolation from the things which they signify, and the impression is confirmed by his description of the individual as a complex of particularized universals. Still, his phenomenological analysis of the characteristics of universals shows an earnestness and originality which may be expected to stimulate sober thinking on a problem which in the recent past has been either ushered incontinently out of philosophical thought as medieval or—all too often by Scholastics, whatever their cast of mind—handled on a sterile terministic or conceptualistic basis. The paper merits careful study. In commenting on a few points I aim neither at singling out all its excellent features nor at questioning all that might be questioned, nor certainly at denying the validity of Professor Berndtson's phenomenological method. Rather, I wish to suggest that he does not press it far enough.

An examination of the characteristics of universals as they appear in our experience must deal with significant generic words of ordinary speech, significant because they express meaningfully the notions which are part of our thinking. Take the sentence, "Mister, your dog is limping." The only word that concerns us for the moment is "dog"; "is limping" is verbal and the other words are particularized. "Dog" is suggested to the mind of the speaker by the thing before his eyes which he knows by that name. He knows it by that name because the name means to him the same as he knows this thing to be, whatever be the prior experience which has built up that knowledge for him. So it is the meaning of the name of a thing which is primarily in question when we discuss universals. Professor Berndtson dismisses content with only a passing notice and concentrates on what he designates as the form of universals. And he does so with reason, at least in the first part of his treatment, where his interest is to disengage the most general possible aspects of universals. I should like to suggest, however, that the whole discussion of the reality of universals loses point, and perhaps even the key to its solution, if only the formal characteristics found to be common to universals are considered. If their meaning should turn out to be the basis of any consistency they have, their reality must be considered primarily from the side of their content rather than their form.

To approach this criticism from another angle: the formal characteristics of the universal—namely, generality, abstractness, indeterminacy, potentiality—are said to constitute the universality of the meaningful content of the universal. In justice to this really acute analysis of the qualities of universals, this much may well be granted. But further, "the significance of these formal characteristics of the

universal is summarized in the notion of intelligibility," where intelligibility is defined as congruence with intellect. That may be quite accurate for one sense of the term, a purely etymological sense. Yet surely intelligibility is not sufficiently accounted for in terms of universality or of "the characteristics of a universal which constitute its universality." "Congruence with intellect" might be applied equally well to the capacity for laughter, to right moral activity, and so on; but intelligibility says or immediately involves understandable meaning. The contentual element of universals seems to be not only by-passed but wholly sacrificed when intelligibility is identified with universality or with "clarity and connexity." The so-called content of a universal, and therefore the meaning by which it signifies a reality, have prior rights over its formal qualities whenever intelligibility comes into question. Consequently, no treatment of universals can safely ignore content and meaning or, by means of formalizing the notion of intelligibility, subsume them under the formal qualities of the universal.

The point of these remarks and the necessity for doing justice to all the elements in our experience of universal knowledge become clear when one considers the second part of the paper. The universal, whose nature and characteristics have been determined in the first part, is here found to be immanent in the world; so that the problem of the reality of the universal is solved in favor of an embodiment of the universal in things.

Without entering in detail into the subtle analysis of the possible variations on this position, one may in fairness note that the position itself is not established. On the question of the reality of universals two and only two mutually exclusive alternatives are envisioned: either the universal is a real, distinct, and resistant universal entity in things, or it is not. The second alternative is unacceptable because it involves nominalism and cannot square with the fact of universal knowledge. The first, that the universal as we have it in experience is solidly real and immanent as a universal in things, is adopted in principle, and, as Professor Berndtson develops it, refined into a more respectable position than it appears to be in a bald statement of ultrarealism. Without insisting at the moment that the disjunction is not complete, one at least sees that to discuss the reality of universals as though the above nominalist-realist dilemma were a true one implies a far-reaching assumption on the nature of knowledge. It is taken for granted that the truth of knowledge demands that there be a one-for-one correspondence between knowledge and reality; in other words, that the way in which an object appears in knowledge

dictates the sort of reality that object must have in things. To put it in the terms Professor Berndtson uses, not merely the content of a universal but its formal characteristics as well (generality, abstractness, indeterminacy, and potentiality) must be part of the real world.

If, then, the proper work of philosophy is to seek out "the conditions and extent of intelligibility in the world," the solution to the problem of the reality of the universal in individuals must be the culminating achievement of the philosopher. Let us see how this "moderate realism" finds universals realized in individuals. The individual is envisaged as a complex of particularized properties (essences) or aspects. The particular is any such aspect insofar as it is communicated to the knower through a combination of sense data. Thus the individual is said to be compounded of particulars, just as the particular is fused out of sense data. Now the particular is simply the particularized universal, less general, less abstract, more determinate and consequently less determinable, more actually exemplified in the concrete and therefore less potential. Still, the particular is nonetheless in its own way universal and formally intelligible in reality just as it is in knowledge. Sense data, too, must be granted a certain formal entity of their own in things. Described as sensed essences, each fleetingly representing a lesser aspect in one time, even sense data have a diminished, but nonetheless stable, universality, although at this level the surd of time and space threatens to leave a shadow on the perfect formal intelligibility of the individual. The individual, therefore, is an ordered arrangement of formal entities, each in its own degree and manner realizing the formal characteristics of the universal as it appears in experience. The individual's only title to individuality—that is, to be this one thing rather than that—is, it would seem, the unique concretion of formal aspects by which it is distinguishable from every other.

It is reasonable, I think, if I have not overdrawn Professor Berndtson's realism, to suggest that historically this position is not altogether a new one. Porphyry found difficulty in reconciling the Aristotelian logic with his own fundamental Platonism. He raised a question which Boethius accepted as a challenge and made into a battleground for centuries of acute thinkers after him: What reality have genera and species? For Boethius the origin of ideas presented no problem. Things are intelligible obviously since we do understand them, and the senses somehow present their intelligibility to the mind. Genera and species, therefore, must be realized in things, just as they are understood. Of course, in real things these universal forms are compounded together, whereas in the mind they are distinct and

separated one from another. The real individual differs from the understood by this togetherness of its components. They differ, therefore, as the concrete and the abstract, where concrete means concreted and abstract means separate or discrete. Passing over the centuries of instructive controversy on the subject of universals, we find in Gilbert de la Porréé the Boethian position on the constitution of the individual highly refined but fundamentally unchanged. Gilbert explains the individuality of each thing by the totality of its intelligible forms. Only by that totality is its unlikeness to every other individual guaranteed, since by each of its component forms it is like every other.

Gilbert, at least, if not Boethius, was aware of the importance of the problem he tried to solve. But his solution was no better for that. He left his world a series of form-clusters, each distinct from every other by its distinctive accretion of forms and none with the solidity and unique individuality of the real material things we know and deal with. True to his Platonic conviction that reality must be constituted of the intelligible formal aspects by which we know material things, Gilbert reconstructed the individual without serious regard for either its matter or its existence. Matter and existence, it is perfectly true, are not directly knowable by universals; they are nevertheless part and parcel of our experience of reality. And unless the philosopher finds the way through an examination of experience to a full accounting for these elements of the real, he may easily find his world losing all but the reality of intelligible forms and bog down in an immaterialist Platonism. That seems to be true, whether the philosopher lives in the sixth century, the twelfth, or the twentieth.

To amplify a remark made above, full justice must be done to all the elements of our knowledge of the real. The universal is not the whole of knowledge. The formal characteristics of the universal cannot with impunity be treated in isolation from, and to the exclusion of, its significant content. Nor can the consideration of the reality signified be excluded. The universal, which we examine in our experience, has in the first instance meaning (and therefore content) and has some mental status (and therefore the formal characteristics of universality, and so on) in the context of a complex knowledge of some real thing.

What is more important, even considered in its transparent reference to the thing it signifies, the universal is far from being the whole of the knowledge. In such a unit of knowledge as "Your dog is limping," there is not just a universal meaning with the formal characteristics of a universal. Nor is there merely a meaning which presents to the mind a particular dog in a definite time and space, that is, an individ-

ual being which exists prior to, and independent of, one's knowledge of it. Over and above those facts of the knowledge—or rather, in composition with them—there is the clear-cut judgment that this particular being is at the moment performing an action of a definite sort. The speaker asserts in an oral judgment an action which he has mentally apprehended; the hearer apprehends the same action through the expressed judgment of the other and looks to the dog to ascertain whether his pet is really walking with a limp. The actions of particular beings are indisputably within our grasp. Judgments about things, therefore, are just as surely part of our knowledge as any general aspects of the things themselves. That is why I suggest that to do justice to the real, and even to establish whatever reality may be attributed to universals, a careful examination of all the elements of our knowledge is indispensable.

AN EMENDATION OF A REPLY OF
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS'S *DE POTENTIA* 9. 7 ad 6
Robert W. Schmidt, S.J.

There is a difficulty in the text of St. Thomas's *De Potentia* 9. 7 ad 6 as it stands in the common editions. The context is a succinct little treatise on the distinction of the transcendentals or four first concepts: being, the one, the true, and the good. After pointing out that the others cannot "contract" being by restricting its extension to some particular kind of being, for they would then not be coextensive with being, universally applicable, and truly "first" concepts, St. Thomas states that what they add to being cannot, therefore, be something real, but only something conceptual: *Hoc autem esse non potest nisi addant aliquid secundum rationem tantum*. He then enumerates what this could be—and here arises the trouble.

*Hoc autem est vel negatio, quam addit unum . . . ,
vel relatio, vel aliquid quod natum sit referri universaliter ad ens; et hoc est vel intellectus, ad quem importat relationem verum, aut appetitus, ad quem importat relationem bonum; nam bonum est quod omnia appetunt.*

The reading given here is that of all the more common editions. It is in the Roman edition of 1570, in Parma and Vivès, in the earlier

Marietti editions of the *Quaestiones Disputatae*, and is repeated in the new revised Marietti edition of 1949 (whose *De Potentia* is edited by P. M. Pession, O.P.).

According to this reading three things could be added to being which would be *secundum rationem tantum*. The first two cause no difficulty. They are negation and relation. But the third is practically unintelligible, for it is said to be "something which is such as to be referred universally to being; and this is either intellect, to which the true implies a relation, or that to which the good implies a relation, appetite." This reading makes St. Thomas say that intellect and will are something unreal, having existence only in our thought. In view of the fact that he regularly regards intellect and will as real proximate principles in a real soul for real operations, the supposed statement of their unreality would be extremely difficult to reconcile. And even apart from the implied inconsistency about the reality of intellect and will, what could this statement mean, "what is added to being is intellect or will"? Supposedly the true would be "being plus intellect," and the good, "being plus will." But the qualifying phrases subsequently added do not say that the true implies *intellect*, simply and in itself, but a *relation to intellect*; and the good, not the *will* itself, but a *relation to will*. The only way of saving the sense of the passage would be to suppose that St. Thomas was not speaking very carefully but was using the name of the term of a relation to designate the relation itself. Apart from the fact that to attribute such slovenliness to him is not very complimentary, the explanation indicated still leaves unintelligible why, if by intellect and will St. Thomas meant relations to intellect and will, this forms a third kind of conceptual being distinct from relation. A further difficulty left is the hurried way in which relation itself is tossed off without qualification or explanation, as if relation in itself, and therefore universally, were only a conceptual being. The many great internal difficulties in this passage strongly indicate that the reading is corrupt.

Not only is the internal evidence of the reply itself against the correctness of the reading, but so also is the broader internal evidence drawn from other passages of St. Thomas. In *De Veritate* 21.1 c, where he is discussing the good, he says that the good, which adds something to the notion of being but yet does not contract it, must therefore add something which has existence only in reason (*et sic oportet quod bonum, ex quo non contrahit ens, addat aliquid super ens, quod sit rationis tantum*). He then states:

Id autem quod est rationis tantum, non potest esse nisi duplex. Omnis enim positio absoluta aliquid in

rerum natura existens significat. Sic ergo supra ens, quod est prima conceptio intellectus, unum addit id quod est rationis tantum, scilicet negationem: dicitur enim unum quasi ens indivisum. Sed verum et bonum positive dicuntur; unde non possunt addere nisi relationem quae sit rationis tantum.

Here he explicitly limits the possibilities of merely conceptual being to two, negation and relation, and expressly states that the true adds to being, not intellect, but a relation to intellect, and the good adds, not will, but a relation to will. The whole of the rest of the article, including the answer to the difficulties, then goes on to develop and explain this theme. None of the difficulties of the tripartite division found in *De Potentia* 9. 7 ad 6 occur here with the bipartite division of negation and relation alone.

Another passage dealing with the same distinction of the transcendentals makes use of words very similar to those of *De Potentia* 9. 7 ad 6 when it speaks of the true and the good. It is *De Veritate* 1. 1 c, where the exposition and divisions are much more elaborate. One way of adding something to the notion of being without contracting it is to add a positive relative mode, the agreement of one being with another (*convenientiam unius entis ad aliud*). Then the text states: *Et hoc quidem non potest esse nisi accipiatur aliquid quod natum sit convenire cum omni ente*. The similarity of these words and of the immediate context to those of *De Potentia* 9. 7 ad 6 suggest, to say the least, that the doctrine also was intended to be the same. The text continues to explain that what is by nature such as to agree with all being is the soul, which is, to use Aristotle's phrase, "in a certain sense all things." In the soul there are two powers, the cognitive and the appetitive. Agreement of being with the appetitive power or will is expressed by the word "the good"; and agreement with cognitive power or intellect is expressed by "the true." Now agreement (*convenientia*) is clearly a relation; it is a relative mode of being, "the ordination of one thing to another," and (as it is called a few lines subsequently) a *comparatio*—which is one of the terms frequently used by St. Thomas to designate a relation.

From the mere chronology of the works, since the *De Potentia* is posterior to the *De Veritate*, it would be possible to suppose that St. Thomas modified his earlier opinion and adopted that of *De Potentia* 9. 7 ad 6. There is, however, nothing elsewhere either in the *De Potentia* or in later texts to bear this out. Though later statements, taken individually, are not so explicit as those already seen, they take for granted that merely conceptual being is either a negation or a

relation and that the notions of the true and the good are constituted by relations to intellect and will respectively. It will suffice to cite the *Summa Theologiae* I. 16. 1 c, where the good is said to "name that to which appetite tends" and the true, to "name that to which intellect tends." Now that to which a power tends is obviously a being with a relation to that power. This is more directly asserted a few lines further on when it is said that the thing known by the intellect is called true secundum quod habet aliquem ordinem ad intellectum—that is, by reason of a relation.

On the basis of the internal evidence, both of the passage itself and of St. Thomas's works as a whole, it therefore appears that the reading of *De Potentia* 9. 7 ad 6 is defective. It can, however, very easily be emended in such a way as to remove the internal difficulties of the passage and its disagreement with St. Thomas's other statements on the same topic. This emendation would leave the first member of the division of conceptual being untouched and combine the following two (as there given) into one. Instead of reading *vel relatio, vel aliquid*, it would then read *vel relatio AD aliquid quod natum sit referri universaliter ad ens*. All that is involved is the dropping of a comma and the changing of a *vel* to *ad*. The text is then brought into entire agreement with the other texts on the matter and forms an almost exact parallel to *De Veritate* 21. 1 c and the pertinent phrases of *De Veritate* 1. 1 c; the true and the good no longer add intellect and will in themselves to being; intellect and will are no longer made *entia rationis*; the statements about implied relations then make perfect sense; and relation is no longer tossed off unqualified and unexplained. The very simplicity of the emendation and the many advantages resulting from it highly recommend it.

On the exclusive basis of internal evidence, however, the emendation would remain conjectural, no matter how highly probable it might be. There are, moreover, some paleographical difficulties against it; for *ad* would not look much like *vel* in the manuscripts. A possible explanation¹ of how the confusion could have taken place can, however, be advanced. Since the word following the hypothetical *ad* was *aliquid*, which would be written *a'd* and look very much like the preceding *ad*, a copyist could easily have thought that this was a case of nodding repetition and have omitted the *ad*; then a later copyist could have noticed the incompleteness of the sentence and its failure to make sense and mistakenly supplied *vel* to extend the previous dis-

¹Suggested to me by Rev. L. L. Nurnberger, S.J.

junctive enumeration. The comma would, of course, then naturally be supplied. All of this is, to be sure, mere conjecture about how the mistaken reading actually came about.

That the reading of the editions is mistaken is certain. This is not affirmed merely on the basis of internal evidence. The reading demanded by the internal evidence is in fact given in the manuscripts. At my request, the Reverend R. W. Mulligan, S.J., when in Paris this past summer, very kindly consulted five manuscripts for me. The results are interesting. The five manuscripts are unanimous in giving the reading *vel relatio AD aliquid*. These manuscripts are:

- Ms. Paris, Bibliotheque Nationale Latin 15352, fol. 87vb
- Ms. Paris, Bibliotheque Nationale Latin 15806, fol. 90va
- Ms. Paris, Bibliotheque Nationale Latin 15791, fol. 269ra
- Ms. Paris, Bibliotheque de l'Arsenal 454, fol. 117rb
- Ms. Paris, Bibliotheque Mazarine 803, p. fol. 102ra

According to Axters the first of these "manifestly dates from the thirteenth century."² The second, which has the questions incorrectly numbered at the top of the page so that the question containing the reply under discussion is marked VIII, is likewise of the thirteenth century according to the catalogue.³ The fourth and fifth are said by Axters to be of the fourteenth century.⁴

The unanimity of these manuscripts suggests that either the false reading crept into one or a few manuscripts at a late date (and the manuscript basis of the early editions was very limited) or (as is more likely) the mistake was due to the carelessness of an early editor. Fuller documentation on the correct reading and some elucidation of the origin of the mistake can be expected when the Leonine edition of the *De Potentia* appears.

Meanwhile we have sufficient evidence, not only internal but also from the manuscripts themselves, to be certain that the correct reading is *vel relatio ad aliquid*. Thus another textual difficulty is removed from the works of St. Thomas Aquinas.

²E. Axters, O.P., "Pour l'état des manuscrits des *Questions Disputées* de Saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Divus Thomas* (Piacenza) XXXVIII (1935), 130.

³L. Delisle, *Inventaire des manuscrits latins de la Sorbonne conservés à la Bibliothèque impériale sous les numéros 15176-16718 du fonds latin* ("Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Chartes"), XXXI (1870), 25.

⁴*Op. cit.*, pp. 134 and 145.

"STATE SCHOOLS AND CHRISTIAN EDUCATION"

The relation between religious organizations, education, and the state is certainly one of the urgent and much-discussed problems of the day. It should, therefore, be a matter of concern for a philosopher. Moreover, as a loyal citizen, a philosopher must be deeply interested in the welfare of his country and of his fellow citizens.

An invaluable source of material for the understanding and solving of this problem is a special issue of *Lumen Vitae*, entitled "State Schools and Christian Education." In view of the amazing amount of misinformation and ignorance that have been displayed in several recent discussions, THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN is glad to recommend this issue of *Lumen Vitae*. A series of articles, covering over two hundred pages, written by authorities from every country where the problem is felt to be acute, gives the pertinent facts in a well-documented study of the problem in all its ramifications and offers a well-balanced solution.

Copies may be obtained from the Catechetical Guild, 147 E. Fifth Street, St. Paul; price, \$1.50.

CHRONICLE

An important event in the field of American philosophy was the organizational meeting of the Metaphysical Society of America at Yale University, New Haven, on April 15, 1950. At the suggestion of Professor Paul Weiss, of the Department of Philosophy of Yale University, a number of teachers and students of philosophy gathered to hear an inspiring set of papers and form a new philosophical society. The purpose of the society is to provide a means and an opportunity of philosophical discussion among those American philosophers who realize the basic importance of the perennial metaphysical problems and wish to enrich American thought by their metaphysical discussions, while hoping at the same time to enlarge metaphysics by their own contributions as serious thinkers aware of American and world problems.

The papers read at this first meeting covered a wide field of interest. The Reverend Gerald Phelan, of the University of Notre Dame, presented a study of "Being and the Metaphysicians." Professor Arnold Metzger, of the Graduate School of Science for Judaism, elaborated the phenomenology of perception in "Perception, Recollection, and Death." Professor Karl Menger of the Illinois Institute of Technology discussed "The Voluntaristic Elements in Logic and Ethics"; Mr. John E. Smith of Barnard College, "The Structure of Individuality." The final paper, by Professor G. Watts Cunningham, dean of the Graduate School of Cornell University, who unfortunately was unable to be present, studied "Metaphysics and the Quest for Clarity." This paper brilliantly discussed the search for clarity carried on by some logical positivists, showing that the propositions they admit to be meaningful necessarily imply the meaningfulness of basic propositions about reality.

At the business meeting, Professor Paul Weiss was elected temporary chairman; Mr. Richard L. Barber, secretary; and Mr. John E. Smith, treasurer. The annual membership fee was fixed at \$1.00. Membership is open to all who are seriously interested in furthering the aims of the society. THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN wishes to congratulate Professor Weiss and the members present at the first meeting of the Society for their part in inaugurating a movement which holds so rich a promise that American philosophy is at last reaching its maturity. It also urges its readers to get in touch with this movement and support it—in the firm conviction that they themselves will profit by this. The SCHOOLMAN also promises its readers that it will keep them informed of the decisions reached by the Constitutional Committee, and the Nominating and Program Committees of the new society.

THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN hopes that papers and discussions dealing with real metaphysical problems will be the fruit of the new organization. So often, when professional philosophers meet, papers and discussions turn on the teaching of philosophy, the relation of philosophy to anything and everything else, on methods. These things are good in minor doses. The one thing necessary for a philosopher is that he philosophize. That is why there is room and need for a new philosophical organization devoted single-mindedly to philosophical thinking.

The twenty-fourth annual meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association took place in St. Paul, Minnesota, on April 11 and 12. The general subject was the "Natural Law and International

Relations." The main papers were "The Metaphysical Foundations of the Natural Law," by the Reverend Charles A. Hart, of the Catholic University; "The Ethical Aspects of the Natural Law," by Charles de Koninck, of the University of Laval; "The Natural Law and International Relations," by Ben Palmer; and "The Natural Law and War Crimes Guilt," by Heinrich Rommen, of the College of St. Thomas. At the annual dinner, an address on "Revelation and Philosophy" was given by the Most Reverend James J. Byrne, Auxiliary Bishop of St. Paul; the Association address, on "The Condition of Philosophy in the Modern World," was given by Joseph Pieper, visiting professor at the University of Notre Dame; and the Presidential address on "Philosophy and World Unity" was given by the retiring president, the Reverend Ernest R. Kilzer, of St. John's University. At the business meeting, the Reverend Gerard Smith, S.J., of Marquette University, last year's vice-president, became president, and the Reverend Francis X. Meehan, of St. John's Seminary, was elected vice-president.

In 1950 the University of Dayton celebrated the centenary of its foundation, and the Society of Mary (Marianists) the centenary of their coming to the United States. THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN wishes to add the tribute of its congratulations to the University and the Society for their past achievements and its best wishes for their future success.

The philosophy section of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology had five programs at the meeting at Nashville on April 6 to 8, 1950. The papers were grouped according to the following headings: philosophic propylaea; survey; ethics, aesthetics, value theory; logic, methodology, metaphysics; and a symposium on perception.

Professor Henry Margenau (Yale University) gave a series of four lectures on "Modern Physics and Its Impact on Philosophy" in the annual Institute of Cultural Relations at Park College (Parkville, Missouri).

Professor Theodore M. Greene of Yale gave the fourteenth series of the "Mahlon Powell Lectures" at Indiana University on March 13, 14, and 15.

Dr. Maximilian Beck, professor at Central College and distinguished author, died on April 21 of this year.

The Northwestern Philosophy Club (Northwestern University) has

announced a tentative plan to begin a philosophical periodical, with contributors limited to students of philosophy who have not as yet received their doctorates. The club feels that such a journal would bring a much-needed and very useful contact between students in various universities. Philosophy clubs and graduate students in other universities are invited to get into contact with the sponsoring group.

The quarterly journal, *Ethics*, published by the University of Chicago Press is making a special offer to students and new subscribers. For students, the subscription will be \$3.50; the special introductory rate for new subscribers is \$4.25. The Press reserves the right to withdraw the offer at any time.

Of possible interest to philosophers who have unpublished manuscripts on their hands is a publication plan announced by Exposition Press. Two free booklets explaining this plan are available on request: *How to Select a Publisher* and *We can Publish Your Book*.

A new review of general interest, *Cross Currents*, will begin publication this fall. Its purpose is to reprint in translation outstanding articles from foreign sources, or those difficult of access, which deal with the relevance of Christianity and spiritual and moral ideals to the intellectual life. Its editors hope to break down some of the spiritual and intellectual isolation of Americans.

The Russian Reprint Program of the American Council of Learned Societies is doing scholars a valuable service in making important Russian source works available. In conjunction with the Universal Press (56 Market Place, Baltimore 2), the Manual of Economic and Social Statistics and the 1947 supplement to the Great Soviet Encyclopedia are being reprinted. Valuable Russian works on literature, history, and language are being offered through Edwards Brothers (Ann Arbor).

The "Current Soviet Thought Series," prepared under the auspices of the Joint Committee on Slavic Studies of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council, is published by Public Affairs Press. Among the translations offered by this service is *A Soviet History of Philosophy*, noted in this month's "Bibliography of Current Philosophical works."

A new philosophical journal, *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, has been announced by Nelson and Sons, Edinburgh. Its editor is to be A. C. Crombie, of University College, London.

The Union Mondiale des Sociétés Catholiques de Philosophie held an extraordinary general assembly in the course of the Third International Thomistic Congress in Rome.

The first postwar meeting of the Societe Thomiste was held at the end of last year. The Reverend M.-D. Chenu, O.P., is president; M. Jacques Maritain, vice-president; Mgr. Beaussart, M. E. Gilson, and R. P. Th. Deman, O.P., members; and R. P. J. Isaac, O.P., is secretary-treasurer and editor of the *Bulletin Thomiste*. The first postwar volume of the *Bulletin* has appeared, covering the years 1943-46.

Emmanuel Mounier, philosopher, founder and editor of *Esprit*, died in Paris on March 22, at the age of forty-four. M. Mounier maintained a form of personalism that stressed spiritual values.

In a special New Year issue, *Nouvelles Litteraires* printed a list of the ten most illuminating and creative thinkers of the half-century; the list was arrived at by the voting of two hundred prominent French artistic and literary personalities. The ten most important thinkers were: Einstein, Bergson, Proust, Debussy, Gide, Valery, Louis de Broglie, Freud, Picasso, and Claudel.

The Societe des Amis de Maurice Blondel, founded on December 26, 1949, at Aix-en-Provence, held its first meeting in Paris on January 27, 1950, at the home of Mme. Flory, daughter of M. Blondel. One of the projects of this society is the re-editing of Blondel's works; *L'Action* is scheduled to appear soon.

The Husserl-Archiv, a research institute at Louvain, announces the forthcoming publication of a series to be called "Husserliana." This series has as its aim the spreading of information about Husserl's teaching by means of critical text editions, which will also contain all the various emendations made by the philosopher; it will also publish hitherto unpublished manuscripts and notes, as well as a volume devoted to the documents relating to his life. The first volume, *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, edited with an introduction by S. Strasser, is already printed. Volumes planned are *Die Idee der Phänomenologie*, edited by Walter Biemel; *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, Volume I edited by Walter Biemel and Volumes II and III (in one volume) by Mrs. Marly Biemel-Wetzel.

During the summer the University of Fribourg conducted a summer school whose general theme was "Europe, tradition, and change."

Two series of lectures were devoted to philosophy. Professor N. Luyten presented a "Thomistic Synthesis," and the Reverend I. M. Bochenksi, O.P., treated "Selected Problems of Modern Philosophy in the Light of Thomism."

The Reverend Gallus-Maria Manser, O.P., died at Fribourg on February 20, 1950. Born July 25th, 1866, the learned Dominican filled many important positions in his Order and was prominent in philosophical societies. His best-known work was *Das Wesen des Thomismus* (1932). R. I. P.

On the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Berchmanskolleg (Pullach bei München), a public disputation was held in which Mr. Walter Kern, S.J., defended theses from the whole of philosophy. The objectors were His Excellency, Doctor Arthur Landgraf, Bishop of Bamberg; Doctor Gottlieb Soehngen of the University of Munich; Doctor Alois Guggenberger, C.SS.R., of Gars; and Doctor Josef Schmucker of Regensburg.

Since 1947 the *Wiener Zeitschrift für Philosophie, Psychologie und Padagogik* has been publishing scientific and philosophical articles. The board of editors is made up of S. Dempf, Th. Erismann, R. Meister, and H. Rohracher.

The Society for Philosophy of Graz, founded in 1920, has resumed its activity after an interruption of ten years, under the title of Philosophische Gesellschaft in Steiermark.

The Katholische Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Philosophen (whose secretarial headquarters were at the Berchmanskolleg, Pullach), has been combined with the philosophical section of the Görresgesellschaft; presiding over this section is Professor Alois Dempf.

The Sociedad Espanola de Filosofia, recently founded, held its first meeting on February 3, 1950. Its president is M. J. Zaragüeta, the director of the Instituto Luis Vives.

The Reverend I. M. Bocheński, O.P., has published an authoritative work on Soviet thought, *Der sowjetrussische dialektische Materialismus* (Bern: Francke).

The Soviet philosophical journal, *Voprosy Filosofii*, in 1948 printed several articles which were condemned as having departed from the ideological line. After being suspended for almost a year, the journal reappeared with a new editor, D. I. Tshesnokov. A severely critical stand was taken toward the condemned articles and the former editors.

BOOK REVIEWS

Traité de logique: Essai de logistique opératoire. By Jean Piaget. Paris: Colin, 1949. Pp. viii + 423.

Unlike most books on symbolic logic, this work, intended both as an introduction for beginners and as a vehicle for some personal theories of the author, presents a rather lengthy preliminary discussion of the meaning and foundations and basic notions of logic. This is perhaps because the author approaches the topic somewhat as an outsider, being primarily a psychologist interested in thought processes, particularly as manifested in children. Yet he is no stranger in the realm of logistic, as this book amply testifies.

The body of the work is divided into two parts, the first dealing with intrapropositional operations and the second with interpropositional. From the viewpoint of interest, however, the work has three parts. The middle section, expounding the logic of classes, relations, and sets, and the calculus of propositions, is less original than the rest. The last three chapters discuss the foundations, axioms, and groupings of deductive logic, the quantification of interpropositional operations on the analogy of quantification in syllogistic logic, and finally the nature of mathematical reasoning. This is the part which contains most of the author's original theories and will be of most interest to theoretical logicians. Its underlying theme is that logic is essentially determined by the reversibility of operations. The first part, comprising the introduction and the first chapter, seeks to induct the beginner into an understanding of logic. First the object of logic, its relations to epistemology, psychology, and mathematics, its definition and its methods are studied. Then the operations and "structures" with which logic is concerned—the meaning of propositions, classes, and relations, and the role of extension and comprehension—are explained. Since the author's conception of logic is here revealed, this part, along with the foreword, will be of interest to the traditional logician and the general philosopher.

Inasmuch as the human process of arriving at truth depends upon man's nature and the nature of the things to be known, an explanation of the basis of logic would have to be both psychological and metaphysical. The latter part of the explanation is entirely neglected in

this work, and any psychological founding of logic is resolutely rejected. Piaget does, indeed, speak of "operations"; but he means by them only the transformations or manipulations of the structure of knowledge, and not the psychological activity of knowing. Holding the autonomy of the sciences, he insists that the foundations of logic must be in logic itself; and he finds them in the totality of logical structure. Throughout he emphasizes the "logic of the totality." Thus logic is a self-contained system, and the consistency of the total structure is its foundation. Proceeding by generalization from actual thought processes, it is, according to Piaget, primarily empirical and positive, and only indirectly normative.

The object of logic is rightly said to be the structures of operations. Though Piaget shows less disdain for "content" than most "formal" logicians, he nevertheless maintains that logic seeks to be purely formal and treats only of forms and structures; and since, from his implicit subjectivistic epistemology, these cannot be the forms of things known, they can be only the forms of thought itself—apparently empty, or at least self-contained, thought. And though logic is admittedly concerned with truth and falsity, its truth is interpreted as merely "formal truth," that is, consistency in operations. The attempt to make logic purely formal no doubt stems from a confusion between generalization and precision. No matter how much the relative structures in thought may be generalized, they do not cease to be structures of what is known inasmuch as it is known—that is to say, of the "content" of thought.

In emphasizing the role of operations and insisting that their structures or forms are not static but dynamic—being the relations between operations—Piaget renders a service which could help to restore perspectives and remove some of the extreme artificiality of logic. A similar service is the highlighting of the central role held by propositions, to which inferior logical entities are subordinated as matter to form and the entities of discourse as means to an end.

Piaget's attitude toward traditional logic, though critical, is sympathetic, or at least not antagonistic like that of so many practitioners of logistic. Although he points out the limitations of classical logic, he tries to save it and indicates correspondences between it and modern logic. The classical quantification of propositions, for instance, he extends to interpropositional operations and applies to these processes the traditional square of oppositions. Yet he does not fully understand traditional logic. He interprets it all in terms of extension rather than of comprehension. Though extension most certainly plays its part and the extensional interpretation of propositions and

syllogisms is useful, nevertheless the role of comprehension is much more basic, and explanations based upon it are much more profound.

His own logic he also bases upon extension; and it is on this plane that he distinguishes it from mathematics. The latter deals with "extensive quantity," or the quantitative relations not only between wholes and their parts but also between the parts or elements themselves. Logic, on the other hand, is concerned only with "intensive quantity," or the mutual relations of parts and wholes; its only interest is the interplay of "all" and "some."

Classical logic is further interpreted as being purely "predicative," that is, as employing only *class predicates* and leaving no room for relations. This obviously comes from interpreting all predicates and copulas univocally and completely failing to appreciate the analogy of the predicaments and of the copula. Of a piece with this is the neglect of the existential import of the copula—to the ultimate destruction of the dynamism of logic which Piaget wishes to save.

Moderation characterizes this work. Though all parties will find in it points with which to disagree, all should be grateful for it and find it stimulating.

ROBERT W. SCHMIDT, S.J.

West Baden College

Metaphysik der Seele. By Bernhard Rosenmoller. Munster in Westphalia: Aschendorff, 1947. Pp. 224.

In this book Rosenmller investigates the depth of the human soul, which is essentially directed to God. The topic itself makes it clear that the contents of the work are related to his earlier *Religionsphilosophie*. The work is divided into three parts. The first part treats of the knowledge and acknowledgment of the existence of God in the personal spiritual life (especially in thought about the meaning of life and in moral acts); the second part treats the evolution of this knowledge into a conviction of the existence of God (the developed idea of God and the proof for the existence of God); and the third part treats the illumination of the depth of the soul (*Seelengrund*) and its relation to God.

Our reflective knowledge of the life of the soul first comes upon that knowledge and acknowledgment of God which is immanent in personal acts and attitudes. This knowledge cannot be lacking to any one (not even an atheist), who leads a personal life in free self-determination and true responsibility. Reflection (also personal) reaches

from this knowledge to a proper conviction of the existence of God, based on reasons and expressed in judgments. A further analysis and reasoning lead to a knowledge of the immediate illumination of the "depth of the soul" by God. This illumination is basic. Only by it are the knowledge and acknowledgment of God concealed in personal activity intelligible, and only by it is the conviction of the existence of God which rises therefrom possible.

Some personal attitudes are these: true love, trust, reverence, repentance, and serious enquiry into the meaning of one's own being. These attitudes do not rise out of the spiritual sphere of man alone; in some way they are related to man in his totality and personality. Such personal attitudes, according to Rosenmoller, are essentially grounded in a hidden knowledge of God, since they are meditately or immediately answers to an appeal to value which is given in relation to God. This knowledge, however, is not yet knowledge in the full sense. The latter is obtained only through judgments and conclusions. But the former kind of knowledge is a direct meeting with being as it is immediately present, not in itself, but only in the personal acts. Since such acts are possible only in reference to an existing God, and in their nature are moral, and so free, these acts include a free acknowledgment of God.

Only on the basis of such free moral decisions can the explicit conviction of the existence of God arise; yet it can be hindered by unfavorable circumstances. The scheme of the reasoning is something like this: Personal acts of such a kind—repentance, for example—are meaningful only if the existence of God is presupposed; but repentance is meaningful (and this is immediately evident in its accomplishment); therefore, God exists.

Rosenmller also accepts the ontological proof, which is usually rejected. According to him, it is valid under the presupposition (which is fulfilled in personal thinking, and there alone) that meaningful being exists and that this being has an infinite basis of its meaning. Rosenmller rejects the proof from contingency as an independent proof, since he thinks that it presupposes the metaphysical principle of causality that all being is metaphysically meaningful.

In agreement with St. Augustine and St. Bonaventure, Rosenmller assumes the illumination of the "depth of the soul" (which he distinguishes from the "depth of life"). Without such illumination, which is a continuation of the creation and conservation of the soul, both the vague and the full knowledge of God would be impossible. For he holds that every knowledge of God is directed by a positive idea of infinity, which we neither make for ourselves nor draw from exper-

ience. The spirit could come to God, could transcend the finite, only if it already possessed a hidden knowledge of God.

The believer, who has performed personal thinking, as Rosenmöller understands it, will be strengthened and helped in his religious convictions by this work. The argument will appear in a less favorable light to a man who has no religion. To him, Rosenmöller's interpretation of personal acts will seem arbitrary or valid only for the believer. He will contest the statement that in his personal acts, as he experiences them, there are contained a knowledge and acknowledgment of God which could be discovered merely by attending to it. Certainly, one cannot deny that a guiltless atheist can have personal attitudes and moral acts; yet such a denial would follow from Rosenmöller's views. In reality, though Rosenmöller treats atheism as a serious objection, and devotes a long discussion to it, he still does not do it justice. If there were such an immediate grasp and acknowledgment of God in all personal acts, then atheism in its historical forms, the religious history of mankind as it shows itself to us, would not be possible.

It is presumed that this so-called grasp and acknowledgment of God occurs consciously, even though in an obscure manner and ordinarily without attention directed upon it. A completely unconscious way of knowing seems to be impossible.

Rosenmöller's investigations of personal acts and attitudes are not worthless because of this criticism, though they do need further clarification. Acts and attitudes are deeper and richer than their conscious content, or than what can become conscious by mere attention to this content. A true act of obedience, for example, really contains according to its nature a relation to an existing personal God. But this relationship need not come to consciousness; it is mediate and therefore can be known only through a reasoning process. The atheist does not see this reasoning and therefore refuses to acknowledge God; and this in spite of the fact that he performs acts from which the necessity of the admission of God's existence can be concluded. The moral activity of a man who directs himself toward God, and of another man who fails to do this, have a different depth of value. Yet the two men will judge this difference differently. The relation to God is thus truly contained in personal activity, but not necessarily as known and recognized.

An examination of the ontological proof and of the proof from contingence would be too lengthy.

Rosenmöller calls the illumination of the "depth of the soul" a "hidden knowledge" of God. But how can an actual knowledge be hidden to itself? The difficulties urged above against immediate

knowledge must be recalled here. From the positive idea of infinity we can draw no conclusion as to the existence of such knowledge. For such an idea is either distinct from God—and then it is merely analogous, being an idea which refers to God through the denial of limitation; or it is not distinct from God—and then its conscious possession founds an immediate and beatifying vision of God, which we do not have here on earth.

And yet the problem remains: How can a finite being transcend the finite in its thinking (and willing)? This problem is to be solved, not through "a hidden knowledge" of God, but through a dynamic striving of the soul from creatures and experience to the object of its knowledge, that is, to being as such, in whose empty endlessness the positive infinity of God is imaged; this infinity nevertheless can be discovered only through a process of reasoning.

These critical remarks are not meant to deny that there are in Rosenmoller's work many penetrating analyses of personal activity, which are of great significance for the knowledge of the soul and its relationship to God. The evaluation of Rosenmoller's work in relation to a total view of existential and abstract thought is well expressed by John B. Lotz, S.J., in his review in *Geist und Leben* (XXI [1948], 302-9).

WALTER BRUGGER, S.J.

Berchmanskolleg
Pullach bei München

Phases of Thought in England. By Meyrick Carré. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949. Pp. xix + 392.

At first glance, this is an impressive book. The author promises to review rapidly the whole course of English thought. He does, in fact, range easily and readably from Augustine and Bede down to the beginning of our century. It seems rather unlikely, however, that readers who have any accurate knowledge of the thought of the first sixteen centuries of our era will bear with the author long enough to enjoy the sweeping survey given in the last half of the book. One might benevolently blame a slip of the pen for a blunder such as the reference to a work of St. Augustine as the *De Vera Doctrina* (p. 11) or the mention of the same St. Augustine as "the apostle of England" (p. 12). But in the first hundred and fifty pages it would not be difficult to point out almost as many palpable inaccuracies and misinter-

pretations as there are pages. Here, for example, is a characteristic doctrine of "Christian Aristotelianism": "The real nature of a thing is a system of general relations and any individual thing or process is a specimen of the system. Essences, then, are universals, appearing in a multitude of different aspects to our senses" (p. 135). In illustrating the torpor of dogmatism from which reason is awakening, the author gives this translation (p. 139): ". . . for the wayfaring man sacred theology is not knowledge, *homini viatori non est scientia*, as William of Ware bluntly puts it . . ." On page 147 appears this example of complete misunderstanding: "Scotus writes that not even the divine power can separate the formal distinction from the essence." And on page 149: "His [Scotus's] theory that a thing is essentially indeterminate, neither singular nor universal, yet potentially both (a conception which he accepted from Avicenna) separated him from the Platonic tradition." On page 152: "The usual doctrine of the schools was that moral evil was contrary to the real intention of the will. The will is naturally conformed to the good and a man who chooses to do evil acts *praeter intentionem*." And a final sample, taken from a summary in which the contrast with modern naturalism is sharply drawn (p. 224): "The chief postulate [of the medieval philosophies] was that the universe had been fashioned by a personal God . . . and the metaphysical doctrines of being, creation, becoming, and end, were consequences of this postulate."

Even a sprinkling of nonsense might be passed over lightly in a work of sincere scholarship which makes good sense over-all. But the passage cited above on man's freedom to do evil can be found with only verbal differences in a secondary source which was already out of date when it was published more than twenty years ago (cf. C. S. R. Harris, *Duns Scotus* [Oxford, 1927], I, 170). And the last sentence quoted above, which illustrates how simply the author's own assumptions dispense him from the laborious investigation of those difficult centuries, is precisely his thesis on medieval thought. In a way, it is the countertheme of the whole book, since the authoritarian obscurantism of the Middle Ages is conceived as the obstacle to be overcome by English thought as it comes of age in empiricist naturalism.

There would be little to be gained from a detailed critique of the author's bold division of English thought into Augustinianism (reason dominated by faith and authority), Aristotelianism (reason striving to throw off the yoke), and Newtonianism (reason subordinated to experience). Whatever merit such a synthesis might have, nothing can excuse Carre's Procrustean cramming into preconceived moulds of so

many thinkers whom he apparently knows mainly from inferior secondary sources. It seems fitting to take leave of the book with a sentence from its concluding page (383): "Our sketch has borne us from the cloister-thinking of the Saxon age to the secular naturalism of the modern epoch." The objective, the spirit, and the value of the work are perhaps sufficiently suggested there.

LINUS J. THRO, S.J.

Saint Louis University

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS PUBLISHED IN THE UNITED STATES

For the purposes of this bibliography, "philosophy" will be understood in a very broad sense. It will include works in other fields—such as sociology, aesthetics, and politics—that involve philosophical principles and problems.

"Current" books will be understood to include new books, revised editions, and reprints if the previous printing had been out of stock for a notable period of time, or if there is a notable difference in price, format and the like.

The procedure is as follows:

1. Books announced for publication will be listed in the issue which next appears after the announcement is received.
2. Books actually published will be listed in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 above.
3. Books received by THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN will be listed with full bibliographical information and a descriptive and/or critical note in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 and/or No. 2. This will be done even if a full review is to appear later.

ALASCO, JOHANNES. *Intellectual Capitalism. A Study of Changing Ownership and Control in Modern Industrial Society.* New York: World Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 158. \$3.00.

ARBER, AGNES. *The Natural Philosophy of Plant Form.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 260. \$5.00.

ARDLEY, GAVIN W. *Aquinas and Kant. The Foundations of the Modern Sciences.* New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1950. Pp. 263. \$3.50.

ARISTOTLE. *Ethics.* Translated by D. P. Chase. New American edition of "Everyman's Library." New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1950. Pp. 341. \$1.50.

AUGUSTINE, ST. *The City of God.* Books 1-7. Translated from the Latin by Demetrius B. Zema and Gerald G. Walsh. Introduction by Etienne Gilson. New York: Fathers of the Church. Pp. 499. \$5.00.

—. *The City of God.* Translated from the Latin by Marcus Dods, D.D., and others. Introduction by Thomas Merton. New York: Modern Lib., 1950. Pp. 907. \$2.45.

—. *The Confessions.* Translated from the Latin with introduction and notes by E. P. Pusey. New American edition of "Everyman's Library." New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1950. Pp. 410. \$1.25.

- . *De Civitate Dei*. Selections with notes and glossary by Rev. William G. Most. Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1949. Pp. 225. \$2.50.
- . *The Greatness of the Soul. The Teacher*. Translated from the Latin and annotated by Joseph M. Colleran. Westminster: Newman Press. Pp. 255. \$3.00.
- AVERROES. *Compendia Librorum Aristotelis qui Parva Naturalia vocantur*. Edidit Aemilia Ledyard Shields, adiuvante Henrico Blumberg. Cambridge, Mass.: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1949. Pp. xxxiv + 276. \$8.00.
- BACON, SIR FRANCIS. *The Essaies of Sr. Francis Bacon Knight, the Kings Solliciter Generall*. Forest Hills, N.Y.: Transatlantic Arts, 1950. Pp. 63. Paper, 50¢
- BAILEY, CYRIL. *Lucretius*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 20. Paper, 75¢
- BALDWIN, ROBERT C., and MCPEEK, JAMES A. S. *An Introduction to Philosophy through Literature*. New York: Ronald Press Co., 1950. Pp. 616. \$4.50.
- BATES, MARSTON. *The Nature of Natural History*. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons. Pp. 309. \$3.50.
- BERGSTRAESSER, ARNOLD. *Goethe and the Modern Age*. The International Convocation at Aspen, Colorado, 1949. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1950. Pp. 414. \$5.00.
- BIERENS DE HAAN, JOHAN ABRAHAM. *Animal Psychology. Its Nature and Its Problems*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1950. Pp. 160. \$1.60.
- BINSTOCK, RABBI LOUIS and OTHERS. *Is Mercy Killing Justifiable?* Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 11. Paper, 10¢
- BITTLE, CELESTINE N., O.F.M.Cap. *Man and Morals*. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1950. Pp. x + 719. \$4.00.
- This is the textbook of ethics in Father Bittle's well-known series. Like his previous works, this book is characterized by moderation, simplicity and adherence to the well-trodden paths of tradition. The second part of the work—special ethics—treats briefly of a very large number of specific, determinate problems.
- BLUCK, R. S. *Plato's Life and Thought*. With a translation of the Seventh Letter. Forest Hills, N.Y.: Transatlantic Arts, 1950. Pp. 200. \$2.00.
- BOAS, GEORGE. *The Acceptance of Time*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1950. Pp. 21. Paper, 35¢
- BODDE, DERK. *Tolstoy and China*. With the collaboration of Galia Speshneff Bodde. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press. Pp. 115. \$2.50.
- BOEHNER, PHILOTHEUS, O.F.M. *Elements and Systems of Scholastic Logic*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. In preparation.
- BORING, EDWIN GARRIGUES. *A History of Experimental Psychology*. 2d. ed. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950. Pp. 798. \$6.00.
- BOYER, MERLE WILLIAM. *Highways of Philosophy*. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1949. Pp. 352. \$3.50; text ed., \$2.50.
- BRAMELD, THEODORE BURGHARD HURT. *Ends and Means in Education. A Midcentury Appraisal*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1950. Pp. 256. \$3.00.
- BRIDGMAN, PERCY WILLIAMS. *Reflections of a Physicist*. New York:

Philosophical Lib., 1950. Pp. xii + 392. \$5.00.

Most of the articles and essays in this volume have been printed in symposia or magazines; some of them are new. Among them are the important papers in which Dr. Bridgman states most clearly his operational theory of the concept. Also interesting and valuable are the several papers in which he insists that the work of science is a work within an individual scientist and deplores the tendency toward complete impersonalism and anonymity.

In a wholly different vein are the dogmatic statements of the author in which he asserts his materialism and reiterates his cynical and intolerant view that only the few real scientists among men are intellectually honest. He implies that all other men, and particularly those who believe or who have proved to their own satisfaction that God exists, are intellectually dishonest.

BINTON, CRANE. *Ideas and Men. The Story of Western Thought*. New York: Prentice-Hall; August, 1950. \$6.00.

BROOKS, CLEANTH; JONES, HOWARD MUMFORD, and OTHERS. *The Humanities. An Appraisal*. Edited by Julian Harris. Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press; June, 1950. Pp. 190. \$2.75.

BROWN, ROBERT BENAWAY. *The Printed Works of Isidore of Seville*. Lexington: Univ. of Kentucky Libs., 1949. Pp. 32. Paper, apply.

BRYN-JONES, DAVID. *The Dilemma of the Idealist*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1950. Pp. 293. \$3.00.

BUBER, MARTIN. *Paths in Utopia*. Translated from the German by R. F. C. Hull. New York: Macmillan Co., 1950. Pp. 152. \$3.00.

BUEHLER, WALTER J. *The Role of Prudence in Education*. A Dissertation. Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press. Pp. 120. Paper, apply.

BURKE, KENNETH. *A Rhetoric of Motives*. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950. Pp. xv + 340. \$5.00.

This book on the history, techniques, and philosophy of rhetoric is a serious attempt to rethink these (and many other tangential) thoughts in the context of today. The history of rhetorical practice and theory which makes up the center of the work is suggestive and valuable. Brilliant criticisms of examples of rhetorical usage abound—distracting at times from the unity of the work. On the negative side, the terminology used is employed with an almost wholly new meaning, while the semantic method involves the author in many relativistic and nominalistic positions. [To be reviewed]

BUTTERFIELD, HERBERT. *Christianity and History*. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1950. Pp. vi + 146. \$2.75.

This is a profound study of history as science and of the philosophy and theology of history. After a brief but penetrating discussion of historical method, the author studies human nature as revealed in history, the tragedies of history, the function of Providence in the historical process. The last two chapters concern Christianity as a historical religion and its connection with an interpretation of historical reality and the present world.

Thomists (and readers generally) must be cautioned not to read their own meanings into certain almost technical terms which Professor Butterfield uses (for example, "myth"). [To be reviewed]

- . *The Origins of Modern Science, 1300-1800*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1950. Pp. 217. \$2.50.
- CAHN, EDMOND N. *The Sense of Injustice*. New York: New York Univ. Press. Pp. 186. \$3.50.
- CAMERON, KENNETH NEILL. *The Young Shelley. Genesis of a Radical*. New York: Macmillan Co.; May, 1950. \$6.00 (approx.).
- CARNAP, RUDOLF. *Logical Foundations of Probability*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1950. Pp. 624. \$12.50.
- CARR, EDWARD HALLETT. *Studies in Revolution*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1950. Pp. 233. \$2.00.
- CARRITT, EDGAR FREDERICK. *An Introduction to Aesthetics*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1950. Pp. 151. \$1.60.
- CASSIRER, ERNST. *The Problem of Knowledge; Philosophy, Science, and History since Hegel*. Translated from the German by William H. Woglum and Charles W. Hendel. Preface by Charles W. Hendel. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 352. \$5.00.
- CAVANAUGH, JOHN J. and OTHERS. *Morals and Higher Education*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. Pp. 32. Paper, 10¢.
- CHILDS, JOHN LAWRENCE. *Education and Morals*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950. Pp. 313. \$2.75.
- CLARKE, OLIVER FIELDING. *Introduction to Berdyaev*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1950. Pp. 192. \$3.00.
- CLEMENS, ALPHONSE H. *Marriage and Family Relationships*. Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press. Pp. 137. \$2.25.
- COHEN, MORRIS RAPHAEL. *Reason and Law*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1950. Pp. 211. \$3.50.
- . *Reflections of a Wondering Jew*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1950. Pp. 176. \$2.50.
- COMMAGER, HENRY STEELE. *The American Mind. An Interpretation of American Thought and Character since the 1880's*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 485. \$5.00.
- COPLESTON, F., S.J. *A History of Philosophy*. Vol. II. Westminster: Newman Press; June, 1950. \$4.50.
- CORNFORD, FRANCIS MacDONALD. *The Unwritten Philosophy and Other Essays*. Edited by W. K. C. Guthrie. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 157. \$2.75.
- CURTIS, CHARLES PELHAM, JR., and GREENSLET, FERRIS (eds.). *The Practical Cogitator. Or, The Thinker's Anthology*. Revised ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950. Pp. 607. \$3.75.
- CURTIS, STANLEY JAMES. *A Short History of Western Philosophy in the Middle Ages*. Westminster: Newman Press. Pp. 286. \$3.25.
- DAWSON, CHRISTOPHER HENRY. *Religion and the Rise of Western Culture*. "Gifford Lectures" delivered in the University of Edinburgh, 1948-49. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1950. Pp. 302. \$3.50.
- DE LUBAC, HENRI. *The Drama of Atheist Humanism*. Translated from the French by Edith M. Riley. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1950. Pp. 263. \$4.00.
- DE MILLE, ANNA GEORGE. *Henry George, Citizen of the World*. Edited by Don C. Shoemaker. Introduction by Agnes de Mille. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1950. Pp. 291. \$3.50.

- DENNEY, REUEL N. and OTHERS. *One Philosophy for One World*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1950. Pp. 18. Paper, 10¢.
- DESCARTES. *Discourse on Method*. Translated from the French by Laurence J. Lafleur. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1950. Pp. 72. Paper, 40¢
- Early Development of the Concepts of Heat and Temperature, The*. Edited by Duane Roller. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 116. Paper, \$1.25.
- EINSTEIN, ALBERT. *Out of My Later Years*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1950. Pp. viii + 282. \$4.75.
- This is a collection of published essays, addresses, dedications and other public (but sometimes unpublished) material, written by Mr. Einstein between the years 1934 to 1950. In all there are fifty-nine of these occasional pieces. There is an index of names (one and one-half pages). [To be reviewed]
- EMMET, DOROTHY. *Presuppositions and Finite Truths*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 20. Paper, \$1.00.
- EVERETT, JOHN R. *Religion in Human Experience: An Introduction*. New York: Henry Holt & Co.; May, 1950. Pp. 450. \$3.50.
- EWING, A. C. *A Short Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. In preparation.
- FITZPATRICK, EDWARD A. *How to Educate Human Beings*. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1950. Pp. xiii + 174. \$2.75.
- This book is a criticism of present-day educational methods and the outlooks on life that are back of them, together with pleas for better organization of curricula, better teachers, and for self-activity on the part of the student who is to be trained as a whole man.
- FLEMING, DONALD. *John William Draper and the Science of Religion*. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1950. Pp. 214. \$2.50.
- FORD, EDMUND BRISCOE. *Mendelism and Evolution*. 5th ed. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1950. Pp. 134. \$1.25.
- FORD, JOHN C. *Mercy Murder*. New York: America Press, 1950. Pp. 16. Paper, 10¢
- FRANK, PHILIPP. *Relativity: A Richer Truth*. Foreword by Albert Einstein. Boston: Beacon Press. Pp. 158. \$2.00.
- FREGE, GOTTLÖB. *The Foundations of Arithmetic*. Translated by J. L. Austin. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1950. Pp. xii, xii^e + XI, XI^e + 119, 119^e. \$4.75.
- This volume is a reprint of a German work, *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik* (published in 1884) with the English translation on facing pages. It is a very important source for much of the modern thinking on the philosophical questions connected with mathematics. [To be reviewed]
- FROMM, ERICH. *Psychoanalysis and Religion*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press; Oct. 1950. \$2.75.
- FÜLÖP-MÜLLER, RENE. *Fyodor Dostoevsky*. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons; Oct. 1950. \$2.00.
- GARDINER, HAROLD CHARLES, S.J. *The Great Books. A Christian Appraisal*. Vol. 2. New York: Devin-Adair Co., 1950. Pp. 173. \$2.75.
- GILBY, THOMAS, O.P. *Phoenix and Turtle. The Unity of Knowing and Being*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1950. Pp. xi + 154. \$3.00.

This book, the author says in his introduction, may seem to "bear to the scientific criticism of cognition the relationship of journalism to literature" (p. x). A nontechnical book on the metaphysics of knowing has long been an urgent need; that need is partly met by the present volume, partly not. The curiously ornate style, heavily encrusted with epigrams and allusions of all types, is not likely to be appealing to scientists, or historians, or philosophers ("Thomist" or other).

The movement of thought in the book is tortuous, a defect that is not entirely due to the nature of its subject, as the author seems to think (p. x). There are some fine things in the book: the continuity between common sense and the most elaborated science is well stressed; the sense of touch as a factor in the human experience of being is given its due importance; unsatisfactory types of epistemology are expounded with telling brevity.

The final conclusion (in which the influence of Monsignor Noël is visible) works through possibility to "eternal truths," to eternal Mind, and finally to the power of existence. How can a "Thomist" so casually use the word *eternal* as a medium of proof (cf. *ST*, I. 16. 8 ad 2, 4)?

GLATHE, ALFRED B. *Hume's Theory of the Passions and of Morals*. A Study of Books II and III of the "Treatise." Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1950. Pp. 175. Paper, \$2.50.

GOUGH, J. W. *John Locke's Political Philosophy*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 212. \$2.50.

GREENBERG, SIDNEY. *The Infinite in Giordano Bruno*. With a translation of his dialogue *Concerning the Cause, Principle, and One*. New York: King's Crown Press, 1950. Pp. 203. \$3.00.

The author attempts an expository study of Bruno's notion and treatment of the infinite. The reason for making this study is that most interpreters have considered Bruno either to be self-contradictory or to have made some rather violent changes of position. After a careful study of the text, the author concludes that Bruno's use of paradox is in harmony with his notion of the infinite as the identity of opposites. He is thus able to add that Bruno was a consistent pantheist.

The translation of Bruno's *De la causa* is well done. There is a bibliography and an index.

GRENE, D. *According to What is Human*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. In preparation.

GUTHRIE, W. K. C. *The Greek Philosophers from Thales to Aristotle*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1950. Pp. 168. \$2.75.

This is one of the "Home Study Books," edited by B. Ifor Evans and originally published in England by Methuen. It is aimed at an audience which has neither an acquaintance with Greek nor a familiarity with technical philosophical discussions.

For the general reader, or for a philosopher who wishes a brief presentation of Greek thought, this little work will be a pleasant introduction. In an easy, informal manner, Mr. Guthrie gives an accurate and sympathetic summary of the thought of the great Greek philosophers.

There is an index and some well-chosen suggestions for further reading.

- . *The Greeks and Their Gods*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. In preparation.
- HADAS, MOSES. *A History of Greek Literature*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Apr., 1950. Pp. vi + 337. \$4.25.
- HAILE, PENNINGTON. *The Eagle and the Bear. A Primer of Political Philosophy*. New York: Ives Washburn, 1950. Pp. 194. \$2.50.
- HALLE, LOUIS JOSEPH, JR. *On Facing the World*. New York: Wm. Sloane Associates, 1950. Pp. 198. \$2.75.
- HALLOWELL, JOHN H. *Main Currents in Modern Political Thought*. New York: Henry Holt & Co.; June, 1950. Pp. 680. \$4.50.
- HAWKINS, DENIS JOHN BERNARD. *The Essentials of Theism*. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1949. Pp. 156. \$2.25.
- HAWTON, HECTOR. *Philosophy for Pleasure*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1950. Pp. 224. \$3.75.
- HAYEK, F. A. *John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. In preparation.
- HERBERT, EDWARD. *A Confucian Notebook*. Foreword by Arthur Waley. Forest Hills, N.Y.: Transatlantic Arts, 1950. Pp. 102. \$1.00.
- HILBERT, D., and ACKERMANN, W. *Principles of Mathematical Logic*. New York: Chelsea Pub. Co.; June, 1950. \$3.50.
- HILL, THOMAS ENGLISH. *Contemporary Ethical Theories*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1950. Pp. xii + 368. \$3.90.
- This is a survey of the ethical theories that have been expounded in modern times. The author has grouped these theories in six general classes. His procedure is to introduce a class with some general remarks, then to present brief studies of the more important representatives and to conclude each section with a brief consideration of contributions and defects. The author's purpose has been partly to provide a suitable textbook for courses in this subject and partly to provide some essential material for progress in what he conceives to be the immediately necessary task in moral philosophy—the clarification of the basic moral ideas.
- To have covered such a wide variety of thought with satisfactory objectivity and thoroughness (as far as can be expected in one volume) is quite an achievement. Natural law theorists should be astonished at the poverty of the ideas in which their thought is here said to consist. Perhaps a reading of this summary might make theorists of this group realize that they have failed to provide description and analysis of moral facts and have passed too rapidly to their own way of founding these facts, leaving their readers under the inevitable impression that this theory is purely metaphysical and abstract.
- HILLIARD, A. L. *The Forms of Value. The Extension of a Hedonistic Axiology*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; July, 1950. Pp. xvi + 343. \$4.00.
- HOOK, SIDNEY. *John Dewey: Philosophy of Science and Freedom. A Symposium*. New York: Dial Press, 1950. Pp. 389. \$3.50.
- HORNEY, KAREN. *Neurosis and Human Growth. The Struggle toward Self-Realization*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.; Sept., 1950. \$3.75.
- HUBERMAN, LEO. *The Truth about Socialism*. New York: King's Crown Press, 1950. Pp. 256. \$3.00.

HUMPHREY, GEORGE. *On Psychology Today. An inaugural lecture delivered on May 25, 1949.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. 24. Paper, 60¢

HUNT, ROBERT NIGEL. *The Theory and Practice of Communism. An Introduction.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1950. Pp. 239. \$2.75.

HUXLEY, ALDOUS LEONARD. *Themes and Variations.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1950. Pp. 272. \$3.50.

HUXLEY, JULIAN. *Heredity East and West.* New York: Henry Schuman, 1949. Pp. 246. \$3.00.

This account of the biological doctrines of Lysenko and of the action of the Soviet Academy of Science in officially approving those doctrines has been published in England under the title *Soviet Genetics and World Science*. The author severely criticizes the subordination of scientific method, procedures, and conclusions to party politics, political control, and in general to any kind of external (that is, nonscientific) control. [To be reviewed]

INGALLS, DANIEL H. H. *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nāyāya Logic.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Dec., 1950. \$6.00.

JOAD, C. E. M. *A Critique of Logical Positivism.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. In preparation.

JOHN DEWEY at Ninety; As Seen at His 90th Birthday Dinner. New York: League for Industrial Democracy, 1950. Pp. 37. Paper, 25¢

JOHNSON, WILLIAM H. E. *Russia's Educational Heritage.* New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1950.

KATZ, DAVID. *Gestalt Psychology. Its Nature and Significance.* Translated by Robert Tyson. New York: Ronald Press Co., 1950. Pp. 185. \$3.00.

KEETON, MORRIS T. *The Philosophy of Edmund Montgomery.* Dallas: Univ. Press in Dallas, 1950. Pp. 397. \$5.00.

KNUDSON, ALBERT CORNELIUS. *The Philosophy of Personalism.* [Reprint] Boston: Boston Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 438. \$2.75.

LAFARGE, JOHN, S.J. *No Postponement.* New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1950. Pp. x + 246. \$3.00.

This is a study of the problems of racial minorities in their relation to religion and the common good of the United States and the world. The author examines the actual situation and the injustices it involves and stresses the need for interracial justice and charity. He then proposes practical procedures, most of which have been found actually to be successful within the range of his own experience as a Catholic priest and the work of the Catholic Interracial Council.

LAMONT, CORLISS. *The Illusion of Immortality.* (2d ed.) New York: Philosophical Lib., 1950. Pp. xviii + 316. \$3.95.

First published in 1934, this fervid attack on personal immortality has been polished and more elaborately documented in this revised edition, to which there is added a selective bibliography and an index. Though the author claims that he has strengthened the weak spots in the argument, the book remains what it was, a congeries of disparate quotations surrounded by a wordy argument. After trying to make Plato, primitive animism, spiritualism, and superstition yield a single argument for, and a coherent picture of, the after life, the author throws up

his hands, to espouse the monist naturalistic materialism that sees matter as all and this life as the end. The value of such a refutation will be admitted only by those who have no real understanding of any system of philosophy (or any religion) that admits immortality. It will unfortunately be accepted by many who wish to use its conclusions for their own ends. Humane culture, the polite humanist notwithstanding, is neither self-sufficient intellectually nor a strong bulwark against moral evil. [To be reviewed]

LAMPRECHT, STERLING P. *Nature and History*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; March, 1950. Pp. xii + 155. \$2.50.

Lectures on Evaluations of the Enduring Qualities of Greek Civilization. Delivered by the faculty members of various departments of the University of Miami, at the assemblies of the Greek Club. Miami: Univ. of Miami Press, 1950. Pp. 95. \$1.50.

LEDBETTER, ELMER E. *Capitalism—or Communism? A Study in the Fundamentals of the Two Clashing Politico-Economic Ideologies*. Detroit: S. J. Bloch Pub. Co., 1950. Pp. 234. \$3.00.

Legal Philosophies of Lask, Radbruch, and Dabin, The. Translated by Kurt Wilk. Introduction by Edwin W. Patterson. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 536. \$7.50.

LIPSKY, GEORGE A. *John Quincy Adams. His Theory and Ideas*. Foreword by Allan Nevins. New York: Crowell, 1950. Pp. 359. \$4.50.

LONG, DAVID OWEN. *Our World Today*. Bridgeport, Conn.: Author, 400 Park Pl., 1950. Pp. 90. Paper, apply.

LOOS, AMANDUS WILLIAM, and CHROW, LAWRENCE B. *The Nature of Man: His World, His Spiritual Resources, His Destiny*. New York: Church Peace Union and World Alliance for International Friendship through Religion. Pp. 120. \$1.00.

LUCRETIUS. *Lucretius on the Nature of Things*. Translated from Latin by W. Hannaford Brown. New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Press. Pp. 283. \$5.00.

—. *Of the Nature of Things*. A metrical translation from the Latin by William Ellery Leonard. New American edition of "Everyman's Library." New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1950. Pp. 316. \$1.25.

MABBOTT, JOHN DAVID. *The State and the Citizen. An Introduction to Political Philosophy*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1950. Pp. 180. \$1.60.

MAJUMDAR, T. C., and PUSALKER, A. D. (eds.). *Prehistoric India*. Vol. I of *The History and Culture of the Indian People*. New York: Macmillan Co.; May, 1950. \$6.00 (approx.).

MALLOCK, WILLIAM H. *The New Republic*. Edited by J. Max Patrick. Gainesville: Univ. of Florida Press, 1950. Pp. xl + 237. \$4.50.

MARGENAU, HENRY. *The Nature of Physical Reality. A Philosophy of Modern Physics*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1950. Pp. 492. \$6.50.

MARITAIN, JACQUES. *Man and the State*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. In preparation.

MASON, ROBERT E. *Moral Values and Secular Education*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Apr., 1950. Pp. 155. \$2.75.

MAYER, FREDERICK. *A History of Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*. New York: American Book Co., 1950. Pp. xii + 546. \$5.00.

This is a comprehensive history of ancient and medieval philosophy. The author intends to bring the student to an understanding of the thought of other ages, and to appreciate their permanently valuable contributions. He believes that a knowledge of the social environment of a thinker is an important means toward understanding. Though there is a palpable effort at objectivity and fairness, there are many instances in which the author fails to grasp the meaning of the work which he is summarizing. [To be reviewed]

MAZIARZ, EDWARD A., C.P.P.S. *The Philosophy of Mathematics*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1950. Pp. viii + 286. \$4.00.

After an introductory chapter locating the philosophy of mathematics, the author takes up the history of the philosophy of mathematics in the first part. In the second part, he presents the philosophy of mathematics in three chapters: the distinction of speculative sciences; the nature of mathematical abstraction; and mathematical abstraction and contemporary mathematics. The work was originally submitted as a doctoral thesis at the University of Ottawa. [To be reviewed]

McFADDEN, CHARLES J. *Reference Manual for Medical Ethics*. Philadelphia: F. A. Davis, 1949. Pp. 92. Paper, \$1.25.

MELDEN, A. I. *Ethical Theories. A Book of Readings from Plato to Schlick*. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950.

MEYER, CORD, JR., and BRINTON, CRANE. *World Government—Necessity or Utopia?* Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1949. Pp. 16. Paper, 15¢

MILL, JOHN STUART. *Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government*. Introduction by A. D. Lindsay. New American edition of "Everyman's Library." New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1950. Pp. 564. \$1.25.

MILLER, PERRY GILBERT EDDY. *The Transcendentalists. An Anthology*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 538. \$6.50.

MITCHELL, EDWIN T. *A System of Ethics*. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1950. Pp. 600. \$4.00.

MONTAGUE, WILLIAM PEPPERELL. *Great Visions of Philosophy*. Chicago: Open Court Pub. Co., 1950. Pp. xvii + 484. \$4.50.

Two chapters and part of a third were delivered as the "Paul Carus Lectures" sixteen years ago. The whole work is a study of what the author thinks to be the great rationalistic systems. There are some fine analyses of individual philosophers, particularly those to whom the author is sympathetic (the Stoics, Democritus, Spencer). The interlude on Christianity is appallingly eighteenth-century. Two examples of the author's rather peevish misinterpretation of history will have to suffice. The Christian idea of morality is expressed in terms of a Lutheran-nominalist theology: "The good is good because God commands it" (cf. pp. 196, 199, 209-11). And on pages 215 to 236 there is a discussion of the proofs for the existence of God "used by St. Thomas and his predecessors and his successors" under the three headings of the argument from design, the ontological argument, and the cosmological argument. To add insult to historical injury, the argument from design is really a version of Paley. Finally, the author suggests that one is a rationalist or a believer, depending on his temperament. Platonically, he also holds that the vision is more important than any arguments that

have been or could be adduced for it.

MOORE, BARRINGTON, JR. *Soviet Politics—The Dilemma of Power. The Role of Ideas in Social Change*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Sept., 1950. Pp. 500. \$6.00.

MORRIS, LLOYD. *William James*. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons; Oct., 1950. \$2.00.

MURE, G. R. G. *A Study of Hegel's Logic*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. viii + 375.

This remarkable study deals mainly with an exposition of Hegel's logic, to a lesser extent a commentary on it, and to a small extent a critique or criticism. The dialectic is presented in some detail, though not in all its ultimate differentiations. Mr. Mure is that unusual writer, a sympathetic commentator whose remarks are illuminating even to those not technically skilled in the works of Hegel. [To be reviewed]

MYERSON, ABRAHAM. *Speaking of Man*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf; Nov., 1950.

NASH, LEONARD K. *The Atomic-Molecular Theory*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Aug., 1950. Paper, \$1.25.

Natural Selection and Adaptation. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1949. Pp. 51. Paper, 75¢

NEF, JOSEPH U. *War and Human Progress. An Essay on the Rise of Industrial Civilization*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Nov., 1950. \$6.00.

NICHOLSON, JOHN ANGUS. *Philosophy of Religion*. New York: Ronald Press Co., 1950. Pp. 427. \$3.75.

O'BRIEN, PATRICK. *Emotions and Morals*. New York: Grune & Stratton, 1950. Pp. 241. \$3.50.

ORTEGA Y GASSET, JOSÉ. *The Revolt of the Masses*. Authorized translation. New York: New American Lib. of World Literature, 1950. Pp. 144. Paper, 35¢

This is a "Mentor Book" reprint of the translation first published by Norton in 1930. The publishers of this series are to be congratulated for their courage in offering to a mass audience serious books of this type and for the generally excellent appearance of the product.

The Revolt of the Masses touches on such modern problems as the origin and nature of the mentality known as the "common man," technology and humanity, the nature of the state and of political rule, and the nature and the function of moral obligation in civilization. The author treats these problems in a manner that is often illuminating, almost always provocative.

ORTON, W. A. *The Economic Role of the State*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1950. Pp. 210. \$3.00.

The Overthrow of the Phlogiston Theory. Edited by James Bryant Conant. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 64. Paper, 90¢

Philosophic Thought in France and the United States. Edited by Marvin Farber. Buffalo: Univ. of Buffalo Publications in Philosophy, 1950. Pp. x + 775. \$7.50.

This collection of thirty-eight essays is intended to give a picture of philosophical activity in France and the United States. The first eighteen articles, by prominent French writers, present various portions of present French thought. It is interesting to see the preponderance of

spiritualistic (idealistic, or even Cartesian) and existentialist themes, though other forms of thought are by no means absent. In this first part, there seem to be a few places where the translations are inadequate (for example, pp. 59, 225, 233, 239). The concluding essay by Richard McKeon describes an American's reaction to this picture.

The second part consists of a series of essays by prominent American writers. The main trends here represented are phenomenology, instrumentalism (pragmatism), naturalism, and logical positivism. Other movements are not omitted; yet the four movements mentioned are to be seen, not only in formal articles on those subjects, but more significantly in survey essays on other subjects (for example, on the philosophy of education). The concluding essay by André Lalande is noteworthy for its penetrating analysis.

The book is important and valuable both as an introductory survey and as a bibliographical source. It is being published simultaneously in France, under the title *L'activité philosophique contemporaine en France et aux Etats-Unis*.

PLATO. *The Republic*. Translated from the Greek with an introduction by A. D. Lindsay. New American edition of "Everyman's Library." New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1950. Pp. 455. \$1.25.

PLOTINUS. *The Philosophy of Plotinus*. Selected books of the *Enneads*, translated with an introduction by Joseph Katz. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950. Pp. xxxi + 158. \$1.75.

This is the eighth of the Appleton-Century-Crofts "Philosophy Source Books," and it adequately continues the fine tradition established by the previous offerings of the series. Neatly printed and bound, this volume, because of its remarkably low price, is within the reach of struggling professors and students.

Though one might quarrel with the selection of passages, this is a difficulty inherent in the very task the translator set himself. On the whole, a good picture of Plotinus is presented. The introduction is quite useful.

The translation itself is smooth, readily intelligible to one who has little acquaintance with Greek philosophy. On the other hand, it is often so free as to partake of the nature of a paraphrase. A teacher will be able to use it as a text only with considerable caution.

POLANYI, M. *Gifford Lectures*, 1950. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. In preparation.

—. *The Logic of Liberty. Reflections and Rejoinders*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. In preparation.

PONTUS DE TYARD. *The Universe of Pontus de Tyard*. Introduction and Notes by John C. Lapp. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 261. \$3.00.

PREMANANDA, SWAMI. *Srimad-Bhagavad-Gita*. Boston: Christopher Pub. House, 1949. Pp. 231. \$3.50.

Quest of Enlightenment, The. A selection of the Buddhist Scriptures translated from the Sanskrit by E. J. Thomas. Forest Hills, N.Y.: Transatlantic Arts, 1950. Pp. 95. \$1.00.

QUETIF-ECHARD. *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum*. New York: Musurgia Publishers, 1950. Reprint of the revised edition of Paris, 1719-21. 2 vols. \$57.50.

- QUINE, WILLARD VAN ORMAN. *Methods of Logic*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1950. Pp. 283. \$2.90.
- RADER, MELVIN. *Ethics and Society. An Appraisal of Social Ideals*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1950. Pp. 401. \$3.25.
- RAPOPORT, ANATOL. *Science and the Goals of Man. A Study in Semantic Orientation*. Foreword by S. I. Hayakawa. New York: Harper & Bros., 1950. Pp. 290. \$3.50.
- Religion and the State*. Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 169. Paper, \$1.25.
- RHAZES. *The Spiritual Physick of Rhazes*. Translated from the Arabic by Arthur J. Arberry. Forest Hills, N.Y.: Transatlantic Arts, 1950. Pp. 115. \$1.00.
- The Road to Nirvāna*. A selection of the Buddhist Scriptures. Translated from the Pāli by E. J. Thomas. Forest Hills, N.Y.: Transatlantic Arts, 1950. Pp. 102. \$1.00.
- Robert Boyle's Experiments in Pneumatics*. Edited by James Bryant Conant. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 72. Paper, 90¢.
- ROBINSON, RICHARD. *Definition*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 215. \$3.00.
- ROEPKE, W. *Social Crisis of Our Time*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. In preparation.
- ROSAN, LAURENCE JAY. *The Philosophy of Proclus. The Final Phase of Ancient Thought*. New York: Cosmos, 1949. Pp. 280. \$3.50.
- ROTH, LEON. *The Guide for the Perplexed: Moses Maimonides*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1950. Pp. 141. \$1.60.
- RUSSELL, HENRY NORRIS and OTHERS. *Time and Its Mysteries*. Series 3. Four lectures given on the James Arthur Foundation, New York University. New York: New York Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. 136. \$3.00.
- SABINE, GEORGE H. *A History of Political Theory*. Revised ed. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1950. Pp. 934. \$4.60.
- Saint Louis University Studies*. Series A (Humanities), Vol. I, No. 3. Saint Louis: Saint Louis Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 70. \$1.00.
This number of the *Saint Louis University Studies* contains an article on "Literary Decorum in Francis Bacon," by Maurice B. McNamee, S.J. This penetrating study relates Bacon's theory and practice of literary style to his theory of knowledge and his philosophy of man.
- SANTAYANA, GEORGE. *Atoms of Thought*. An anthology collected and edited by Ira D. Cardiff. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1950. Pp. xv + 284. \$5.00.
Scarcely any present-day work on philosophy is apt material for an anthology—a passage short enough to be put into a collection such as this almost always fails to convey precisely what makes a philosophical text philosophical, namely, the reasoning itself. Santayana's diffuse style limits the possibility even more. In addition to this, an inspection of the index shows that a large proportion of the passages selected deals with attacks on revealed religion and with defenses of naturalism, moral relativism, and a genteel skepticism. Scarcely any reference is made to the really philosophical analyses that Santayana conducted into the nature of truth, and so forth.

Some of the passages selected are fine writing from a literary point of view.

SCHENK, WILHELM. *Reginald Pole*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1950. Pp. xvi + 176. \$3.00.

This posthumously issued biography is a well-written study, of great historical and philosophical value. In the intention of its author, it is a concrete analysis of the essence of civilization. Significantly, he chose a period of crisis at the birth of the modern age. Of particular philosophical interest are the chapters dealing with the choice between the active and the contemplative life, and those on the nature and functions of the state and political authority.

SCHILLING, BERNARD N. *Conservative England and the Case against Voltaire*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Apr., 1950. Pp. 394. \$4.50 (approx.).

SEABURY, SAMUEL. *The New Federalism*. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1950. Pp. 311. \$5.00.

SEARS, PAUL BIGELOW. *Charles Darwin. The Naturalist as a Cultural Force*. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1950. Pp. 133. \$2.00; college ed., \$1.50.

SEIDENBERG, RODERICK. *Post-Historic Man. An Inquiry*. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press; Sept., 1950. Pp. 272. \$3.50.

SELLERY, GEORGE CLARKE. *The Renaissance. Its Nature and Origins*. Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press; June, 1950. Pp. 293. \$3.75.

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS. *Against the Professors*. With an English translation by Rev. R. G. Bury. Vol. IV of *Sextus Empiricus*, "Loeb Classical Library." Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 417. \$3.00.

SHARP, F. C. *Good Will and Ill Will. A Study of Moral Judgments*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1950. Pp. 310. \$5.00.

SIMON, YVES. *Democracy*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. In preparation.

SINGER, DOROTHY WALEY. *Giordano Bruno. His Life and Thought*. New York: Henry Schuman; Sept., 1950. \$6.00.

SINGER, KURT. *The Idea of Conflict*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 181. \$1.75.

SINNOTT, EDMUND W. *Cell and Psyche: The Biology of Purpose*. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press; Oct., 1950. Pp. 128. \$2.00.

SLATER, R. H. L. *The Paradox of Nirvana. Burmese Buddhism in World Religion*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. In preparation.

SMITH, JOHN E. *Royce's Social Infinite. The Community of Interpretation*. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1950. Pp. 189. \$2.75.

SMITH, VINCENT E. *Idea-Men of Today*. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co.; Nov., 1950. \$3.50.

—. *Philosophical Physics*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1950. Pp. xv + 472. \$4.00.

This work on the philosophy of nature pays a good deal of attention to modern physical theories. In the first part the author defines his subject as the science of mobile being, and then proceeds to a study of motion, its principles, origins, and ends, and the relation between motion and the infinite. In the second part, he discusses modern physics in its relation to motion, in its attitude to dualism, efficient causality, progress, and purpose; and he studies mathematics and the infinite.

He then proceeds to a series of chapters on place, time, quantity, and alteration.

There is a detailed index, and each chapter offers some suggestions for further reading. [To be reviewed]

Soviet History of Philosophy, A. Translated by William Edgerton. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1950. Pp. 58. Paper, \$1.00.

When in 1947 the Communist party withdrew from circulation the standard work on the history of western European philosophy, it did so on the ground that this work was not faithful to the Marxist-Leninist line. So a commission was drawn up to write a new book. The present little volume is the first fruit of the commission's labors, a prospectus that was published in *Voprosy Filosofii* in 1947.

Two things about the present work strike the reader at once. One is the thorough attempt to interpret philosophy as the more or less direct reflection of the class struggle, an attempt which certainly leads to a selection of facts to be emphasized and seems to indicate that, in the work of which this is the plan, facts will have to be manufactured where evidence is lacking. The second is the stress on the contributions of Russian thinkers to philosophy. Undoubtedly most Westerners are poorly informed on this point; yet this new work will give little ground for credibility here because of its party spirit elsewhere.

The prospectus divides the history of philosophy into two parts: from its beginnings to Marx, and the rise, development, contributions, and struggles of Marxism.

All philosophers will be grateful to the translator, the press, and the Joint Committee on Slavic Studies for making this material available.

SPEARMAN, CHARLES EDWARD, and WYNN-JONES, LLEWELYN. *Human Ability.* A continuation of "The Abilities of Man." New York: Macmillan Co., 1950. Pp. 205. \$2.50.

SPIER, FRED S. *The Golden Gate. A New Experiment in Philosophy.* New York: Terrace Publs., 1950. Pp. 264. \$3.00.

SPINKA, MATTHEW. *Nicolas Berdyaev: Captive of Freedom.* Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1950. Pp. 220. \$3.50.

STALLKNECHT, NEWTON P., and BRUMBAUGH, ROBERT S. *The Spirit of Western Philosophy.* New York: Longmans, Green & Co.; Summer, 1950. Pp. 536. \$4.75.

STANDEN, ANTHONY. *Science is a Sacred Cow.* New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1950. Pp. 221. \$2.75.

STEINER, RUDOLF. *Goethe the Scientist.* Translated by Olin D. Wannamaker. New York: Anthroposophic Press, 1950. Pp. x + 280. \$3.50.

This volume is a collection of the comments and expositions of Goethe's ideas which Rudolf Steiner published in connection with his edition of Goethe's scientific writings. The translation is on the whole faithful; at times it is awkward and too much influenced by German idioms.

Steiner intended to show that Goethe's scientific discoveries flowed from a theory of the nature of science which was part and parcel of an entire philosophical world view. It is true that the German poet had tendencies toward a monistic pantheism, colored with a kind of empiricist idealism. But the carefully articulated and fully expressed

system presented by Steiner seems to be at least in part a projection of his own ideas into the fragmentary writings of Goethe. Steiner himself, founder of the anthroposophical movement, holds a monistic idealism, characterized by a theory of intellectual intuition of the Idea of things. This intuition of the Idea of the whole is especially necessary in the study of living things. Presupposed is the idea that in every living thing there is to be found the plant or the animal after the manner of an immanent universal.

STEPHEN, LESLIE. *The English Utilitarians: Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, John Stuart Mill.* (Reprinted ed.) New York: Peter Smith, 1950. \$15.00.

STONE, JULIUS. *The Province and Function of Law. Law as Logic, Justice, and Social Control. A Study in Jurisprudence.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 979. \$10.00.

STRAUSS, L. *The Natural Rights of Man.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. In preparation.

THOMAS AQUINAS, ST. *Middle High German Translation of the Summa Theologica.* Edited with a Latin-German and a German-Latin glossary by Bayard Quincy Morgan and Friedrich Wilhelm Strothmann. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 400. \$5.00.

—. *Of God and His Creatures.* Translated, with some abridgments, by Joseph Rickaby, S.J. Westminster: Carroll Press, 1950. Pp. xxii + 423. \$6.50. (19 x 28 cms.).

This is the well-known translation of the *Summa Contra Gentiles* by Father Rickaby, first published in England in 1905. Several whole chapters of the Latin text were omitted by Father Rickaby, and a great number of smaller omissions were made which were not indicated at all. If this work is ever reprinted, it would be a great service to add a table showing these omissions.

Many of Father Rickaby's notes on the text are still valuable, though some have been outmoded and some are inadequate. There is a very brief index.

—. *The Religious State.* Edited by the Very Reverend Father Procter. Westminster: Newman Press, 1950. Pp. 174. \$2.25.

THOMPSON, CLARA, and MULLAHY, PATRICK. *Psychoanalysis: Evolution and Development.* New York: Hermitage House, 1950. Pp. 264. \$3.00.

TILLICH, P. *Systematic Theology.* Vol. I. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. In preparation.

TOMARS, ADOLPH SIEGFRIED. *Human Relations in a Changing Society.* New York: New York Society for Ethical Culture, 1949. Pp. 39. Paper. 20¢

TOYNBEE, ARNOLD J. *War and Civilization.* Selected by Albert Vann Fowler from *A Study of History.* Cambridge: Oxford Univ. Press; Oct., 1950. \$2.50.

TRILLING, LIONEL. *The Liberal Imagination. Essays on Literature and Society.* New York: Viking Press, 1950. Pp. 319. \$3.50.

URBAN, WILBUR M. *Beyond Realism and Idealism.* New York: Macmillan Co.; May, 1950. \$4.50 (approx.).

VELIKOVSKY, IMMANUEL. *Worlds in Collision.* New York: Doubleday & Co., 1950. Pp. xiii + 401. \$4.50.

This is an attempt to establish the occurrence, within historical

times, of several cataclysmic interactions within the solar system. The "proof" is drawn partly from geology, but mainly from an interpretation of legends, myths, and religious writings from all over the world, somewhat after the manner of H. S. Bellamy and Ignatius Donnelly. Many scientists have protested against the author's method of interpreting his data.

A detailed criticism will be given in a later issue of THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN.

VIETOR, KARL. *Goethe the Thinker*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Nov., 1950. \$4.00.

VIVAS, E. *Moral Life and Ethical Life*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. In preparation.

VON WEIZSACKER, C. F. *The World of Physics*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. In preparation.

VON WRIGHT, G. H. *Form and Content in Logic*. An inaugural lecture delivered on May 26, 1949, in the University of Cambridge. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 34. Paper, 30¢.

WACH, J. *Types of Religious Experience*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. In preparation.

WEILGART, WOLFGANG J. *Who is Peaceful?* New York: Exposition Press, 1950. Pp. 71. Paper, \$1.00.

The author, now teaching at Xavier University (New Orleans), offers some suggestions for a philosophy of peace and an education for peace. He shows that direct action for peace is worthless unless peace becomes an effective ideal for many of this world's inhabitants. He pleads for a spirit of co-operation among all the forces that are now working toward peace. This unity of effort he hopes to base on a spiritualization of the individual man and the cultivation of contemplation. It is a thought-provoking little volume for educated men who are ready to think seriously.

WEISS, PAUL. *Man's Freedom*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 334. \$5.00.

WEITZ, MORRIS. *Philosophy of the Arts*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Dec., 1950. \$3.75.

WELLS, HARRY KOHLSAAT. *Process and Unreality. A Criticism of Method in Whitehead's Philosophy*. New York: King's Crown Press; June, 1950. Pp. viii + 236. \$3.00.

WHITROW, G. J. *The Structure of the Universe. An Introduction to Cosmology*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1950. Pp. 171. \$1.60.

WHYTE, LANCELOT LAW. *The Next Development in Man*. New York: New York: New American Lib., 1950. Pp. 255. Paper, 35¢

This is a thought-provoking book prompted by the author's desire to bring about a unified culture. This laudable and important aim the author seeks to accomplish by a "unitary" system of thought, which is a monistic, evolutionary process-philosophy. [Reviewed in THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, XXVI (1949), 372-73].

WIENER, NORBERT. *The Human Use of Human Beings*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.; September, 1950. \$3.00.

WILLIAMS, MELVIN J. *Catholic Social Thought. Its Approach to Contemporary Problems*. New York: Ronald Press Co., 1950. Pp. 550. \$5.00.

WOODWORTH, HUGH. *The Nature and Technique of Understanding. Some Fundamentals of Semantics*. N. Vancouver, B.C.: Canada Publs., 1949. Pp. 142. \$4.00.

WOOLLEY, ANTHONY DOUGLAS. *Theory of Knowledge. An Introduction*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1950. Pp. 196. \$1.60.

YUTANG, LIN. *On the Wisdom of America*. New York: John Day Co.; June, 1950. \$5.00.

ZACHARIAS, H. C. E. *Human Personality*. Saint Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1950. Pp. 360. \$4.00.

This is a study of the rise of the reflexive awareness of human personality in the cultures of India, China, and Israel. Though the author is careful to distinguish between personality as a metaphysical character of a human being and personality as self-conscious awareness, he seems not to speak of the direct awareness of the self that is to be found in every intellectual act. Moreover, he seems slightly to exaggerate the somewhat dubious thesis that primitive peoples have no reflective awareness at all.

The author presents a clear and well-documented picture of the origin and nature of philosophic thought in India and China, thus presenting us with one of the few books written in English by a Thomist on these philosophies. This book will be very useful for supplementary reading in courses in the history of philosophy and psychology, as well as for the anthropological and sociological courses for which it seems to have been more directly intended.

ZWEIG, FERDYNAND. *Economic Ideas. A Study in Historical Perspective*. New York: Prentice-Hall; June, 1950. \$3.65.

BOOKS RECEIVED

BENEDICT, GASTON. *L'Enseignement Vivant des Langues Vivantes*. Lausanne, Suisse: Éditions Pro Schola, 1950. Pp. 33. Paper, apply.

BERGER, GASTON. *Traité Pratique d'Analyse du Caractère*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950. Pp. xx + 250. Fr. 500.

BITTLE, CELESTINE N., O.F.M.Cap. *Man and Morals*. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1950. Pp. x + 719. \$4.00.

BRIDGMAN, PERCY WILLIAMS. *Reflections of a Physicist*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1950. Pp. xii + 392. \$5.00.

BURKE, KENNETH. *A Rhetoric of Motives*. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950. Pp. xv + 340. \$5.00.

BUTTERFIELD, HERBERT. *Christianity and History*. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1950. Pp. vi + 146. \$2.75.

The Chant. A Simple and Complete Method for Teachers and Students. Tournai, Belgium: Desclée & Co., 1949. Pp. 126. Paper, \$1.00.

CIKLIC, PEDRO. *Caracterología*. Cordova, Argentina: Cervantes, 1950. Pp. 182.

CLAUDEL, PAUL. *The Eye Listens*. Translated from the original French by Elsie Pell. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1950. Pp. ix + 293. \$2.75.

- COMBES, GUSTAVE. *Revival of Paganism*. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1950. Pp. v + 360. \$4.50.
- DALLAVAUX, JOHN. *For Students Only*. Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1950. Pp. 79. \$2.00.
- EINSTEIN, ALBERT. *Out of My Later Years*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1950. Pp. viii + 282. \$4.75.
- FARBER, MARVIN (ed.). *Philosophic Thought in France and the United States. Essays Representing Major Trends in Contemporary French and American Philosophy*. Buffalo: Univ. of Buffalo Publications in Philosophy, 1950. Pp. x + 775. \$7.50.
- FITZPATRICK, EDWARD A. *How to Educate Human Beings*. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1950. Pp. xiii + 174. \$2.75.
- FREGE, GOTTLÖB. *The Foundations of Arithmetic*. Translated by J. L. Austin. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1950. Pp. xii, xii^e + XI, XI^e + 119, 119^e. \$4.75.
- GALLI, GALLO. *Saggio sulla Dialettica della Realtà Spirituale* (3d ed.). Turin: Gheroni, 1950. Pp. 255.
- GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, REGINALD, O.P. *Christ the Savior. A Commentary on the Third Part of St. Thomas' Theological Summa*. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1950. Pp. iv + 748. \$9.00.
- GEMELLI, AGOSTINO, O.F.M., and ZUNINI, GEORGIO. *Introduzione alla Psicologia*. Milan: Pubblicazioni dell'Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 1949. Pp. xv + 490. Lire 1100.
- GILBY, THOMAS, O.P. *Phoenix and Turtle. The Unity of Knowing and Being*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1950. Pp. xi + 154. \$3.00.
- GREENBERG, SIDNEY. *The Infinite in Giordano Bruno*. With a translation of his dialogue *Concerning the Cause, Principle, and One*. New York: King's Crown Press, 1950. Pp. 203. \$3.00.
- GUTHRIE, W. K. C. *The Greek Philosophers from Thales to Aristotle*. Edited by B. Ifor Evans. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1950. Pp. 168. \$2.75.
- HARTNETT, ROBERT C., S.J. *Federal Aid to Education*. New York: America Press, 1949. Pp. 48. Paper, 25¢.
- HILL, THOMAS ENGLISH. *Contemporary Ethical Theories*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1950. Pp. xii + 368. \$3.90.
- HUXLEY, JULIAN. *Heredity East and West*. New York: Henry Schuman, 1949. Pp. 246. \$3.00.
- In the Service of Truth. Pope Pius XII Speaks to This Generation*. Detroit: Marygrove College, 1950. Pp. 76.
- KAMP, JOSEPH P. *We Must Abolish the United States. The Hidden Facts Behind the Crusade for World Government*. New York: Constitutional Educational League, 1950. Pp. 168. \$1.00.
- LA FARGE, JOHN, S.J. *No Postponement*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1950. Pp. x + 246. \$3.00.
- LAMONT, CORLISS. *The Illusion of Immortality*. (2d ed.). New York: Philosophical Lib., 1950. Pp. xviii + 316. \$3.95.
- Letters of Jean de Carro to Alexandre Marcet. 1794-1817*. Edited with an introduction and notes by Henry E. Sigerist. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1950. \$2.00.
- MARIAS, JULIAN. *Ortega y la Idea de la Razón Vital*. Spain: published by the author, 1948. Pp. 88.

- MATCHETTE, FRANKLIN J. *Outline of a Metaphysics*. With an introduction by William H. Matchette. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1949. Pp. xiv + 108. \$3.75.
- MAURIAC, FRANÇOIS. *Proust's Way*. Translated from the original French *Du Côté de Chez Proust*, by Elsie Pell. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1950. Pp. 105. \$2.75.
- MAYER, FREDERICK. *A History of Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*. New York: American Book Co., 1950. Pp. xii + 546. \$5.00.
- MAZIARZ, EDWARD A., C.P.P.S. *The Philosophy of Mathematics*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1950. Pp. viii + 286. \$4.00.
- McKINNON, HAROLD R. *The Secret of Mr. Justice Holmes*. Reprinted from the *American Bar Association Journal* of April, 1950. Berkeley: The Gillick Press, 1950. Pp. ii + 18. Paper, apply.
- MONTAGUE, WILLIAM PEPPERELL. *Great Visions of Philosophy*. Chicago: Open Court Pub. Co., 1950. Pp. xvii + 484. \$4.50.
- MURE, G. R. G. *A Study of Hegel's Logic*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. viii + 375.
- ORTEGA Y GASSET, JOSE. *The Revolt of the Masses*. Authorized Translation. New York: New American Lib. of World Literature, 1950. Pp. 144. Paper, 35¢.
- PLOTINUS. *The Philosophy of Plotinus*. Selected books of the *Enneads*, translated with an introduction by Joseph Katz. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950. Pp. xxxi + 158. \$1.75.
- ROEMER, THEODORE, O.F.M.Cap. *The Catholic Church in the United States*. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1950. Pp. viii + 444. \$5.00.
- ROONEY, WILLIAM J. *The Problem of "Poetry and Belief" in Contemporary Criticism*. Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1949. Pp. vii + 165. Paper, \$1.75.
- Saint Louis University Studies. Series A (Humanities), Vol. I, No. 3. Saint Louis: Saint Louis University Press, 1950. Pp. 70. \$1.00.
- SANTAYANA, GEORGE. *Atoms of Thought*. An anthology collected and edited by Ira D. Cardiff. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1950. Pp. xv + 284. \$5.00.
- SCHENK, WILHELM, Reginald Pole. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1950. Pp. xvi + 176. \$3.00.
- SMITH, VINCENT EDWARD. *Philosophical Physics*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1950. Pp. xv + 472. \$4.00.
- A Soviet History of Philosophy*. Translated by William Edgerton. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1950. Pp. 58. Paper, \$1.00.
- STEINER, RUDOLF. *Goethe the Scientist*. Translated by Olin D. Wannamaker. New York: Anthroposophic Press, 1950. Pp. x + 280. \$3.50.
- TEMPLE, PATRICK J., S.T.D. *Pattern Divine or Our Lord's Hidden Life*. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1950. Pp. xii + 389. \$5.00.
- THOMAS AQUINAS, ST. *De Principiis Naturae*. Introduction and critical text by John J. Pauson. Fribourg: Société Philosophique, 1950. Pp. 111.
—. *In Aristotelis Libros De Sensu et Sensato. De Memoria et Reminiscentia Commentarium*. Turin: Marietti, 1949. Pp. viii + 130. Lire 500.
—. *In Decem Libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nichomachum*. Turin: Marietti, 1949. Pp. xv + 611. Lire 1800.